Daily Times

In June last year, Islamic State (IS) captured vast territories in both Iraq and Syria, bringing it into global prominence for the reach and speed of its conquests. It started from Fallujah in Iraq with about 2,000 fighters that defeated two divisions of the Iraqi army and, by mid-June, IS had occupied vast territories. Important cities were seized, like Tikrit, Mosul and Baiji, the oil rich areas of Iraq. The recent, simultaneous seizure of Ramadi, the capital of Anbar, the largest Iraqi province, and Palmyra, Syria, has brought into focus the coordinated plan and strength of IS.

These advances indicate a lack of strategy to contain IS by governments in the Middle East. In the last one year, decisive resistance to IS came from Kurdish peshmergas (private militias) and from informal militias backed by Iran. Militants were pushed back from Kobane, a town inhabited by the Syrian Kurds, after a hard fight and again pushed away by Iraqi Kurds from Erbil, the capital of the Kurdistan regional government. The Iranian backed militias played a significant role in the victory in Tikrit, which was seen as a sign that IS was on the decline and getting weak. This was a flawed assessment.

Now with Ramadi gone, it is getting rather difficult to dislodge IS from its present territories and areas of influence. The Iraqi prime minister has managed to assemble, at this belated stage, a Shia militia in support of the defeated Iraqi army to launch an offensive towards Ramadi. This is a crisis where the initiative is gradually slipping away from the Iraqi and Syrian governments. Ash Carter, the US defence secretary, stated that the Iraqi army did not “show the will” to fight in Ramadi even though it far outnumbered IS fighters. In its withdrawal from Ramadi, the Iraqi army abandoned a large number of tanks and ammunition that were captured by IS. This is not the first time the Iraqi army abandoned and surrendered its weapons to IS. Last June, two divisions of the Iraqi army abandoned the US provided armament to be captured by IS.

The fall of Palmyra is a rather serious issue and has attracted global attention. Palmyra is a UNESCO protected World Heritage Site with a history of 2,000 years. The world seems to be rediscovering Palmyra. Agatha Christie’s memoirs of the 1930s, Come, Tell Me How You Live, – the “meandering chronicles” of Iraq and Syria — has received new interest. This was her “forgotten book”. During a visit to Palmyra, the “courts and temples and ruined columns” left a deep impression on Agatha Christie. A new edition of the book is being published.

The battle for Palmyra is significant because it was a direct contest between the Syrian army and IS fighters. The once credible Syrian army is weak and could not come up to the level of IS. The Syrian army has become fatigued through attrition, mostly fighting the moderate rebels, trained and equipped by the US and Saudi Arabia, to oust President Assad. The al Nusra front, a militant organisation fighting President Assad, received aid from Saudi Arabia, helping it to capture the Syrian town of Idlib in March. Making the regime of President Assad weak through the moderate rebels is a strategic error. Syria might be heading towards irreversible chaos like we see in Libya today after the fall of Colonel Gaddafi. Saudi Arabia is not realising the real threat: it is not President Assad but IS that holds control over almost half of Syria and continues to grow, contrary to the many assessments of its declining strength. Recently, IS captured Yarmouk, a Palestinian refugee camp, on the outskirts of Damascus.

The recent gains by IS in Iraq and Syria, surprisingly have not much moved the capitals in the Middle East. On the other hand, there is a disproportionate thrust to oust and eliminate the Houti rebels in Yemen. The possibility of lifting sanctions against Iran dominates the current political horizon in the Middle East, a misplaced preference for the time. Arab governments must show a resolve to fight their own battles; such a resolve is missing and extremist forces know this. In the recent summit in Washington, members of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) wished to have a formal defence treaty with the US, styled and patterned like the NATO treaty, in view of the possible lifting of sanctions against Iran. President Obama stopped short of such a treaty and gave an “iron clad commitment” to help counter “Iran’s destabilising activities” in the region. The Arab leaders were satisfied to have US guarantees. The summit would have been more fruitful if it had tried to formulate a strategy on the present crisis created by IS military advances.

There is no distinct and coordinated strategy to contain IS. The US-led coalition of 60 nations formed in September last year to “decimate and destroy” IS is non-functioning. From the beginning, the coalition did not inspire any confidence, a plan or the will to combat IS. Partners from Europe were less than willing for another military commitment in the Middle East. The west is already war weary and wants to concentrate upon problems of extremism, racism, illegal boat migrations and the economy at home. The US-led invasion of Iraq in 2003 led to problems of extremism in the Middle East, North Africa and the fallout in Europe. Under these circumstances, IS continues to grow. The recent suicide attack on Friday on a Shia mosque in al-Qadeh village in eastern Saudi Arabia is rather alarming. The Saudi government must realise the threat and presence of extremists in the Kingdom. IS is spreading to the Sahara; it has now extended an invitation to Mokhtar Belmokhtar, the veteran Algerian militant, and his associate al-Sahwari.

In a recent interview given to Thomas Friedman, President Obama stated that Arabs must recognise their internal threats: “populations that, in some cases, are alienated, youth that are underemployed”. President Obama further stated that the “biggest threat they face may not be coming from Iran invading. It is going to be from dissatisfaction inside their own countries.” This summarises the dilemma and is a realistic assessment of the Middle East. Experience has shown that granting of subsidies and unearned economic benefits cannot pacify the youth for long. Such measures do not bring prosperity to a country. It is a liberal economy, with equal opportunities to all that guarantees economic development and prosperity. There does not appear to be any possibility of such an economic environment in the foreseeable future in most of the countries in the Middle East. It must be realised that extremist organisations thrive on suppression and lack of economic opportunity. The threat of extremism is spreading rapidly in the Middle East and North Africa; adjoining regions and countries should not feel any safer. The leadership in the Arab world must realise that time is of the essence and is running out. The Arab world must have more meaningful political and economic reforms to combat the looming challenge of extreme militancy. Such reforms seem an improbability in the present.

The writer is a former member of the police service of Pakistan. He can be reached at humayunshafi@gmail.com