The general elections under the 1973Constitution had to be held before August 14, 1977. Bhutto had started an implicit campaign since early 1976. He invoked his successes with respect to the 1973 Constitution, Simla Agreement, initiation of the nuclear programme, Sino-Pakistan friendship, etc. Moreover, he attempted to sell his performance on the domestic front with reference to reform measures. His main aim was to attract the poorest of the poor who could probably elect him again. When the government, in January 1977, formally announced the election scheduled for March, nine opposition parties, which included the Jamaat-e-Islami (JI), Jamiat-e-Ulema-e-Islam (JUI) and Jamiat-e-Ulema-e-Pakistan (JUP), were subsequently able to unite under the Pakistan National Alliance (PNA). The PNA’s election campaign remained Bhutto-centric: he had ruined Pakistan’s economy, society and ideology. Nonetheless, the Bhutto-led PPP finally contested the National Assembly (NA) elections on March 7.Resultantly, the PPP owned 155 seats as compared to the PNA’s 36 out of 200. The latter was defeated everywhere except in the then NWFP. However, instead of accepting the results, the PNAhad all along mobilised the people against what it perceived as the government’s plans to rig the elections. In fact, some quarters had predicted that the PNA would boycott the provincial elections on March 10 in case of a sweeping PPP victory in the NA elections. The world’s press was circumspect in this respect. TheGuardian, for example, acknowledged: “Mr Bhutto has won unfairly and by no means squarely. But, there is a certain crude legitimacy to his victory.” However, the PNA was not prepared to bestow that legitimacy. It started its agitation from March 14. Bhutto’s offer to enter into a dialogue with the opposition was rejected by the PNA, which demanded his resignation and the holding of fresh elections under the joint supervision of the army and the judiciary. Personalistic politicianswent to the extent of inviting the military to intervene in the country’s politics again. However, Bhutto had his own game plan. In the wake of rigging allegations, he opted to appease the PNA in terms of offering a judicial enquiry and holding a referendum on the issue of his continuation as PM. In fact, he got the Constitution amended for the sake of a referendum. However, the more Bhutto chose to reconcile, the more the opposition demanded.Thus, the demands for the establishment of Nizam-e-Mustafa (the Prophet’s (PBUH) system) was vociferously put forward. Bhutto, on his part, decided rationally. In order to appease the authoritarian clergy and control the situation, he announced, on April 17, certain aspects of sharia whereby drinking alcohol and gambling were prohibited officially, and Friday was declared a public holiday. Nevertheless, Bhutto’s sharia measures could not satisfy opposition politicians who resorted to agitation. On April 20, they called for a strike that was observed almost countrywide and caused many problems of governance. In order to maintain law and order, Bhuttodeclared(partial) martial law in Lahore, Karachi and Hyderabad under Article 245 of the Constitution. Moreover, he got an amendment passed to the Army Act that enabled military action with retrospective effect. More importantly, the three services chiefs preferred to obey the civil government. To this end, Air Marshal (retd)Asghar Khan, also head of a party that was part of the PNA, wrote a letter to various military officers todisobey civilian orders. In an environment where the opposition was calling for his skin, in a country where coups and martial laws were no exception and in a nation where politicians and their parties were personalistic and urging the military to takeover, PM Bhutto thought it rational to strategically engage with the military. Had he maintained a distance at this stage, it would have shown him as a weakened PM. Nonetheless, to add insult to injury, the judiciaryjudged the martial law as being unconstitutional. The court’s judgment took the choice of applying military means for crisis management away. The political choice, however, was still there for Bhutto and the PNA. “From June 3 to July 2, both parties progressed towards an agreement in an atmosphere of extreme mistrust.On July 2, the opposition’s negotiating team put the final manuscript of its accord with the government before the PNA’s central council. It was categorically rejected by Asghar Khan and a few others. On the night of July 4, the long-dreaded army rule finally arrived,” argued DrMohammad Waseem. Little wonder that on July 5army chief General ZiaulHaq, whom Bhutto had appointed while superseding six generals, successfully staged the third coup d’état in Pakistan’s history. Consequently, the 1973 Constitution was put in abeyance and the National and provincial Assemblies were dissolved.The Chief Martial Law Administrator promulgated the Laws (Continuance in Force) Order 1977 to run the state. Bhutto was put under ‘protective’ custody. Later he was put on judicialtrial and murdered judicially. Quite paradoxically, the martial law regime chose to dissolve the Hyderabad Tribunal and withdrew cases against the accused, includingWali Khan, Marri and Bizenjo. The factionalised PNA and released politicians such as Wali Khan urged Zia to hold accountability of the Bhutto yearsinstead of holding elections. The regime’s preference converged with the latter and Zia finally decided to start the three-phase process of accountability under the stewardship of a compliant judiciary. The main hunt was the purging of politicians, especially from the PPP.Interestingly, the PNA, which had earlierfailed to mend electoral differences with the regime, opted to pursue its politicalinterests by joining the military government on August 6, 1978. The following month, the Chief Martial Law Administrator assumed the office of president too. Ironically, the regime-PNA alliance got fractured when, in the post-Bhutto period, the formerdid not require a factionalised PNA. To add insult to injury, Zia postponed the general elections. Instead, in September 1979, local body elections were held on a non-party basis, to de-politicise the provinces and interact with local politicians directly. When the PNA started questioning this, the regime amended the 1962 Political Parties Act to further squeeze the parties that were then supposed to hold internal elections annually, register with the Election Commission (EC), submit the details of their financial assets to the EC and importantly, abstain from any activity prejudicial to Pakistan’s ideology, public order, independence of the judiciary and integrity and honour of the military. However, before the politicians and their parties could put their house in order, the regime finally decided, on October 16, 1979, to postpone the elections indefinitely; all political parties were dissolved, political activities banned and the press suppressed. In the post-postponement period, politicians, especially from the PNA, were able to nominate the military regime as their rival, which left no stone unturned to de-politicise, factionalise and physically crush them as well as their organisational structure. On the other hand, non-PNA forces started political negotiations with the PPP and formed the Movement for the Restoration of Democracy (MRD) in February 1981. On his part, Zia held an arbitrary referendum in 1984 and became president.Subsequently, elections to the National and provincial Assemblies were heldon a non-party basis, which the MRD boycotted. Muhammad Khan Junejowas appointed as PM and Nawaz Sharif served as chief minister of Punjab. After Bhutto and the like, the military was able to produce another generation of politicians who were supposed to work with and for the former. Did they work or shirk? The final part of my article will explain this. This is part four of a five-part article that appears every Saturday The writer is a political scientist by training and professor by profession. He is a DAAD fellow and the author of Military Agency, Politics and the State in Pakistan. He tweets @ejazbhatty