Daily Times

The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) comprising 11 articles basically has three components or pillars: non-proliferation, disarmament and the right of the non-nuclear states to use nuclear technology for peaceful purposes.

In the domain of nuclear non-proliferation the Nuclear Weapons States (NWS) have undertaken not to transfer to any recipient nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, and not to assist a non-nuclear weapon state to manufacture or acquire such weapons. The non-nuclear states have pledged not to receive nuclear weapons and other explosive devices from any source or accept assistance for the manufacture of such weapons or devices.

In regard to disarmament, the signatories to the treaty have affirmed the desire to ease international tensions and strengthen international trust so as to create, someday, the conditions for a halt to the production of nuclear weapons and a treaty in general for a complete disarmament that liquidates, in particular, nuclear weapons and their delivery vehicles from the national arsenals.

The third pillar of NPT recognises the right of the non-nuclear states to the acquisition of nuclear technology for peaceful purposes under the incisive glare of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), provided they can prove verifiably that they are not engaged in developing nuclear weapons.

Ostensibly, all these objectives of the NPT are beyond any reproach, but the reality is that the NPT has failed to stop nuclear proliferation or in evolving a credible mechanism for disarmament. According to the former IAEA chief, Mohammed ElBaradie, there are 35-40 states that possess the knowledge to develop nuclear weapons in addition to 13 others who have installed facilities for enrichment of weapon grade uranium. Israel beyond doubt is an undeclared nuclear power. North Korea is also well on course to become a nuclear power. Iran has been persuaded to cap its nuclear programme after a protracted process of dialogue.

The failure of the NPT to prevent nuclear proliferation and achieve its objective of disarmament is mainly attributable to the breach of treaty provisions by the NWS, and some intrinsic inadequacies in the treaty itself. The NWS under the treaty committed not to provide nuclear technology or weapons to any other state or use nuclear weapons against a non-nuclear state. But in violation of this commitment the US — which has been crying hoarse to urge the non-signatory states to join the NPT — has provided nearly 180 B61 nuclear bombs to Belgium, Italy, Germany, Netherlands and Turkey for use.

The US also targeted its nuclear warheads at North Korea, a non-NWS, from 1959 until 1991. Former secretary of defence UK, Geoff Hoon, explicitly invoked the possibility of the use of nuclear weapons in response to a non-conventional attack by “rogue states.” In January 2006 the then president of France, Jacques Chirac, indicated that an incident of state-sponsored terrorism on France could trigger a small scale nuclear retaliation aimed at destroying a rogue state’s power centres.

The failure of the NWS to bring about a major reduction in their nuclear arsenal, to halt the production of nuclear weapons, the inability to hammer out a treaty on general and complete disarmament, and their reluctance to agree on a complete disarmament within a prescribed time-frame has also contributed to lack of progress in this regard. This has angered many non-nuclear states, and also provided justification to many of them to develop nuclear programmes of their own.

The dilemma with the third pillar of NPT is that the commercially popular light water reactor nuclear power station uses enriched uranium fuel, which either has to be enriched by those countries themselves or purchased from the international market. The countries concerned can easily switch to nuclear weapons programme if they so desire, leading to the spread of enrichment and reprocessing capabilities. That perhaps explains why in 2004 US declared the prevention of further spread of uranium enrichment and plutonium as a major pillar of its non-proliferation policy, and why it has been pressurising a number of countries including Pakistan to sign the Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty.

But the issue still remains unresolved, and even the process to negotiate has not taken off the ground. The sticking point is that while the US, UK and Japan favour a treaty that limits future production of fissile materials, other states including Pakistan believe that the treaty should also address fissile materials already produced and stockpiled. Pakistan holds the view, and rightly so, that a fissile material treaty that does not address existing stockpiles will “freeze existing asymmetries” that threaten its security, and is therefore unacceptable. This, undoubtedly, is a manifestation of its concern regarding regional rival India, which possesses much larger stockpiles of fissile material.

Pakistan maintained the same principled position in the first committee meeting of the Conference on Disarmament (CD) in 2009 and 2010, as a result of which a deadlock still persists. Islamabad’s position is likely to prolong the stalemate in the CD, which operates on a consensus basis. The US, Japan, Australia and several other countries have announced that they would support moving negotiations for a fissile material treaty to another forum if the deadlock in the CD continued.

The apprehensions expressed by Pakistan have proved true. The US violated the NPT by entering into agreement with India — a non-signatory state to the NPT — for the transfer of civilian nuclear technology in 2008 to prop it as a counterbalance to China, and also to exploit its lucrative market. UK and France followed suit. India has agreed to accept IAEA supervision for only 14 nuclear reactors out of 22. Pakistan views it as a discriminatory act, and has a considered opinion, in view of its Indo-centric security paradigm, that India will utilise this to enhance its nuclear capability and that might lead to a nuclear arms race in the region.

The NSG waiver to India, as apprehended by Pakistan, has helped the former to exponentially increase its fissile material stocks. This is borne by reports of US-based Institute For Science And International Security and Nuclear Threat Initiative. It is pertinent to mention that the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute and HIS Jane’s Intelligence Review in their reports for 2014 also mentioned India’s plans for a new uranium enrichment facility aimed at expansion of its naval capacity, and India’s efforts to pursue a thermo-nuclear option to enhance its nuclear weapons capability.

The US and its allies are working against the objectives of the NPT, and their actions could give a new direction to nuclear arms race in South Asia, as Pakistan could not afford to remain oblivious to its security concerns in view of the Indian doctrine of “cold-start.” I am afraid it might push Pakistan to go for a full spectrum of nuclear deterrent as against the present stance of maintaining minimum nuclear deterrent. In view of the double standards practised by the NWS, there is little hope of the NPT ever achieving its objectives. Through their discriminatory actions they are actually promoting nuclear proliferation.

The writer is a retired diplomat, a freelance columnist and a member of the visiting faculty of the Riphah Institute of Media Sciences, Riphah International University, Islamabad. He can be reached at ashpak10@gmail.com