Daily Times

Global efforts to halt the quantitative and qualitative nuclear arms race by preventing nuclear weapons testing started less than a decade after the first nuclear explosive test was carried out in Alamogordo, New Mexico in 1945. On the larger nonproliferation canvas, a global ban on nuclear explosions has remained one of the oldest agenda items. Arms control advocates have consistently pushed for the adoption of a treaty banning all nuclear explosions but no binding framework could be put in place. To date, more than 2,050 nuclear tests have been carried out at 60 different locations around the globe.

As the existential threat posed by the existence of nuclear weapons has emerged once again, following a revival of the nuclear arms race, a new momentum is gathering for a worldwide ban on nuclear testing. For more than two decades, nuclear experts have been considering the ratification of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) a landmark step towards achieving this goal. However, the treaty remains stuck in limbo due to politically difficult domestic processes in some countries and ‘after you’ domino politics. It has now been more than 17 years since the CTBT was opened for signature. As of December 31, 2013, more than 180 states have signed the CTBT and 159 have ratified it. A deadlock exists because article XIV of the CTBT makes the ratification by 44 states with commercial or research nuclear reactors a necessary requirement for the treaty to become legally binding. Of those 44 specified states, the US, China, Pakistan, Iran, Israel, India, Egypt and North Korea are showing reluctance to ratify the treaty.

Under the present circumstances, the chances for ratification of the CTBT by the unwilling countries are very slim. With China linking its ratification process to that of the US and Pakistan waiting for India to ratify first, achieving entry into force of the treaty has been a daunting challenge. After the CTBT was defeated by the US Senate in 1999, the Bush administration made little effort to promote it though US ratification could also spur Egypt and Israel to sign and ratify the treaty. President Obama, on many occasions during his first term, expressed strong commitment to the CTBT but later it slipped down his agenda due to other domestic political concerns. In order to break this deadlock, many non-nuclear-weapon states are considering the option of ‘provisional application’ of the CTBT until article XIV’s conditions are met in full.

This approach will not only enable the consenting states to avoid unnecessary political obstacles but will also strengthen nuclear test ban regimes. Without violating the provisions of article XIV of the treaty, this approach is likely to increase pressure on other countries to accelerate their ratification processes. The CTBT, after it is provisionally applied by a large number of states, will have enhanced legal status, increasing the political costs of violation. In this way, the treaty would provide a stronger legal basis for collective UN action against the violator and there would be a glimmer of hope to prevent failure of the ‘test ban’ norm.

According to article 25 of the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, “a treaty or part of a treaty is applied provisionally pending its entry into force if: (a) the treaty itself so provides or if the negotiating states have in some other manner so agreed.” The CTBT does not rule out the provisional application and even during the negotiations over entry-into-force requirements the idea of provisional application was discussed by many states as a way to prevent a handful of other states from exercising a veto. Thus the CTBT can take legal effect for those who wish to abide by the agreement. Though not binding on those who remain outside, the treaty in provisional force would be more likely to act as a brake on further ‘me too’ testing.

A major criticism levelled against the provisional application of the CTBT is based on the apprehension that the US, which contributes a fifth of the overall costs of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty Organisation, may not like this step and limit its funding to the CTBTO. Such fears are exaggerated because any such decision to cut down funding to the CTBTO would be far more costly to Washington in terms of political influence against nuclear proliferation. Also, the provisional application of the CTBT can be expected to tilt US public opinion in favour of ratification and bring the US Senate under added pressure to ratify the CTBT. And once the US ratifies the treaty, the remaining states will rapidly follow suit due to the fear of being left out of influential posts. The technological advances in the global nuclear test monitoring system have already made it easier to detect underground nuclear tests with a yield of even less than one kiloton. The entry-into-force of the CTBT will also make on-site inspections possible. Over the past few years, the US and Russia are spending billions of dollars on modernising their nuclear forces. And there are very genuine apprehensions that China is also planning to miniaturise its nuclear weapons. Thus the CTBT, after taking full legal effect, would be a major contribution to nonproliferation goals by restraining countries with nuclear weapons capability from further modernising their nuclear forces.

The writer is a research scholar and a former visiting fellow at the Monterey Institute of International Studies, California. He can be reached at rizwanasghar7@hotmail.com)