Daily Times

I do not know what prompted Major General (retd) Athar Abbas, the former Director General (DG) of the Inter Services Public Relations (ISPR), to reveal to foreign media at this stage that the military was prepared to launch a North Waziristan operation by 2011 and that it was General Kayani’s dithering that delayed the operation, thus allowing the militants to further entrench their positions. I think the most important fact reiterated by General Abbas was the truth already known to all — that our foreign policy, of which Pakistan’s policy towards religious militants is a part, was and is heavily influenced by the army. The army chief has indeed been the lynchpin of this policy. No doubt, General Kayani as army chief was the main decision maker regarding the North Waziristan operation but there were some very complex political, military and strategic considerations before him. These considerations must have weighed heavily on General Kayani’s mind and eventually pushed him into indecisiveness on the issue of the operation. It would be instructive to briefly analyse some of these considerations.

After the successful conclusion of operations in Swat and South Waziristan, from where the army has still not returned completely, General Kayani perhaps thought that opening the North Waziristan front would stretch the army too thin. Our so-called strategic assets in the Haqqani network and the pro-Pakistan Hafiz Gul Bahadar group were also based in North Waziristan and we had not yet made up our minds to move against them. Even today, the army’s exact policy towards these groups is ambiguous, in spite of ISPR statements about carrying out an operation against all militant groups irrespective of their past links. It seems that, in 2011, the army did have the support of the PPP federal government but the government must have been very tentative in this support because the two most popular rightwing parties in the country, the PML-N and the Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaaf (PTI), were not in favour of a military operation at all. Religious parties like the JUI-F and Jamaat-e-Islami (JI) were also strongly against any operation. General Kayani perhaps also feared that certain proscribed militant organisations that were still patronised by the army, like the Jamat-ud-Dawa and Lashkar-e-Jhangvi, could also turn against the army and the government in case of further military operations. The fear of blowback from the operation and the issue of Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) must have also influenced General Kayani’s decision. US pressure to ‘do more’ was at its peak in 2010 to 2011, which created a lot of resentment amongst the generally conservative Pakistani masses. Any operation carried out at that time would have been considered an operation carried out under US pressure and thus not supported by the masses.

As could be seen from General Abbas’ interview, the army as a whole was prepared for the North Waziristan operation but the presence of certain elements within the army who were against the operation cannot be ruled out. An important question that begs an answer is: if an operation in Northern Waziristan was not carried out in 2011, why is it being carried out today? The simple answer to that question would be that the monster of terrorism was growing in size and our very existence was at stake. It had to be now or never. General Raheel’s personality in many ways is also more assertive than that of his more cautious predecessor, General Kayani, although it is said that personalities do not matter much at that stage. Soon after assuming charge as the new Chief of Army Staff (COAS), General Raheel gave the order for automatic retaliation to Pakistani troops in case of a militant attack. General Raheel, earlier as DG Training and Evaluation, had for the first time in Pakistan’s history, declared the internal militant threat to Pakistan to be of a higher magnitude than the threat from India.

On the other hand, there are many similarities between General Kayani’s time and the present. General Raheel faces some of the same considerations that General Kayani did: lack of firm political support, the issue of blowback from the operation and the question of IDPs. The only difference this time was that the subversive activities of the militants, especially after the attack on Karachi airport, reached such a critical mass that an operation became inevitable. General Raheel waited patiently as the farcical talks between the government and the Taliban took place. Once the talks broke down, as they were bound to, General Raheel — I believe correctly — presented the alternative of military operation to the government as a fait accompli. Secular parties like the PPP, MQM and ANP declared their full support for the operation. The rightwing PTI reluctantly supported the operation because it did not want to annoy the army. Even today it seems to be looking for pretexts to ask the army to stop the operation. Religious parties like the JI and the JUI-F have opposed the operation.

The military it seems has undertaken a re-evaluation of sorts. It seems that it has crossed the Rubicon, where strategic assets do not matter as much as they did some time ago. This is not to say that they do not matter at all. Some senior analysts believe that so-called strategic assets, especially the Haqqanis, are still being preserved by putting them in a camp deep in North Waziristan. The army under General Raheel also seems prepared for the blowback from the operation as a legitimate price to be paid for our existence as a nation. The masses generally seem to be in favour of the operation, as they have become fed up of living in perpetual fear. The care of the IDPs is certainly a very important issue. The displaced people have made tremendous sacrifices for the sake of all Pakistanis. The government and non-governmental agencies should make every effort to make their stay as comfortable as possible. The only thing that the government and the army should be careful about are ‘Islamic’ NGOs like Falah Insaniat of Jamat-ud-Dawa and other NGOs working under the aegis of proscribed organisations like Jaish-e-Mohammad and others. These welfare organisations are known to radicalise and recruit people through their welfare work. The state and army should sever their links with all militant ‘Islamic’ organisations no matter what hue and stripe they are.

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