Daily Times

Domestic politics and international relations are often somehow entangled but it seems our politicians have not yet sorted out the puzzling tangle. It is fruitless to debate whether domestic politics really determine international relations, or the reverse. The answer to that question is clearly “both, sometimes”. The more interesting questions are: “when” and “how” domestic politics are allowed to overshadow international relations.

The domestic political war is being conducted by Imran Khan, in tandem with Dr Tahirul Qadri. All other political parties, on behalf of the PML-N, seek an end to the conflict, preferably via a negotiated agreement since the army has destroyed the gossip tunnels built by the opposition to carry out back door deals. However, this strategy is at odds with the public mood and the sentiments of a majority of the government. With mounting PTI pressure, Imran’s popularity could be politically disastrous for Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif. Imran can probably continue to muster a majority and he knows that full house political gatherings will be more likely to approve a significant escalation. On Monday night, Imran said the country should be prepared for a prolonged conflict but the military is complaining that it does not know what the politicians want. Senior military officials feel that the political echelon must decide now; either make up or end this political campaign. It is unclear if Imran has achieved the goals that were set for the PTI. The political leadership of the PTI needs to take a decision about whether it is going in further or pulling out of the politics of pressure tactics. However, the army has warned that disposing of Nawaz Sharif by force is not an option and comes with the price that would entail paralysing democracy.

Imran Khan has four basic options: a unilateral end to the campaign and claiming that the demand for the resignation of Nawaz Sharif was just rhetoric, ending the dharnas (sit-ins) as part of a political agreement, expanding the political campaign with the aim of achieving a decisive victory or going for broke and toppling the Nawaz regime. The dilemma is daunting and Imran must weigh domestic pressure for a decisive victory with mounting international pressure for a truce. In the last two months, Imran has adopted the slogan “go Nawaz go”. His popularity rating remains high at present but he is all too aware that an exit strategy perceived by the public as granting Nawaz a victory could mark the beginning of the end of his political career.

What emerges from the present situation is a sense of the intense difficulty for Imran to negotiate successful exit strategies and the extent to which the choices available to him are looking suboptimal. He seems forced to contend with competing pressures. His own party and many of the supporters of the PTI frequently push for early exits. Although many policymakers rightly fear the consequences of continuing till it is too late, Imran is confident to let the game linger in the wake of weak institutions and unresolved conflicts.

Imran Khan unconvincingly demonstrates the planning of an exit strategy necessary to negotiate these competing pressures. One of the central dilemmas encountered, therefore, is whether he will employ a time-specified or a result-dependent strategy. It is argued that, in many cases, time-specified exit strategies can be extremely helpful in reassuring both the supporters that the sit-ins will not be indefinite. However, it is also observed that mandating a specific timeframe for exit can leave little room for flexibility to respond to crises. On the other hand, it is also clear from the current political situation that results-dependent strategies are similarly fraught with difficulty. The holding of midterm elections, whilst essential for the consolidation of democracy, can be a divisive event that threatens to reignite conflict. I would stress that exit must be seen by Imran Khan as a process rather than a discrete event. A successful exit strategy, I would maintain, is one that leaves behind a consolidated peace, a peace maintained rather than a peace merely arrived at.

It is important for Imran Khan to note that an exit strategy must not be confused with an exit date. Setting a specific exit date for withdrawal may prove to be counterproductive. An exit strategy for Imran would define in advance the circumstances and criteria for ending the sit-ins, not setting a specific date for the withdrawal of his demands. The term exit strategy itself is hard to clearly define within political and military circles; in fact, there are various definitions. One definition offered is: “A plan to remove forces once the end state has been achieved and the instruments of power can give way to other instruments.” In other words, for Imran to exit political intervention, the political, economic and other social instruments of power must be able to assume the dominant role. For this to be effective, civil-military cooperation for Imran is essential and must be coherent from the outset so that a realistic and achievable exit strategy can be formulated.

In his numerous public speeches, while avoiding the need for an exit strategy, Imran does not provide information on how he plans to develop and execute an exit strategy. Planning an exit strategy for Imran Khan is difficult because it involves weighing political objectives like Nawaz Sharif’s termination strategy strictly under the rubric of overestimated street power. Like ‘mission creep’ and ‘quagmire’, the use of the term exit strategy tends to raise public frustration when the possibility of an unending result increases. Thus the question of when to formulate an exit strategy from this political conflict is at the forefront of the debate surrounding its use by the PTI and Imran Khan. Many experts believe that the formulation of an exit strategy should ideally have occurred before Imran launched the azaadi (independence) march and vowed to hold his ground until Nawaz Sharif resigned.

Ideally, politicians decide on a set of goals that their movements will achieve. Then they establish a method for measuring progress towards these goals. Next they determine the point at which progress toward the goals would be sufficient to declare political intervention a success. By addressing the exit strategy up front, it ensures measures of effectiveness are formulated and forces the political decision makers to think about the end state before opposition forces are committed. However, different interventions warrant different strategies and there may be good reason for Imran Khan to make long-term commitments to situations that have previously ended in chaotic results. In the dangerous and unpredictable arena of using force, Imran may think that an exit strategy, like any other plan, may not be sustainable and a preconceived exit strategy is sustainable only if it can be militarily forced down the enemies’ throat and remains politically acceptable at home. This means that having an exit strategy in his mind is not the same thing as being able to stick to it.

The writer is a professor of Psychiatry and consultant Forensic Psychiatrist in the UK. He can be contacted at fawad_shifa@yahoo.com