We have written many columns on Pakistan’s place in the priorities of the Biden Administration. All these writings by finer minds have spared no factor- economic, political or strategic, no issue –regional or international, and no condition – internal or external – that may likely impact the future relations between the two countries. There were some overlapping arguments, repetitions in the analysis of the country’s internal and external weaknesses and strengths, all ending at the final advice we should concentrate on resetting our house and expect less generosity – economic, political and strategic – from our erstwhile uneasy patron. This advice is pragmatic. Scratch my back, I shall scratch yours is the maxim followed in the global power politics or interstate relations delicately founded on the bedrock of national interests with no exception whatsoever. We have always scratched the back of the US for economic and strategic advantages. Ironically, this arrangement was always preceded by big incidents of international concern including our sudden importance to the US in the War against Communism; the Soviet military intervention in Afghanistan; the counterterrorism. In these phases of our relationship, our approach was transactional and short term grabbing economic aid, strategic assistance and political legitimacy than seeking long term friendship founded on shared economic, political, strategic and technological interests. The political and institutional objectives of the rulers were prioritized over the country’s interests. The economic aid received in 1980s and 2000s was not utilized to found the economy of the country on sound structural basis, and to bring about any improvement in the social and economic life of the masses. The subsequent civilian regimes also continued to have an aid-dependent and sick economy run on borrowings and grants. We have new diplomatic vistas to take advantage of within the gradually firming up partnership among the regional countries including China and Russia to open a window for multipolar system We fought the Americans’ war in this region plunging the country into a messy security situation. The people of Pakistan, who never felt stakeholders in these two wars, suffered enormous losses in life and treasure from the terrorism. We behaved as a client than the strategic partner of the US in the counterterrorism war. We knew our partnership with the US in these wars would be transactional leaving us high and dry at the end. Consequently, we have had the biggest disappointments in our diplomatic history. The economic and military aid to Pakistan was conveniently discontinued as the situation in Afghanistan afforded the Americans an opportunity. Do we have something to offer to the US for an advantageous relationship based on geo- economics? Is our economic position strong enough to lure American investments; the relocation of the labour intensive American industrial enterprises? We do not have an investment friendly atmosphere; the law and order situation is bad, the bureaucratic procedure cumbersome and the judicial system un-inspiring. We do not have steady supply of energy for our people and industry. Our exports have revolved around $20-22billion. We are short of finances for increased imports. No quick relief from these conditions. Do we have some diplomatic leverage to exercise on Taliban in Afghan issue? The resolution of the Afghan conundrum, as signals show, is going to be a multilateral affair involving all the regional countries and Russia. Moscow talks have resurfaced. These countries would expect us to play a wise role in the multilateral peace process. We are conscious the Ashraf Ghani regime and the Northern Afghan leaders, being closer to India, do not trust Pakistan. India is very much present in the multilateral approach. It would be critically important how we balance our divergences with India in this multilateral game. The Afghanis particularly the Taliban would not accede to any peace plan imposed from outside. The Taliban, as the US leaders warn, are credibly poised to take over Kabul militarily. They would loath to squander the gains they have made in the battle fields on Pakistan’s bidding or any other country, or for any power-sharing formula falling short of their expectations. The Ghani regime and the Northern leaders with India and Iran at their back would not easily accept to give Taliban a lion’s share in power. Thus, our importance in connection with the Afghan issue stands diluted in the new scheme of peace process. If we are to play a role, the demand for that would come from the countries to be involved in the peace process along with the US officials. However, Pakistan – a nuclear state of a vibrant population of 220 million people, has an important strategic location to count on. It could be an economic hub hosting north-south energy pipelines along with Iran and Afghanistan competing with Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan oil pipeline, and joining the Russian sponsored North-South Transport corridor along with 20 member states, linking Russian Volga/Caspian port of Astrakhan with Chabahar seaport raising the interests of the energy hungry Western countries. We can strengthen our position in economic connectivity within the economic and energy projects like TAP, TAPI, CASAREM, and the potential South-West energy pipelines. But again, this depends on political and strategic stability in the Gulf region and return of peace to Afghanistan, and improvement of law and order situation in the country including reduction in political polarization and a negotiated end to the Baloch insurgency. We need to make a start towards improving the things within our control. We can only make a modest contribution towards peace in the Gulf and Afghanistan. We should recalibrate our relations with Iran and Afghanistan commensurate with the promising economic connectivity in the region. We have new diplomatic vistas to take advantage of within the gradually firming up partnership among the regional countries including China and Russia to open a window for multipolar system. There is a new-found trust and vigour in our carefully advancing political and strategic relations with Russia – probably tempered only by our concern to the sensitivities of China. Under the surface of friendly relations, there are undercurrents of competition and rivalry between two powers. We cannot sacrifice our friendship with China at any altar. So, options are limited and challenges daunting. We need to play our cards wisely. The author was a member of the Foreign Service of Pakistan and he has authored two books