Daily Times

A Saudi-led coalition has declared an end to four weeks of airstrikes in Yemen, saying the threat of Iran-backed rebels there had been removed and that operations were entering a political phase. However, it left open the option of resuming strikes if the movements of the Houthi rebels warranted them, while adding that a naval blockade on the strategic country at the tip of the Arabian Peninsula would continue. The public and parliament is concerned with the motivations that can drive Pakistan to intervene in the Yemen crisis and they argue that government actions are not wholly disinterested. The notion that states intervene for entirely altruistic reasons does not stand up to scrutiny. Even in cases where a conflict has no immediate impact on a third party, wider interests such as the upholding of values, national security and the protection of its own forces become apparent. Foreign interventions in ethnic conflicts will often result in a third party intervening on one side of a conflict, rather than as a neutral mediator. The impact this can have on the settlement of a conflict is worth noting, as it may lead to feelings of victimisation and resentment, retributive attacks and increased support for an oppressive regime. This can be a major stumbling block in the future when trying to settle ethnic conflicts in our own country. The Pakistan government has confirmed to the Saudi administration that the scope of support will be limited for interventions that third parties can justify on humanitarian grounds, rather than interventions in secessions or civil wars.
Ethnic and religious divisions are often identified as preconditions of civil conflict in general. A second and more complex connection begins with differential treatment of some groups. Discrimination against a religious or ethnic minority is likely to increase the salience of group identity and its mobilisation for violent action. If violent action takes the form of persistent communal rebellion, ethnic minorities are likely to respond with aggression, which, when other predisposing structural variables are present, can escalate into campaigns like killings by the crowd. If an ethnic group in a country is subject to active religious or ethnic discrimination the group perceives it as a viable threat and forceful intimidation. A third possible connection is the ethnic and religious composition of the political elite. If political elites disproportionately represent one segment in a heterogeneous society, two consequences can follow that may lead to violent outcomes. Underrepresented groups are likely to challenge the elite’s unrepresentativeness and elites, fearing such challenges, are likely to define their interests and security in communal terms, e.g. by designing policies of racial exclusion. The narrower the ethnic base of a regime, the greater the risks of conflict that escalates to murderous levels.
Much of the debate concerning Pakistan’s motivation will be based on a normative understanding of intervention. There is nothing wrong in questioning the reasons why Pakistan should involve its armed forces in intervention; indeed, it is necessary, with history rife with examples of underhanded or ulterior motives being masked behind a humanitarian justification. It would seem that often the nature of statecraft is misunderstood. Or it may be that, at times, national interests are not deviously Machiavellian but simply happen to coincide with the pervading moral climate of the day. As Walzer says, “circumstances sometimes make saints of us all.” Furthermore, it is also the case that Pakistan would like to act in a way that is seen to be morally correct. It is possible that the Houthis will always seek to justify their actions to the wider world when engaging in conflict, arguing that their cause is a just one, rather than letting it be taken as naked aggression. In the case of intervention, acting morally is itself the end, rather than simply a part of wider legal justification. It cannot be denied that there has been pressure from the media, public and civil society. These actors had an interest in being seen to do the right thing, regardless of whether or not they believed it to be a just or necessary cause.
Military intervention on behalf of the Saudis, or even Arab allies, would not be in Pakistan’s interest’ where on one hand Islamabad does not want to upset its indigenous Shia population, on the other hand it would not like to interfere in the affairs of powerful states where it would be likely to lose trust at a huge cost. Supporting one group over another can have a large impact on the settlement of an ethnic conflict. As the case of Kosovo demonstrated, the population of Serbia felt it was they who were being victimised by NATO rather than their government. The result of this was a surge of nationalism and support for Milosevic’s government. Furthermore, it created a cover under which further ethnic cleansing by the Serbs took place, whilst also giving the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) freedom to pursue its own policies of ethnic cleansing. NATO, having interests at stake and coming in to support one side at the expense of the other, actually created more problems for the overall settlement of the conflict.
Pakistan has a duty to its citizens and armed forces to only engage in conflicts that they have the right to fight in and in which they have a reasonable chance of success. To enter a conflict in which a problem seems contagious, particularly one in which a state’s existence is not immediately under threat, is irresponsible. Islamabad’s failure to act on behalf of Saudi Arabia should not somehow disqualify it from acting in North Waziristan, as some commentators liked to think it may do. Again, Walzer sums up the situation when he writes, “We cannot meet all our occasions; we rightly calculate the risks in each one. We need to ask what the costs of intervention will be for the people being rescued and also for the rescuers, and for everyone else.

The writer is a professor of Psychiatry and consultant Forensic Psychiatrist in the UK. He can be contacted at fawad_shifa@yahoo.com