Daily Times

The professionalisation of intelligence cooperation, or at least efforts leading in that direction, became increasingly necessary when the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) and Afghan Taliban extended their terrorist networks beyond their spheres of influence. Heightened, sustained vigilance and a coherent approach to a professional intelligence mechanism are considered central to countering their way of misgovernment. Worse can emerge; when thinking in terms of the professionalisation of intelligence cooperation, its counter or antithesis, namely poor intelligence sharing, can increasingly become the dominant theme.

The issue of professionalising intelligence cooperation in Afghanistan has received little attention since the majority of foreign intelligence agencies in the country do not sincerely cooperate on matters involving shared intelligence. Afghan intelligence agencies operate inside Pakistan, while Pakistani intelligence agencies operate in Afghanistan. Thus the issue of intelligence sharing remains a paper truth, not a ground reality. The activities of the Afghan National Directorate of Security (NDS) and Research and Analysis Mili Afghan (RAMA), different Indian agencies, and the Israeli MOSSAD in various parts of Afghanistan, particularly along the Durand Line, have long been the subject of conjecture and supposition. These agencies usually adhere to their national interests; they do not necessarily want to share their collected data with the US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and other NATO agencies, or the Pakistani Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI).

In his 2011 speech, US Defence Secretary, Chuck Hagel accused India of financing problematic groups against Pakistan and Afghanistan. Such statements further increased the gulf in trust between Kabul and Islamabad. Islamabad also complained that two of its neighbours, India and Iran, are secretly bidding to destabilise Pakistan using Afghan soil. India rejected these allegations and stated that they were nothing more than an attempt to pressure India to scale back its activities in Afghanistan. India understands that its presence in Afghanistan has promoted it to a regional power in global terms. In 1999, Pakistan enjoyed the same position, but now India has become a rising global power. These allegations and the war of words halted the process of intelligence sharing among India, Iran, Pakistan and Afghanistan.

The International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) established different intelligence units, but most of its secret operations are carried out by individual states in Afghanistan. The CIA does not share all information with its allies while German intelligence agencies have their own operational role in Kabul and northern Afghanistan. The ISI is no doubt a professional organisation but its changeable loyalties have made it suspect in the eyes of most Pakistani citizens. The ever-changing shape of its alliance with the CIA raised deep and serious questions about it.

Outside the Middle East, intelligence cooperation and sharing partners have been instrumental in the roundup of terror leaders in the subcontinent. With Pakistan’s proximity to Afghanistan and its links with insurgent groups, its intelligence support has been critical in the War on Terror in Afghanistan. As a full-fledged partner of the US, Pakistan provided an air corridor, logistics, and intelligence support. Mutual trust between the two states remained fundamental in their critical intelligence cooperation. Despite this, intelligence cooperation between Pakistan and the US represents one of the most significant challenges in Afghanistan. The exponentially growing terrorist networks of the TTP and Afghan Taliban in Pakistan and Afghanistan necessitate increased cooperation among the intelligence agencies of ISAF-NATO and the ISI, NDS and Iranian intelligence, but in reality, none is willing to share their intelligence with any other. The present new emphasis on intelligence sharing between the CIA and ISI creates new challenges. The CIA relationship with the ISI has arguably been one of the most complicated intelligence partnerships in South Asia. Challenges persist in fostering closer CIA and ISI cooperation on Afghanistan, though both states appear publicly committed to fostering closer relationship in the areas of counterterrorism, law enforcement and border control.

After the Swat and Abbottabad operations in 2009 and 2011 respectively, the CIA-ISI relationship raised serious questions. Suspicion grew, the two sides became near adversaries. The arrest of Raymond Davis in Lahore, and the US’s unfriendly attitude towards Pakistan, further complicated relations between the two states. Meanwhile, intelligence sharing and cooperation between the two intelligence communities completely stopped. As far as Afghan intelligence is concerned, in fact, extending intelligence cooperation to the ISI was not in its control — external powers have the Afghan remote-control in their hands. US intelligence officials recently disclosed that their country’s intelligence network is one of the largest in the world — the Agency has more than 1,000 personnel, including operatives and technical staff. Moreover, there are a number of intelligence sub-units, like the Serious Organised Crime Committee (CCSC) and Military Counterterrorism Investigation Group with 3,000 soldiers from the Afghan army, working under the CIA across Afghanistan. All these units, Blackwater, NDS, and other private intelligence companies, have different intelligence cultures. Their relations with the main CIA are also strained. Russian intelligence experts recently iterated the exaggerated capabilities of the CIA in Afghanistan and said it does not give any wider role to the intelligence agencies of other NATO and ISAF member states.

Disagreement between EU member states and the CIA also negatively affected the professionalisation of intelligence cooperation. Fundamental divergences regarding the way terrorism should be tackled, and the US’s unprofessional approach to the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, estranged partners and hindered the advance of intelligence cooperation. In Afghanistan, the CIA closely worked with Northern Alliance war criminals and drug smugglers. Therefore the roots of Afghan intelligence are in northern Afghanistan. Pashtuns were marginalised and the Taliban who accepted the new administration were targeted. Intelligence was skewed to meet immediate operational needs, rather than directed to build up a multidimensional picture of key actors, context and dynamics.

The ranking US commander in Afghanistan, Major General Michael Flynn in his report complained about the poor intelligence cooperation in Afghanistan. Military officers and civilians working with ISAF are non-cooperative and do not share a single word with each other. There is no common database, no common strategy and no common thinking among the ISAF allies. The lack of digital networks available to all participating states raised serious questions about their partnership in the war on terrorism in Afghanistan.

The writer is the author of the book Whose Army? and can be reached at zai.musakhan222@gmail.com