Post-Mullah Omar

Afghanistan’s premier intelligence agency claimed on Thursday that Mullah Omar had died in a Karachi hospital in April 2013. On the other hand, the statement from the Taliban confirmed the death of their leader Mullah Omar, saying that his condition had deteriorated in the last two weeks. The statement contradicted the Afghan government’s stance that he had passed away in Karachi. The news has disrupted the second round of Afghan peace talks as, according to Pakistan’s Foreign Office, the meeting that was scheduled to be held on July 31 has been postponed on the Taliban leadership’s request. “It is hoped that the forces with their mala fide intent to undermine the peace talks, will not succeed in their designs,” the statement concluded. A statement from the Afghan Presidential palace said that the ground for the discussion is more solid now than before, and implored all insurgents to join the peace process.
Meanwhile, the Taliban have chosen Mullah Akhtar Mansour as their new leader. Of course, the post-Mullah Omar scenario could be disturbing, and not only for the Taliban, because it will be difficult to maintain unity amongst the rank and file and leadership of the organisation. On the other hand, the Afghan government, comprising different groups, also stands divided on the issue of holding talks with the Taliban. Since former president Hamid Karzai wields enormous influence over his former colleagues in the government, his loyalists are trying to subvert the policy of bonhomie that President Ashraf Ghani has adopted towards Pakistan. Indeed, Pakistan has given unstinted support to the Afghan government; it conducted the operation in Waziristan against all groups, including the Haqqani network, and brought the Taliban leadership to the negotiating table. With the death of Mullah Omar, Afghanistan could descend into chaos.
It will be an uphill task for Pakistan, the US and China to keep the peace process going, especially when Afghan elements hostile to Pakistan continue trying to stall the talks. Former President Hamid Karzai and the Afghan National Directorate of Security had been propagating that, like Osama bin Laden, Mullah Omar and Aiman al Zawahiri were in Pakistan. But there was also news that Mullah Omar was in Afghanistan. In September 2011, the Daily Outlook of Afghanistan carried the news that a female Member of Parliament (MP) claimed to have had a meeting with the Taliban’s supreme leader, Mullah Mohammad Omar. MP Huma Sultani, elected from Ghazni province, had said she had met Mullah Omar about 90 miles away from the capital city of Kabul. She claimed that Omar had signalled consent and willingness to peace talks with the government of Afghanistan. There is no reason to disbelieve her, as the Taliban did show a willingness to initiate talks later on.
Huma Sultani had claimed that she could present Omar in front of the public, provided his security and safety were guaranteed. Yet, US civil and military leaders insisted that Mullah Omar and Aiman al Zwahiri were hiding in Pakistan, and had asked Pakistan to dig them out, otherwise they would launch a Special Forces operation against them. It is unfortunate that the Pakistani print and electronic media did not consider that news worthwhile and remained mute, especially when American Generals, members of the Obama administration and the western media had been propagating that Mullah Omar was in Quetta, and that Aiman al Zawahiri was in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA). Pakistan had asked the US to provide information about Omar and Zawahiri to enable Pakistan’s security personnel to arrest them but they did not provide any information, because they had none.
Hamid Karzai has made a trade of berating Pakistan and has spared no opportunity to accuse Pakistan of meddling in Afghanistan. Yet no one in Islamabad ever tried to challenge his statements. When the US descended into Afghanistan and occupied it after toppling the Taliban, they perched Karzai on the Kabul throne.
The CIA found in Karzai an obliging ally to carry out this task. When US commanders and allies found the situation to be increasingly tough, Karzai kept crying horse and saying that Pakistan was fuelling an insurgency in his country by providing sanctuaries to fleeing Taliban members. However, no one in Islamabad bothered to refute his charge. The US and its allies had invaded Afghanistan to wipe out the Taliban and al Qaeda. If they had failed to corral the fleeing Taliban and al Qaeda militants in Afghanistan and decimate them, they were responsible, not Pakistan. But so inept and apathetic was the hierarchy in Islamabad, that instead of being on the offensive, it timidly became defensive.
The problem was that the basics of the US policy were wrong, since efforts were made, right from the beginning, to rely on the Northern Alliance and marginalise the Pashtuns, who were neglected while the Afghan army and other state institutions were built up. If President Ashraf Ghani and Chief Executive Abdullah Abdullah can show magnanimity and take the Taliban on board, they can avert civil war. If they cannot, the end result could be the disintegration of Afghanistan and more regional players could jump into the fray to secure their positions. It is, therefore, in the interest of all ethnic groups to find common ground and share power to make Afghanistan peaceful, stable and sovereign.

The writer is a freelance columnist. He can be reached at mjamil1938@hotmail.com