Daily Times

There is an abundance of literature on civil-military relations in general and military intervention in particular. The majority of existing works, in my view, are society-oriented whereby the military is not viewed as a different institution. Rather, it is assumed as part and parcel of a given society. Hence, it is not considered immune from the sociology and psychology of a society. Huntington, Finer, Janowitz and recently Rebecca Schiff have extensively highlighted the ‘sociological’ side of the militaries of Asia, Africa and Latin America — the regions with comparatively interventionist militaries. Quite contrary to the foregoing, a student of Huntington, Peter Feaver, questioned the earlier perspectives both empirically and theoretically. Feaver argued that concepts such as cultural values of a society and ‘professionalism’ cannot explain the phenomenon and practice of the coup d’état completely. In certain cases, even professional and culturally homogenous militaries have staged coups against the same society.

To explain this puzzle, Feaver proposed an ‘agency’ theory of civil-military relations. The agency here does not mean an intelligence agency such as the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) or Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). Rather, in purely ontological terms, agency points to someone’s inherent ability to make things happen. In other words, in a given context, if A is able to make his or her preference prevail over B or C — or both — this very fact points to A’s agency. Importantly, agency theory is grounded in another important theory of social sciences: rational choice. This marriage with rational choice makes agency theory more explanatory since it also assumes actors and stakeholders to be both agentive and rational (in a cost-benefit analysis). Feaver, in the view of this writer, has applied his agency model to the US’s case quite convincingly. Owing to empirical dissimilarities with the US’s case, this writer has modified and applied agency theory to the case of Pakistan during his doctoral research. In so doing, four actors are assumed in the Pakistan case, namely, politicians, civil bureaucracy, judiciary and the military. These actors interact with each other both strategically and rationally. Each actor, in a given context, tends to maximise its political and economic interests, and strives to assume the principal position in the civil-military relations matrix of Pakistan.

At partition, the politicians led by Jinnah and Liaquat assumed the principal-ship of Pakistan’s politics and the state constitutionally, legally, politically and morally. The three remaining actors acted as agents. Nevertheless, the civil bureaucracy’s preference prevailed post-Liaquat Ali Khan’s assassination and it ruled Pakistan as the principal actor till October 1958. The military and the judiciary, for that matter, worked as agents. From the agency perspective, the military rationally and strategically allied with the bureaucracy to accrue strategic and economic benefits, i.e. US aid. Because that was a ‘structural’ continuation of military rule, there was no need to stage coups.

Paradoxically, however, the 1958 martial law was technically declared by Iskander Mirza though in strategic interaction with the Ayub-led military. Since Mirza wanted to maximise his and his parent institution’s interests, he was packed off. From late October 1958, the military, for the first time in Pakistan’s political history, acted as the principal. Interestingly, a section of bureaucrats, politicians and judiciary allied with the military rationally. Each saw to its own interests rather than the larger interests of Pakistan. Ayub Khan had to resign in the context of agitation politics since the cost of confrontation was deemed high.

Yahya Khan staged the second coup to deal with the agitators. However, measuring the cost, he announced democratisation. It worked since populist politicians left no time in starting to participate in electoral politics. Unfortunately, the politicians’ and the military’s preference could not converge post-elections and Pakistan was partitioned. Importantly, however, the military could not continue as the principal due largely to demoralisation and (internal) criticism. Contextually, the Bhutto-led politicians acted as ‘civilian’ principal. This change also reflects the non-structural nature of civil-military relations. Had the military been structurally (sociologically) embedded in Pakistan’s state and society, it would have continued as the dominant force. Interestingly, Bhutto affected the organisational makeup of the civil bureaucracy, judiciary and, importantly, the military.

Before Bhutto could achieve his vision fully, his government was dismissed as a result of the third coup staged by the Zia-led military. Here, it is useful to note the anti-military measures adopted by Bhutto, showing that if and when the military’s institution is affected, there is a strong probability of a backlash in terms of a coup. However, the coup’s timing was decided by the military itself, contextually and rationally. Interestingly, a section of politicians, the judiciary and bureaucracy chose to side with the new principal. From 1977 till now, the military has been the principal actor in the politics and the state of Pakistan. The 1999 and 2007 coups were staged to teach agents a lesson since they attempted to question and challenge the military’s principal-ship.

Could there be a sixth coup? Given the most recent divergence of choice between the military led by General Raheel Sharif and Nawaz Sharif-led politicians, there is less likelihood of a coup since Sharif (and others) seemed to have learned from the 1999 episode. Also, there seems to be a strategic understanding between politicians, the judiciary and the military over the Musharraf affair. In this case, the military’s presence in domestic and foreign policy is constrained and, in case the military does not revisit its stay-as-principal policy, there is then a strong probability of a sixth coup. Contextually then, a section of politicians and the bureaucracy, if not the judiciary, is expected to side with the military and maximise politically and economically.

The writer is a DAAD fellow. He holds a PhD in political science and works as assistant professor at Iqra University, Islamabad. He tweets @ ejazbhatty