Daily Times

First, a note to my readers: United Press International (UPI) has granted me the great honour and distinction of being named UPI’s first Arnaud de Borchgrave distinguished columnist. As those who know me know, it will be impossible to duplicate Arnaud’s intellect, wisdom, insights, sense of humour and more than occasional irreverence. However, this appointment recognises Arnaud’s monumental contribution to journalism and reporting truth and fact as he saw both. I am profoundly humbled and hugely appreciative. I also would hope that Arnaud would have found this particular column a fitting tribute to his strategic thinking.
Every US president, probably dating back to George Washington, has been criticised for having no strategy or the wrong strategy. President Barack Obama is no exception. Of course, having a single overarching and existential threat such as Nazi Germany or the Soviet Union made strategising much easier.
In World War II, the strategy was clear. Win first in Europe and then in the Pacific through mobilising the US’s arsenal of democracy to force the axis enemies to surrender unconditionally. The strategy of containment and deterrence produced the bloodless Cold War victory with the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991. Unfortunately, the 21st century has not offered a single or principal adversary around which one strategy could be crafted. Yet, a unifying linkage among today’s many disparate threats, dangers and challenges exists. The combination of the diffusion of power and globalisation, accelerated by the information revolution, has made the world far more interdependent and interconnected. The result is that events regarding Russia, Putin, Ukraine, NATO and Europe are directly related to what is happening in Iraq, Syria, with Islamic State (IS) and the Gulf of which Iran is a vital part, and vice versa.
John Kerry’s peripatetic consecutive travels in mid-May to Africa, Moscow and Turkey for the NATO defence ministers’ meeting, the Gulf Cooperative Council (GCC) Summit at Camp David and, finally, to Asia underscore this interconnectivity. The issue is how to relate each in an effective strategy. The starting point is Iran. Negotiations with Iran over its nuclear intentions are binary. The P-5 plus 1 will either achieve a successful, verifiable and effective agreement with Iran or it will not. Strategy must take both possibilities and the ambiguities of each into account.
The most immediate danger is IS and what is happening in Iraq and Syria. It is clear that only the states in the region, to include the GCC and by extension Egypt, Turkey and Jordan, can affect the means to contain and ultimately defeat IS. Here, the US and its NATO allies are powerful enablers.
The Ukraine crisis has rekindled fears in former Warsaw Pact states particularly on the potentially more vulnerable “northern” (i.e. Baltic) and “southern” (Black Sea and eastern Mediterranean) flanks to Russian intimidation and aggression. But NATO has another more vulnerable “southern” flank: Turkey’s 1,000-mile border with Syria and Iraq through which the secondary and tertiary consequences arising from the civil war in Syria and the onslaught of IS in the region flow and threaten the alliance with more than terror attacks recently launched in France and Denmark.
To protect this flank, NATO must build a stronger partnership with the GCC. As NATO’s 28 members and many of its partners are engaged in the 62-nation coalition formed against IS, expanding cooperation further should not be a bridge too far. The GCC and other Arab states have agreed to field an Arab land force. Advancing that concept, the Combined Air Operation Centre at al-Udeid Air Base in Doha, Qatar, where a dozen GCC and western states have been operating for as many years, is a good place to establish an initial coalition ground force headquarters to begin building that capability. The purpose is to contain IS and make regional states more militarily interoperable. NATO can and must facilitate this interoperability.
Russia has a key role to play. It has some leverage in Syria. If it can abide by the Minsk Accords regarding Ukraine to defuse that crisis, obviously fears in Europe will be mitigated and the lifting of sanctions will improve the Russian economy. The tactical centre of gravity for this strategy is Baghdad. Recognition that IS is a creature of Iraqi brutality over the past decades is vital. That means unless or until Baghdad deals with the sectarian divides between Sunni and Shia, IS will replenish itself. Repealing the de-Baathification law must be the next step.
Should nuclear negotiations with Iran fail, the Gulf States will be drawn closer by the anti-IS strategy. The US and NATO can provide added missile and air defences to reassure regional states fearful of a more aggressive Iran. Indeed, the US could always deploy a Trident submarine to reassure and reinforce deterrence as well as declare certain GCC states major non-NATO allies.
Constructing an effective strategy can be done if we understand that the foundation rests in understanding the linkages that exist between and among regions, challenging and exploiting them to achieve the outcomes we seek. But will we grasp this opportunity and act accordingly? Those are the intriguing and perplexing questions that will determine our future safety, security and prosperity.

The writer is chairman of the Killowen Group that advises leaders of government and business and senior advisor at Washington DC’s Atlantic Council. His latest book, due out this fall, is A Handful of Bullets: How the Murder of an Archduke a Century Ago Still Menaces Peace Today