Al Qaeda leader Ayman al-Zawahiri was purportedly assassinated in a U.S. drone raid in Kabul. The statements claimed that the air raid was launched from Ganci Air base, a US transportation service at Manas in northern area of central Asian state Kyrgyzstan. According to the US Department of Defense, Ganci is a former Pentagon military base in Kyrgyzstan, near the Bishkek airport. It was controlled by the American Air Force, which handed it over to the Kyrgyz armed forces in June 2014. At a safe house owned by an assistant to Afghan Interior Minister Sirajuddin Haqqani, Ayman al-Zawahiri was present. “Any cooperation” with an international terrorist organization in Afghanistan would have been disastrous for the Afghan Taliban. The raid has heightened worldwide concerns about the Taliban’s earnestness and capacity to deliver on their obligations in the Doha accord and other undertakings. However, the assassination may have only minor ramifications. The Taliban government is frail and yet seeking international recognition. According to the UN “Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team”, Zawahiri’s “takeover of Afghanistan” “coincided” with the publishing of its 30th report in July. A world notorious terrorist leader like Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi could only fathom how much freedom militants from South Asia, China, and Central Asia would have in Afghanistan. The UN monitoring team’s February 2022 report stated that terrorist groups had “enjoyed considerable independence in Afghanistan than ever in recent history.” Tehreek-e Taliban Pakistan (TTP) commanders have been visiting Pakistani officials, tribal jirgas and religious scholars in Kabul for some months now. Many counterterrorism analysts point to Islamabad’s negotiations with the TTP and the death of Ayman al-Zawahiri as evidence that the Haqqani Network has close ties to foreign terrorist organisations. Al Qaeda appears to have played an adjudication role in resolving TTP internal problems. There is no sign that the Haqqanis can assess their prior links or demilitarise international terrorists. There is no law enforcement in Kabul due to the Haqqanis who hold the city under their grip. Islamabad has been impressed by Haqqani’s “reconciliatory’ strategy, but the rest of world may have been less so. The Taliban and the Haqqani network’s contribution to the international community serve as a conduit for communication between governments and terrorist groups. Pakistan has already accepted the offer and begun a contentious political settlement with the TTP. Pakistan has already accepted the offer. They offered the same to China, but it refused and made it clear that the country has zero tolerance for terrorism in general or AQTP in particular. There is no virtue in states engaging with their foes for no reason, which is why Haqqani’s “reconciliatory’ approach has not pleased the world. Terrorists and insurgents use such inter-group reconciliation strategies to keep peace and avoid squandering resources. In Afghanistan, Al Qaeda has served as the major mediator between terrorist groups, and for some reason, it followed the same policy when it loosened its administrative grip and empowered its affiliates. The early days of the Taliban revival were said to have seen Al Qaeda mediate disputes among the Taliban’s several shuras (advisory councils). Arbitration between Islamist militant groups was made famous by Osama bin Laden. Conflict arose over the division of resources after Maulana Masood Azhar split from Harkatul Mujahideen in March 2000 and founded Jaish-e-Mohammad (JeM). Ultimately, Osama bin Laden’s presence was crucial to reaching an agreement. The TTP representatives met with Pakistani officials, but it’s unclear whether Al Qaeda or Zawahiri counselled them. It’s worth noting that al-Qaeda would have gained greatly if Pakistan had agreed to demand an end to the Fata merger. The TTP and Al Qaeda have long been maintained a tight relationship. Just like Osama bin Laden had done in the Harkatul Mujahideen vs JeM disagreement, Al Qaeda appears to have played an adjudication role in resolving TTP internal problems and its disagreements with other parties and factions. The TTP founder Baitullah Mehsud was assassinated in a US drone attack in 2010, and an Al Qaeda-trained terrorist named Abu Dujana al-Khorasani sought vengeance by blowing himself up. The TTP’s leadership was recently visited by a Pakistani ulema group led by Mufti Taqi Usmani in Kabul in an attempt to persuade them to modify their stance on peace with Pakistan. After a gap of 22 years, the Deobandi ulema returned to Afghanistan for an official visit. The Taliban held anniversary celebrations in Kabul and Kandahar in August 2001 to mark the occasion. At the same time, the Taliban demolished the Bamiyan sculptures. Therefore, these festivities were significant. Islam forbids Muslims from worshipping idols, which they call statues. Another notable occurrence was the trial of American charity workers accused of teaching Christianity, a crime punishable by death under Taliban control. The Taliban invited several Deobandi ulema delegations to attend the trial and guide their qazis or judges. Pakistan delegates were ecstatic as they attended celebrations organized by several Pakistani terrorist groups in their honour. The preaching they would have received at that time can be imagined. These sermons were documented at the time by a slew of Islamist websites. In order to avoid repercussions from law enforcement, many madrassahs in Pakistan have destroyed copies of these publications. However, the Taliban and TTP have not remembered their prior mistakes. How did the Pakistani religious clerics feel when they met with their former students who have now entered the TTP? There’s no way the TTP could have missed the fact that these ulema had reversed course and signed an anti-terrorism proclamation known as ‘Paigham-i-Pakistan. According to substantial reports, media sources stated that the TTP management listened calmly to their teachers but refused to move from their demands. Instead of renouncing violence, the TTP leadership offered an eight-point justification, all of which were predicated on the ulema’s past speeches praising violent jihad. Today, the security planers in Pakistan will have to think when thinks might head to if they keep no veering in this direction. The writer is a PhD candidate.