Daily Times

True, in the 21st century, power is widely diffused. Non-state actors share a power chessboard along with state actors. International politics is not the sole province of governments to exercise power anymore. The proliferation of non-state actors and the rise in their power is a global phenomenon. In the strong states of the west, it means the swelling influence of multinational corporations (MNCs). In weak states such as Pakistan, this global trend manifests itself in the rise of militant formations. Here the retreat of state authority leaves behind a power vacuum to give way to non-state actors to perform state-like functions. Nevertheless, with 9/11 as a case in point, non-state actors do strike in strong states as well but that is more of an aberration. A strong state works as a deterrent in denying local support to militant outfits. Is the state recovering from its weakness in Pakistan?

Various developments contribute to a sigh of relief in containing the chaotic matrix of Taliban violence. With the launch of operation Zarb-e-Azb in North Waziristan, the military has deployed nearly 200,000 troops in a counterinsurgency operation in FATA. The backlash from the operation is less intensive. The internal fissures within the ranks of the militants have resulted in the parting of ways and the emergence of new outfits. Some weeks ago, Asmat Muawiyah, the chief of Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan’s (TTP’s) Punjab chapter, announced the switching of his militant activities to Afghanistan. Freelance jihadists — Uzbeks, Chechens, Chinese Uighurs and some Arabs — are moving to Syria. Within the TTP, a bitter internal power struggle over the past year pitted the influential Mehsud tribal faction of the group against Mullah Fazlullah, who has headed the TTP since late 2013. Maulvi Halim, the influential commander within the Hafiz Gul Bahadur camp of non-TTP Taliban, wants Bahadur to sue for peace with the military. As per the claim of the military, 80 percent of North Waziristan has been cleared of militants, including its regional headquarters Miranshah and sub district Mirali. Owing to air strikes, the military has suffered only 44 casualties since the launch of the operation on June 15 while killing more than 900 militants in air bombings other than combat operations. But what is there to worry about?

These latest developments, encouraging though in no way, herald the definitive decline of militants in Pakistan. The state is a human community with a definite boundary that successfully lays claims to the monopoly of legitimate use of political violence. The realists’ premise of “the state is a state is a state” is under question. In August, executed by Uzbeks, the TTP carried out attacks on the PAF’s Samungli airbase and Khalid military airbase, both in Quetta, in response to the ongoing North Waziristan operation. The TTP also carried out the Karachi naval dockyard attack of September 13. Since 2004, no tribal agency has been spared a military operation. Zarb-e-Azb is just the latest. Given the porous nature of the Pak-Afghan border and the presence of militant networks in other tribal agencies and urban centres, the Taliban relocate from one place to another. To quote the latest example, Gul Bahadur has sought sanctuary in Afghanistan’s southeastern Khost province. In a grim reminder of resurging al Qaeda, Ayman al Zawahri, named former Taliban commander Asim Umar as the “emir” of a new South Asia branch of the network. In Karachi, the Jundullah group remains the prime suspect of the attack on SSP Awan’s convoy on September 26, 2014. The TTP’s allegiance to the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) and its support for the ISIS global Islamic caliphate is the harbinger of a nexus in the making. The militant outfit’s spokesman, Shahidullah Shahid, said, “Oh our brothers, we are proud of you in your victories. We are with you in your happiness and your sorrow. We are with you, we will provide you with mujahideen and with every possible support.” IS activists were spotted in Peshawar while distributing IS pamphlets. What about the narrative?

The Islamist militants manipulate narratives to capture the imagination of the masses. Although many have awoken to the danger of Taliban violence, a majority of people still remains incognizant of the impending danger. People may not be sympathetic to the militants’ modus operandi but they do cherish their avowed ambition of an Islamic caliphate. A great number of the masses are reluctant to reject militants outright lest they anger Allah. Parallels are drawn between the difficulties faced by the Prophet (PBUH) and present time Islamists for a just world order. In a similar vein, many among the clergy depict the rise of militants as the vanguard of the Khurasan war, the conflict that, by some Muslim counts, will usher in the prevalence of Muslims over the non-Muslims. This is the Islamists’ variant of the end of history. Jamat ul Ahrar, a breakaway faction of the TTP, envisions global implementation of sharia with Pakistan being the first priority.

What makes ISIS worrisome is not only its trans-border nature but also its significant territorial possessions in Iraq and Syria, almost qualifying for a state without definite borders. The self-declared state has more potential to cause destruction than al Qaeda did. Its symptoms in FATA make ISIS more threatening. Undercutting local support is the key in surmounting the militant challenge. According to Mao Zedong, “The guerrilla must swim in the people as the fish swims in the sea.”

Tackling militancy through hard power only demonstrates the inadequacy of the strategy. Mainstreaming FATA is the answer. Socio-politico-economic development aimed at bringing the periphery at par with the rest of the country is a must. Political mainstreaming, getting rid of FATA’s ‘special status’ by either merging it with Khyber Pakhtunkhwa or making a new province, comes first.

The writer is a freelance journalist stationed in Quetta