Daily Times

Strategically, not much distance is present between the news item that on his recent visit, the Chief of Army Staff (COAS) General Raheel Sharif had been given a red carpet welcome in the US and the news item that US President Barack Obama had silently permitted a residual combat force (numbering about 10,000) in Afghanistan to fight against the Taliban for another year in case, after December 31, they threatened the nascent Afghan government and in case the remnants of al Qaeda resurfaced. These developments are not surprising if one understands the latest doctrines governing US foreign policy.

A doctrine can be understood in terms of a principle that engenders policies and consequently means for their execution. In the context of Pak-US relations, the doctrine of US President Barack Obama can be understood in his two addresses in the beginning of his first term. First, on March 27, 2009, Obama declared his resolve to fight against al Qaeda in both Afghanistan and Pakistan, especially in Pakistan’s lawless tribal belt where al Qaeda had shifted its bases and had silently been waiting to repeat 9/11. The annunciation of this stance prompted the famous Af-Pak strategy, which is a hallmark of the US foreign policy overseeing US relations with Pakistan and Afghanistan. Second, on December 1, 2009 (while speaking to a gathering of US army cadets at the West Point Military Academy, New York), Obama said that Pakistan was key in solving the Afghanistan crisis. In this address, Obama outlined three fundamental elements of his policy towards the Af-Pak region: “A military effort to create the conditions for a transition, a civilian surge that reinforces positive action and an effective partnership with Pakistan.” In effect, the US is now operating in the third element of this policy. Nevertheless, the overarching goal of the policy was to “disrupt, dismantle and defeat al Qaeda in Afghanistan and Pakistan, and to prevent its capacity to threaten the US and [its] allies in the future.” Certainly, General Sharif should have been venerated for launching Operation Zarb-e-Azb.

Though Obama entered the White House in January 2009 with the slogan of change, in some ways the Obama doctrine was a development on the Bush doctrine. The prospective part of the Bush doctrine uttered on June 1, 2002 (on the occasion of the graduation exercise of the US Military Academy, West Point, New York) was this: “[W]e will not hesitate to act alone, if necessary, to exercise our right of self-defence by acting pre-emptively against…terrorists [whether a state or its clients], to prevent them from doing harm against our people and our country…even if uncertainty remain as to the time and place of the enemy’s attack.” This aspect of the Bush doctrine transformed the US view of the world and vice versa. The doctrine generated two main principles: first, to act pre-emptively and second, to act unilaterally, whether the (perceived) enemy is a state or non-state actor.

The doctrine was also the recognition of three points. First, the world had entered a new era of warfare in which not only rogue states but also non-state actors could launch attacks (or wage wars). Secondly, in the (consequent) asymmetrical style of warfare, the initiative could rest with non-state actors. Thirdly, deterrence, which was a functional term during the Cold war, ceased to be functional. Apparently, it was the execution of these principles that has compelled Obama to allow the US residual force in Afghanistan to stay proactive for another year even after December 31, 2014.

Recently, Obama told Nawaz Sharif telephonically that he would not be visiting Pakistan. Instead, he will be visiting India. In the past, US foreign policy paired Pakistan with India in the region. However, since 2000, the US has started viewing India as a partner in economic terms. Then, General Pervez Musharraf was ruling Pakistan. After winning the presidential elections in 2000, Bush also aspired to develop a US-India strategic partnership. With that, the process of de-hyphenation of Pakistan from India started. The appalling incident of 9/11 just hastened the process. Subsequently, there took place cooperation between the US and India in the fields of spaceflight, satellite technology and missile defence.

On the other hand, having sensed the policy change, Pakistan raised a hue and cry but in the context of its vulnerability in the domain of security. No doubt, in 2004, Bush mollified Pakistan by awarding it the status of a Major Non-NATO (MNNA) ally but, in 2005, formal negotiations for a US-India nuclear energy deal started and the famous 123 Agreement was signed in 2008. In this way, Pakistan’s pleading for security backfired. Obama picked up the threads where Bush left off. On March 27, 2009, the Obama doctrine hyphenated Pakistan with Afghanistan and, on December 1, 2009, Obama detached Pakistan further from the US by saying: “In the past, we too often defined our relationship with Pakistan narrowly. Those days are over. Moving forward, we are committed to a partnership with Pakistan that is built on a foundation of mutual interest, mutual respect and mutual trust.” This statement alone changed the contours of the Pak-US relationship, as it happened. For instance, Pakistan was kept in the dark about the Abbottabad Operation in May 2011.

The prescriptive part of the Bush Doctrine, announced on June 1, 2002, was to reform the political societies of the world by introducing democracy and by recognising the importance of human rights where these were suppressed. The Obama doctrine toed the same line. In fact, both doctrines viewed a relationship existing between the emergence of democracy and the decline of extremism. In the Kerry-Lugar-Berman Act, 2009, Pakistan received the prescriptive part of the Obama doctrine. Now, it is up to Pakistan to make policy changes both domestically and regionally that are more acceptable to the US in the future.

The writer is a freelance columnist and can be reached at qaisarrashid@yahoo.com