Daily Times

Adapting a phrase immortalised by former US President John F Kennedy, Afghanistan’s President Ashraf Ghani said during his recent visit to the US, “We do not now ask what the US can do for us; we want to say what Afghanistan will do for itself and for the world.” Kennedy had recognised that to stir his people, he had to give voice to their own deep desires and motivate them to believe they can scale mountains. Ghani probably knows pretty well that the leader and followers must unite around a shared vision. If there is misalignment, a speech is going to make no difference.
The successful visit of the Afghan leadership duo to the US has not only attracted worldwide media attention but has also given rise to optimism in an otherwise uncertain atmosphere characterised by four decades of war, betrayal and suffering. A majority of Afghans seem opposed to living in the ‘ideological’ past. Against all odds, the Afghans have achieved far higher standards of living than they experienced under the fundamentalist Taliban regime. Despite incalculable human losses, liberal inflows of foreign financial and technical assistance have ensured the emergence of a more prosperous Afghanistan where, despite adverse circumstances, girls in large numbers are attending school and thousands of young Afghans are attending institutions of higher learning.
Contrary to widespread apprehensions, Afghanistan achieved a peaceful political transition last year that brought together the major political and ethnic factions of Afghan society, leading to the formation of the unity government. It is a well-known fact that Afghans are remarkably adaptable and resilient people. One should have no doubt that various sorts of political arrangements would emerge before final shape is given to the current state of affairs where President Ashraf Ghani and Chief Executive Officer (CEO) Abdullah Abdullah are delicately sharing power. Apart from reprioritising some domestic policies related to economy and governance, the foreign policy shifts are more visible and fundamental under the new leadership. With Ghani now six months into the presidency, Afghanistan’s posture towards the US and Pakistan has undergone a sea change.
Ever since they began their term, Ghani and Abdullah have been more cooperative with the US than the previous Hamid Karzai regime. Ghani has used every possible opportunity to express his immense gratefulness to the US for the security and economic assistance that it has provided during the last one-and-a-half decades. Ghani has requested US President Barack Obama to agree to keep about 10,000 troops and two military bases in Afghanistan. Much to his satisfaction, the US has agreed to slow down its troop withdrawal plans especially at a time when the Taliban are reported to be bracing themselves for a summer offensive and the self-styled Islamic State (IS) is also reported to have intensified its hunt for Afghan fighters in several Afghan provinces. Questions, however, may arise as to how long the US can be asked to station its troops in Afghanistan. A lot will depend upon the precise nature of their ‘training’ responsibilities.
President Ghani has made sensitive noises in his public commentary on Pakistan. While the strategic interests of Afghanistan may not be identical to those of Pakistan, the large amount of overlap of socio-political networks among the two societies may provide opportunities for cooperation. Ghani has radically toned down enmity and hatred towards Pakistan as was witnessed during Karzai’s tenure. As a friendship gesture of far reaching strategic importance, Ghani has sent some Afghan soldiers to be trained in Pakistan for the first time since the ouster of the Taliban. Under Ghani, Afghanistan has pledged all possible cooperation to Pakistan’s security forces in fighting the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), and Pakistan has reciprocated with a commitment to thwart cross-border attacks against Afghanistan. Most importantly, Pakistan has promised to promote long-stalled and much-needed negotiations with the Taliban.
Reconciliation is the next stage of conflict settlement and cannot be imposed if it is to be of enduring value. Individuals will feel secure only if the society in which they live demonstrates a renewed sense of order and purpose. Though all stakeholders have subscribed to the notion of reconciliation in Afghanistan, not all questions pertaining to reconciliation can be answered easily or convincingly. For example, it remains to be seen how the Taliban can be accommodated in the Afghan power structure. There have been unconfirmed reports of Ghani offering some ministerial positions or governorships to a select group of Taliban leaders. If the Taliban decide to accept this offer, how will it be operationalised?
President Ghani faces the greatest challenge in ensuring that the new political arrangement is capable of withholding pressures to return to the medieval system of governance prior to the Taliban’s overthrow. The repulsive and highly intolerant practices of the Taliban era have not yet become the faint memory of a distant, violent past. Afghan society, which has been confronted with extreme forms of religious intolerance, has yet to become convinced that the liberal principle of freedom of religion should be the bottom line of their democratic state regarding religious plurality.
There are enormous divisions within the Taliban on the practicability of peace talks with the Afghan government. The Taliban political leadership, led by Akhtar Mohammad Mansour, is said to favour negotiations while battlefield commanders, led by Abdul Qayum Zakir, want the fight to continue. The Taliban have been demanding complete withdrawal of foreign troops as the precondition for talks. This demand is going to be one of the major stumbling blocks as President Ghani has insisted on and won pledges of the continued presence of US troops. Ghani’s overtures to Obama may have complicated emerging attempts to achieve reconciliation with the Taliban. And even if Pakistan is sincere in promoting negotiations, what is uncertain here is the level of influence that Pakistan currently wields over the Taliban.
Does all the hype and excitement generated due to Ghani’s tilt towards Pakistan measure well against reality? Apprehensive of Ghani’s overtures towards Pakistan, some experts are asking whether Islamabad’s involvement in Kabul’s misfortunes be covered up and forgotten. Despite the rhetoric of bonhomie, there are many irritants to an eventual rapprochement between Afghanistan and Pakistan that go a long way beyond newfound tactical diplomatic coordination. Thus, before making further concessions to Pakistan’s ever increasing strategic demands, Ghani needs to ask himself what he has received in return for his efforts to woo Pakistan. Can he persuade Pakistan to confront the unwilling Taliban to either engage in peace talks with the Afghan government or leave its territory?
President Ghani has won effusive praise from Pakistan for not pursuing an offer of heavy weaponry from India. Pakistan’s security establishment has every reason to be pleased with the beginning of training of Afghan soldiers in Abbottabad as it has long desired to train Afghan soldiers to provide a counterbalance to training offered by India. The Obama administration has also lauded the positive trajectory in relations between Afghanistan and Pakistan. So, everything seems absolutely perfect right now for Islamabad. However, the conflict in Afghanistan will remain unresolved and no final termination of the conflict will be in sight unless Pakistan realises that rebuilding Afghanistan is essentially a collective enterprise from which India cannot be forced to remain detached.

The writer is an assistant professor at the Department of International Affairs and Security Studies and coordinator at the Centre for Peace and Conflict Studies, Sardar Patel University of Police, Security and Criminal Justice in Jodhpur