Daily Times

The tense standoff between China and Vietnam continues in the South China Sea. It started when China deployed a giant oilrig in the waters with contested sovereignty. Vietnam resisted it, resulting in skirmishes between their naval vessels. So far there has been no exchange of firepower, with the incidents confined to ramming of ships and use of water cannons. According to Hanoi’s account, “On May 4, Chinese ships rammed two Vietnamese Sea Guard vessels. Chinese ships, with air support, sought to intimidate Vietnamese vessels. Water cannon was used.” The contested islands, the Paracels and Spratlys, and the waters around them are said to be rich in oil and fishery. The recent anti-China riots in Vietnam added another dimension to an already difficult relationship.

China also claims much of the South China Sea as its territorial waters, which makes it an issue that also concerns the US. The US is involved for two reasons. First, it has a string of security alliances with some regional countries that are in dispute with China over the sovereignty question, like Japan in the East China Sea and the Philippines in the South China Sea. Though the US does not have any security treaty with Vietnam, both Hanoi and Washington are developing close ties, which might also come to encompass military relations.

Who would have thought that Vietnam and the US would start coming together, considering the history of the war that brought so much destruction to Vietnam? Indeed, the US waged war against Vietnam in the 1960s and parts of the 1970s to prevent the spread of communism in the region in what was then called the domino theory. And in that long struggle, communist China was Vietnam’s political and strategic ally. However, since the occupation by China of the Paracel islands in 1974, which Vietnam claimed, and their contested sovereignty over the Spratlys, their relations have never been the same. This new bout of tensions and skirmishes is bringing the US and Vietnam closer. The US state department spokeswoman, for instance, said that Washington was “strongly concerned about dangerous conduct and intimidation by vessels [of China] in the disputed area”. Beijing’s response has been dismissive, with its foreign ministry spokeswoman saying that the deployment of the oil rig had nothing to do with the US or Vietnam. In other words, China was in its own territorial waters.

The second reason for US concern over China’s control over much of the South China Sea is that Beijing might interfere with the freedom of navigation through its busy sea lanes, adversely affecting world trade and the movement of its naval fleet. China and the US almost collided in the South China Sea recently. Last December, for instance, when China’s new aircraft carrier, the Liaoning, was patrolling contested waters of the South China Sea, it came close to clashing with a US cruiser shadowing it at a distance. The US ship reportedly saved the situation by taking evasive action. Earlier, in 2009, there was another incident that might have gotten out of hand. The possibility of more such incidents and worse cannot be ruled out. While China would like to drive the US out of the Asia-Pacific, Washington seems equally determined to maintain its naval supremacy.

One puzzling thing though about China’s assertion of power in the region is: why is Beijing virtually antagonising almost all its regional neighbours (it has maritime boundary disputes with six of its Asia-Pacific neighbours), pushing them to strengthen and/or forge new defence links with the US? It might be recalled that Deng Xiaoping, the leader who put China on its new path in the post-Mao period, had counselled that China should “hide our capabilities and bide our time”. At that time, Beijing was in the process of modernising the country by growing its economy and military capabilities. In the last few years, Beijing has apparently come to the conclusion that it no longer needs to hide its capabilities. It is now the second largest economy in the world and is emerging as a superpower with military capability to match. It might not be itching for a fight but, at the same time, is not squeamish about proclaiming its writ over much of the region by way of asserting sovereignty over the surrounding seas, as the US did in the 19th century in the western hemisphere by way of proclaiming the Monroe Doctrine. It sure is creating serious tensions with some of its neighbours like Vietnam, the Philippines and Japan. There is risk in this of starting a conflagration but Beijing would seem to think that these risks, if at all, are manageable.

There are reasons for this line of thinking. First and foremost, China would like to believe that it has time on its side, considering its long history. Though the US is still the top power, it might not remain in this league for long. By most accounts, China is likely to overtake the US as an economic power in about a decade. In the meantime, it is militarily powerful enough to create sufficient risk for the US to keep away from any major involvement in a regional conflict. In other words, the US might voice much support for its allies and provide them some weapons and logistical support, but it would, most likely, stay away from any direct military confrontation with China. Therefore, for China, the risk of pushing its regional sovereignty is manageable.

Second, even though China has maritime boundary disputes with a number of regional countries, it is unlikely that they will all form a united front against China. The recent Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) meeting in Myanmar failed to produce a joint statement critical of China. The most it did was caution restraint and peaceful resolution. At the same time, they have growing trade ties with China. They would hate to lose China’s expanding market. Third, although the US is critical of China, it does not seem keen to get involved militarily. There is a general feeling that the US has been weakened by its wars in Afghanistan and Iraq and hit hard by the global financial crisis. Therefore, China might be right to think that time is on its side and if it were to persist with its sovereignty agenda, the chips would fall into place.

The only caveat though is that China has enough political, social and economic issues to resolve, which might pose serious domestic problems for the Communist Party’s monopoly on power. The pursuit of national power, against the backdrop of China’s humiliation in the 19th and right through to the mid-20th century appears a sufficiently powerful banner to rally people around the party. However, things rarely work out smoothly and many things can go wrong. In that case, we might be in for dangerous times.

The writer is a senior journalist and academic based in Sydney, Australia. He can be reached at sushilpseth@yahoo.co.au