Daily Times

The Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) is miffed. Like children losing a game, they are crying foul. In a statement after the death of Asmatullah Shaheen, they claimed that this was an irreparable loss, that the Pakistan government was responsible for his killing and that it was on the warpath to eliminate the Taliban. The statement almost reads as if the TTP was surprised that the government had started to consider them a threat to the Pakistani state. The post-Asmatullah Shaheen death statement almost had the feel of a ‘you too, Brutus’ to it.

I welcome the military offensive, although I am not entirely sure if I can call it that. When you have lost more than 40,000 citizens, when your soldiers have been beheaded, your actions should be called defence and not offence but perhaps I am pen pricking. What is more important is to try to share some questions that need a little clarity. Does the limited, or in future the probable full-fledged, military operation reflect a policy change of the civil and military establishment? In other words, will the military operation (selective, targeted or blanket as the case may be) include all the TTP and their allied groups or will we continue the policy of picking and choosing between militants? Political parties like the Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaaf (PTI) and large sections of the ruling PML-N are of the opinion that it should not be inclusive. The ‘milder’ groups or those who want to negotiate with the government should not be targeted. This thinking also seems to be reflected in the National Security Policy (NSP). However, who is to guarantee that today’s negotiating Taliban group does not turn even more rogue tomorrow? A cursory glance at the recent history of deals would show that the TTP and its allies have rather fickle temperaments and short-term memories.

Speaking of picking and choosing, an important question is whether or not the military operation, targeted or otherwise, will target the Hafiz Gul Bahadur group. Hafiz Gul Bahadur has a rather love/hate relationship with the civilian and military establishment. Hate with the former and a kind of friends-with-benefits kind of relationship with the latter. The head of the Utmanzai Wazirs, Hafiz Gul Bahadur has a strong support group within the military establishment due to past services rendered. He is a classic example of being a strong ally on account of being considered a good strategic asset by the military. He has reportedly been the ‘buffer’ for the khakis in Waziristan since 2007 and is rumoured to be not only an ally of the army but also someone who offers local hospitality and logistical support to the Afghan Taliban. During the 2005 army operation against al Qaeda in Waziristan, he stood against the army but then, in September 2006, he negotiated with the military. It was during these negotiations that Haji Gul Bahadur agreed to withdraw support to foreign militants and not provide sanctuaries to terrorist tourists such as the Uzbeks and the Chechnyans. However, as a source privy to post-2006 events remarked, “Haji Gul Bahadur agreed to purge his area of foreigners. However, the militants who had married into the tribe were no longer foreigners but family.” It is also important to mention that, in spite of being an army strategic asset, Haji Gul Bahadur used to operate according to his own will on some matters. As recently as two years back, the political administration took the step of withdrawing honorariums and a cessation of issuance of passports and national identity cards in an effort to pressurise him to stop attacks against the polio drops field workers. However, despite ‘good relations’ with the military, Haji Gul Bahadur considered the attacks against the polio teams to be kosher. Since the protection of polio teams is not a priority for the military brass, they preferred to look the other way.

Thus, as Haji Gul Bahadur’s case shows, it is pertinent to rethink our definition of strategic assets — there should be a different basis of judging whether a militant group has laid down arms or not. If the military operation does not reflect this thinking, another military operation would have to be conducted against a new brand of rogue militants a few years down the line.

Secondly, we keep hearing about how the TTP is not a homogenous group but has a lot of sub-groups. True, but it also has a lot of allies and, for want of a better word, ‘sub-contractors’. I have written at length previously in this space about how militant groups have somewhat clearly marked areas of operation. There are groups that operate only in Afghanistan, others specialise in Kashmir and some of them focus their activities only in Pakistan. Just to remind our readers, over the years our definition of a ‘good’ and ‘bad’ militant is that assets are those who focus outside Pakistan and bad militants are those who focus within the country as per the prescribed framework, like the Hizbul Islami, LeT and LeJ to name a few. Those who tend to become ambitious within Pakistan (as most have the tendency to do) tend to be seen as rogue.

Given this context, how many militant groups will be targeted if at all? Is the operation and/or the NSP geared towards the rogue Taliban only or are other militant groups, sub-groups and contractors also being considered? After all, the TTP is not the only militant group in Pakistan. Will the militant groups allied with major political parties also be targeted? If we are not to lament the killing of another 40,000 Pakistanis in the coming years, it is important that today, when some semblance of a military operation is underway, these questions are addressed in the interests of peace.

The writer is a development consultant. She tweets at @GulminaBilal and can be reached at coordinator@individualland.com