Daily Times

Wars, as Clausewitz suggests,are violent clashes of opposing wills, each seeking to prevail over the other. Among the tomes of treatises on warfare by the Prussian General, considered a guru on war strategy and philosophy, this is a simple yet profound observation, one that can be neglected only at the peril of defeat.In the current unconventional and asymmetric warfare that the state of Pakistan is engaged in against the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), the latter, despite no recourse to the teachings of Clausewitz or for that matter any formal academic training in warfare, are applying this simple principle against Pakistan very effectively.

Combining a psychological warfare blitz with random but sensational attacks on key national installations and targeting high profile political and military/police personnel who are engaged in anti-TTP operations, they have virtually caused a paralysis in the decision making capability of the present politico/military leadership. Only after the elevation of the rabid Fazlullah as the head of the TTP, they appear to have overplayed their hand, giving a much needed wakeup call to the leadership and the administration, which have finally realised that the Taliban’s terror can no longer be tolerated.

All political and social indicators point towards comprehensive military action against the Taliban threat and a major air/land assault on the militant stronghold appears imminent. Contrary to what some may expect, this new offensive will be planned and executed on a strategy different from what was witnessed in the Swat (Rah-e-Raast) and South Waziristan (Rah-e-Nijaat) campaigns because the circumstances are dissimilar. The earlier two were joint air/land operations operating on combined destruction and space oriented strategies. The current campaign most likely will also be a joint air/land one where destruction rather than capture and holding of space would be the paramount objective.

A study of US drone attacks since they began in 2004 and TTP reactions reveals an interesting phenomenon that betrays the mindset of the current leadership. From 2004 to 2007, only 10 drone strikes were registered, leading to the assassination of Nek Muhammad, the TTP commander. The numbers spiked during the first term of President Obama and, by 2012, about 333 drone strikes were reported,which resulted in the killing of a single high profile TTP commander, BaitullahMehsud.The target selection then was based on the signature strike concept whereby drone commanders were given the authority to go after individuals or groups that to them appeared to be militants. During this period it was Pakistan rather than the TTP leadership that was vehemently protesting the drone incursions in FATA. In 2013,Obama introduced a radical change in drone target selection. Signature targeting was abandoned and instead, attacks on high value targets,which included key Taliban/TTP commanders, were ordered. As a result, during 2013, while the number of drone strikes werereduced to just 15, at least five high level TTP commanders, including HakeemullahMehsud, were eliminated.

Successful revolutionary leaders like Lenin, Mao and Ho Chi Minh had a mass followinsg and lived by the principles they preached and espoused. The current lot of Taliban leaders do not meet those exacting standards. HakeemullahMehsud’s million-dollar mansion in Mir Ali came to light when he was assassinated by a US drone strike during one of his rare visits there. Fazlullah and his mentor, Sufi Mohammad, are known to persuade, nay brainwash, young vulnerable children and prepare them for suicide attacks with the promise of hoors(beautiful women) in the hereafter but would not remotely consider allowing themselves or their own kith and kin to volunteer for such ‘noble’ acts. They would rather enjoy some heavenly promises right here, right now, rather than in the hereafter.

When TTP foot soldiers were being killed by the drones its leadership did not appear to be perturbed and might even have viewed it as a blessing in disguise since it helped them in both propaganda warfare and recruitment of more foot soldiers and suicide bombers from a traumatised local population. When the drones turned their fury primarily towards the rebel leadership, suddenly the cessation of drone strikes became their principle demand for any peace talks with Pakistan, knowing well that Pakistan had little sway in the matter. The new drone policy has rattled the current TTP leadership, revealing their Achilles heel:their own survival rather than that of the ‘cause’.

The topography of North Waziristan, compared to Swat and even South Waziristan, is formidable, very suitable for guerrilla warfare. Clearing and holding spaces there would require enormous military effort, which would be difficult even for a superpower like the US. Besides, North Waziristan is now just the tip of the iceberg as the Taliban cancer has now spread into the rural and urban areas of the country on a scale where eliminating them through the use of force would result in casualties on a massive scale. The strategy for military operations should now shift from targeting the foot soldiers to going after the head of the serpent, the leadership.

Pakistan’s armed forces’ impending major assault on the TTP should, therefore, be built on the policy of deliberate, accurate, ferocious and no holds-barred attacks on the rebel leadership. In the tribal belts this is best accomplished by a combination of air power and raids by the special services group and, in the urban areas, through the use of police and paramilitary forces. Fast, accurate and actionable intelligence is essential if this strategy is to bear fruit. Suitable laws should be promulgated where zero tolerance is shown towards individuals or groups harbouring or aiding militant leaders in any manner, and their prosecution should be conducted swiftly but fairly. If this strategy is implemented successfully, the TTP movement is likely to either collapse or their leaders will beg for peace on terms acceptable to the state.

The strategy outlined must form the ‘scarlet thread’ of military manoeuvre but it does not imply that other military actions should not be a part of the overall military plan. Besides, other strands of strategies, like exposing the hollowness of the TTP’s Islamic credentials, reformation and monitoring of the madrassas (seminaries), barring any religiously motivated hate speeches from the seminaries and mosque pulpits and enhancing the capabilities and quality of the police force, among many other measures must be implemented simultaneously. Failing to do so will lead to failure even if the military offensive decisively eliminates the current TTP threat. Finally, in this nature of warfare, the struggle may continue for a long period — the nation and its people have to display courage, patience and sacrifice no matter how long it takes. In short, the state’s stamina and resolve to fight to the finish must exceed those of the rebels.

The writer is a defence analyst and director of Centre of Airpower Studies and can be reached at jamal4701@yahoo.co.uk