Daily Times

The brutal killing of Avijit Roy in Dhaka on February 27, 2015 is another example of the rise of intolerance in Bangladesh. He was a Bangladesh born US citizen, an atheist blogger and the founder of a blog called Mukto Mano. According to reports, Ansarullah Bangla Team, an Islamist extremist group based in Bangladesh, claimed responsibility for the murder. Before Avijit Roy, in 2013, Rajib Haider was also hacked to death for his blogs, which invited people to be a part of the Shahbag Movement to demand capital punishment instead of the life sentence for the perpetrators of violence during the liberation war of Bangladesh in 1971. Hefajat-e-Islam Bangladesh, which was formed in 2010 to protest against the secular education policy of Bangladesh and also engaged in carrying out violence against protestors in the Shahbag Movement, took responsibility for killing Haider. These two are recent incidents where individuals have been targeted by radical groups. In the past, not only targeted killings but also attacks on groups have been carried out by organisations or individuals regulated by their parent body, the Jamaat-e-Islami (JI).
The level of violence in Bangladesh has not increased abruptly, rather its roots lie in the war of liberation in 1971. In its eastern part, the Pakistani army and its collaborators unleashed violence against its citizens and carried out rapes to mow down the growing dissidence against the state. Those who were fighting for liberation adopted similar means to fulfil their goals. They also engaged in killing non-Bengalis and carrying out physical violence against their women. Once the country was liberated from the yoke of discrimination and exploitation, it was thought that the level of violence would be controlled but that did not happen. Instead, structural violence was used to suppress the dissidents. During Sheikh Mujibur Rehman’s tenure, the Jatiya Rakkhi Bahini (JRB) was created to fight against the Marxist dissident group Gonobahini but the real aim was to silence all dissenters through violent means. After the assassination of Sheikh Mujib in 1975, General Ziaur Rehman came to power. During this period, Ghulam Azam, who was against the creation of Bangladesh and killed many innocent Bengalis during the liberation war, was allowed to return from his exile in London. This was the beginning of radicalism, which strengthened itself in the following decades. Both military dictators and political parties, after democracy returned in 1991, directly or indirectly used radical groups to serve their power interests.
In 2009, acting on popular demand, the Awami League government, under Bangladeshi Prime Minister Ms Sheikh Hasina, re-set up the International War Crime Tribunal (ICT) to try the perpetrators of the 1971 liberation war. Though the ICT’s work has been appreciated, its verdicts have been a reason to inflame violence in Bangladesh. It handed down capital punishment despite facing criticism from international human and civil rights bodies. In reaction to the verdicts, since 2013, the JI and its umbrella organisations have carried out phase-wise violent protests across the country. In a fit of rage, JI cadres have engaged in hurling petrol bombs and, at certain important locations, even crude bombs have been planted. Also, ICT members have failed to use its platform to discuss and debate a few issues that keep Bangladeshi society boiling. Instead, it issued a contempt of court notice to journalist David Bergman for expressing a different opinion on the number of people killed in the 1971 war.
Politically, in post-1971 an excluded group was created by the state. The liberation war was fought to give space to the Bengali identity, which is being used to construct an idea of belongingness at the cost of an inclusive Bangla identity. The Hindus have been included because of their Bengali background but Muslims from central and east India, who adopted this land as their home in 1947, are treated as outsiders or aliens. Around 161,000 managed to migrate to Pakistan in and after 1971 but most of the members from this group are living in a pathetic situation in 70 camps spread across the country. In Bangladesh they are considered ‘stranded’ Pakistani citizens and the Pakistani government is not interested in them. In a landmark judgment in 2008, the Bangladesh Supreme Court ruled that the stateless Biharis, who were minors during the 1971 war or born after, had the right to enjoy citizenship rights. This judgment cleared legal sanction but not the socio-political attitude towards them. Legally, they are citizens but of a second grade nature — alienated. It is this group that mainly provides physical, political and financial support to many radical groups in Bangladesh.
Unless this ethnic community is socially and politically included, Bangladesh is not going to get respite from a series of violent acts. Hence, the managers of the state must take political steps to address the situation instead of relying on structural violence.

The writer is a PhD holder in South Asian Studies from the Jawaharlal Nehru University. He specialises in Indian internal security and foreign policy as well as regional water conflicts