Daily Times

Theoretically, terrorists’ success has two parallel effects on recruiting. On one hand, the positive effects of their actions can be measured by seeing the addition of more recruits to the list while, on the other hand, the negative effects can be measured in arrests, compromise of intelligence assets etc. Thus, when there is significant development in a terrorist or militant campaign, there are almost always significant changes in recruiting. A priority of the military-led Operation Zarb-e-Azb against terrorism is to move beyond responding to attacks and threats, and to take proactive steps to cripple terrorists. One prong of this proactive strategy is to diminish the ability of terrorists and affiliated terrorist organisations to recruit new members. The manpower for carrying out attacks and sustaining operations is a critical resource for terrorist organisations and, therefore, hindering recruitment strikes a blow at their ability to function.
Noticeably, since the loss of their training bases in North Waziristan and the tribal borders of Pakistan and Afghanistan, terrorists have had to incorporate new and more clandestine methods of recruitment. A first step towards hindering terrorist recruitment is to understand how it works: where terrorists recruit, what tools they use, who they target and why. A clearer picture of this recruitment process could help the National Counter Terrorism Authority (NACTA) develop strategies and interventions to counter militant abilities to replenish and increase their numbers. Terrorists use different models and approaches for recruitment to attract new members and target centres of activity, such as mosques, universities and seminaries where recruiters seek new members and where potential recruits are likely to become acquainted with the radical jihadist worldview.
The evidence that university campuses have become recruitment beds of Islamist radicalisation is getting stronger. Students are not only just radicalised online, terrorists also have people on the ground who act as recruiters deliberately going around madrassas (seminaries), campuses and mosques looking for vulnerable students to begin the radicalisation process. It is time to take a serious note of student extremism. But do our university and law enforcement forces have information? Are they ready to act?
It has long been known that effective recruitment hunting is designed to suit the audience and its cultural, social and historical context. For example, encouraging a youth to join the military can be couched in patriotic terms if the youth’s family has a member linked to the privileged class and has had a decorated service history in the army. These are simple generic examples of ‘tuning’ the hymn to the psychographic and demographic particulars of the audience and its environment. This tuning is especially necessary for terrorists or militant groups, whose recruiting is often undertaken in the teeth of radical opposition. There is little room for error and the consequences of failure can be severe. Less well appreciated than tuning is how these groups change or adapt their own form and patterns of activity to facilitate recruitment. For instance, when religious terrorist groups are banned from evangelising on religious-political frameworks, they may disguise their activities by changing their names, dress, meeting places, use of language, types of activities and timetable to avoid interference from authorities, and yet maintain access to the target population. This organisational adaptation occurs across both regions and nodes e.g. prisons, madrassas, seminaries and university campuses.
More importantly, there is no single, uniform recruitment process for a group; rather, there are as many recruitment processes as there are distinct regions and nodes in which the group operates. While there may be overlap and similarity between the recruitment techniques in one location and those in another, there will as often be clear differences. For example, in rural areas recruiters may enjoy open, public access to the target population while in urban settings they may have to operate more clandestinely. Moreover, the characteristics of any regional or nodal recruitment process will change over time, as circumstances warrant.
Correspondingly, the recruitment efforts of a group will not be mitigated, shaped, hindered or halted by a one-size-fits-all prescription. Different recruitment patterns will necessitate different counterterrorist interventions. Some counterterrorist methods may be effective in more than one locale but, just as often, what works in one situation will prove ineffective (or counterproductive) in another. Thus, banning student organisations in university campuses with force might be an effective intervention if potential recruits have linked with terrorist groups but this runs the risk of polarising and strengthening the cause of anti-establishment groups and would simply be counterproductive.
I have not claimed that academics teach students to become extremists. What I have said — and what is demonstrably true — is that there is clearly a connection that university campuses have been seen providing safe space for extremists to recruit and radicalise, whether onsite or offsite, hiding their tracks with spurious arguments about free speech and disillusioning students with distorted religious beliefs.
After all, there is a difference between free speech and incitement to terrorism. Indeed, incitement has been a crime since long before anyone had even heard of Islamism. To use campuses to undermine democracy through violence so as to bring about an Islamist regime is not about upholding free speech: it is about working for its destruction. Another aspect of the problem is a lack of coherence within religious political parties and the military establishment. Religious political parties claim that the balance between civil liberties and security is wrong, and they insist that we need more of the former and less of the latter.
University officials should launch a counterterrorism strategy to tackle the spread of radicalisation on campuses. But what might these strategies be? And, in particular, what can be done to halt the radicalisation of Muslim youth on college campuses? Officials at every university should work with the government, police and security services to monitor the activities of student societies that might be targeted by terrorists. Extra vigilance is essential in light of the growing concerns that terrorist organisations are recruiting from campuses. The government and university authorities must act before a generation of students continues to become prey to an intolerant, separatist and violent ideology that threatens our society and the lives of all Pakistanis.

The writer is a professor of Psychiatry and consultant Forensic Psychiatrist in the UK. He can be contacted at fawad_shifa@yahoo.com