Daily Times

There is a general view that Iran is at the forefront of the offensive against the so-called Islamic State (IS). The Iraqi forces simply fled last June when IS almost walked into Mosul, Iraq’s second largest city. This is not to suggest that the Iranian forces are actually doing the fighting against IS. What they have done is put together Shia militias, train them and even equip them, in some cases with some of its commanders in the field leading them. There are, of course, the Iraqi armed forces also in the field but the sea change was the involvement of Iran and militias backed by it. And that was showing results as IS was reportedly pushed back in some parts of Tikrit, the birthplace of Saddam Hussein, thus improving the morale of the Iraqi troops. However, the situation now appears to be stalemated (despite recurrent unconfirmed reports of Iraqi victory in Tikrit), leading the Iraqi government to enlist the US’s help with aerial bombardment of IS positions. That created its own complications as some of the leading militias in the field did not like US involvement as they had hoped to take back Tikrit from IS on their own. But that was sorted out and US aerial assistance is now an integral part of the battle against IS. But that does not mean that the Iraqi army and its allied militias are about to overrun Tikrit. Even if that were to happen, it would not be the end of IS in Iraq. There are several components that complicate Iraq’s story.
The Iraqi state, as it emerged from the decade-long US military intervention, was transformed from a Sunni-dominated machine under Saddam Hussein into a Shia-controlled instrument. And its stint under then Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki seemed largely to hurt its Sunni citizens. Maliki’s Iraq was a state of revenge and there was no pretence of creating a cohesive nation based on inclusion. How far have things changed since Maliki’s replacement? Before we examine this, there is a bit of recent history that is relevant. IS grew out of al Qaeda in Iraq, which was defeated by an alliance between the Sunni tribes and the US forces. Al Qaeda in Iraq had itself emerged out of the ruins of Saddam’s machine. But as it started to turn on the Iraqi Sunni tribes, they made common cause with the US military. At this point the interests of the US forces in Iraq tended to converge with the Sunni tribes. And they coopted them into a shared armed struggle against al Qaeda. They were assured that in the new Iraq the US was creating these Sunni tribal fighters, paid and armed by the US, which would become part of the new Iraqi armed forces.
But when the Shia-dominated state emerged, the US was unable to have this undertaking enforced by the Maliki government. The Maliki government and the country’s Shia majority did not want any Sunni armed group(s) to become part of the country’s armed forces, regarding it as a threat to its new power structure. On the other hand, as pointed out earlier, the new Shia state apparatus turned on the Sunni minority to remind them brutally that the country now had a new power structure more interested in excluding the Sunnis than creating an inclusive democratic state catering to all people and interests. Living in fear of their lives and many experiencing torture, they aligned themselves with the Sunni IS when its forces moved into Mosul and elsewhere. They obviously forgot that IS was a latter day incarnation of al Qaeda in Iraq against which they had collaborated with the US forces. But that was in the past and the new Shia-dominated Iraq was the greater and more immediate danger.
Iraq’s new prime minister, Haider al-Abadi, might succeed where Maliki failed, but it is still too early to say though there are reports that some Sunni tribal leaders are willing to make common cause with the Iraqi armed forces. Whether even this will turn the tide against IS remains to be seen. One important reason why it might not work is that while the Iranian-trained militias are helping to push back IS forces in some areas, Tehran’s leading role in Iraq is not going to be welcome over the medium and long term, signifying its domination, especially by the country’s Sunni population. In other words, the underlying sectarian and regional divide in Iraq is likely to remain a destabilising factor, providing ammunition for IS at critical times.
This divide has an important destabilising dimension in the region as well. Saudi Arabia and its Gulf partners are deeply concerned about Iran’s perceived regional influence already exercised, as they see it, in Tehran’s support for the Bashar al-Assad regime in Syria and its Hezbollah connection, with the latter fighting for the Damascus regime (the developments in Yemen have added a more dangerous dimension that might be examined in a separate article). It is making Riyadh and other Gulf states very nervous as the US appears supportive of Iran’s role against IS, even as the former remain mindful of the threat to their monarchies from IS as the vanguard of new Islamic revival and resurgence. The announcement of the so-called Islamic caliphate is a strong indication of this. And it is already drawing foreign jihadists, even from western countries, to its banner. In other words, there are no easy solutions to untangle the present mess and put together a new cohesive political architecture in Iraq, Syria and the region.
The fragmentation of Iraq, Syria and neighbouring Lebanon has its roots in the arbitrary reconfiguration of these territories as separate states by Britain and France as colonial powers after the dismemberment of the Ottoman Empire in the wake of World War I. Some have suggested that Iraq might be better off if divided along sectarian and regional lines. Will that solve the problem? It does not look like it because that will simply externalise the existing conflicts along the boundaries of new states thus created. This could even make things worse. Besides, the conflict in Iraq, Syria and, by extension, in Lebanon is also regional, with Iran, Saudi Arabia and its Gulf allies fighting proxy wars. The only possible solution is a regional one with neighbouring countries facilitating and underwriting a new agreement rather than aggravating the conflict. In other words, the offensive against IS has to be both political and military. And that, if at all feasible, will be a long process. In the meantime, there is unlikely to be much respite for Iraq and Syria.

The writer is a senior journalist and academic based in Sydney, Australia. He can be reached at sushilpseth@yahoo.co.au