Daily Times

In South Asian Strategic Environment, the key challenge to Deterrence Stability is India’s unstoppable strategic aims to negate the stable situation. This is continually reconsidering Pakistan to revolutionise its Strategic Doctrine to Full Spectrum Deterrence (Credible Minimum Deterrence), which can counter Indian threats from all domains. India’s war-fighting strategy (Indian Armed Forces Joint Doctrine-2017 and Indian Land Warfare Doctrine-2018) aims are to accomplish its strategic ambitions for regional supremacy and resultantly destabilise the strategic environment of South Asia. So, there is a need to augment the “Credibility of Deterrence” to dissuade India from taking aggressive action against Pakistan.

The Credibility of Deterrence is a significant component, as Thomas Schelling, a leading exponent of nuclear deterrence maintained that the manoeuvring of “Credibility” can influence another state’s behaviour. David Robertson, in the Dictionary of Modern Defence and Strategy, described that “Deterrence works with the capability, credibility and will.”

The Credibility of Deterrence is the crux of deterrence stability that works effectively with “Capability” and “Political Will” of a nation.

In the latest Pulwama Crises of 2019, it was Pakistan’s decision-makers’ “Political Will,” along with Pakistan Air Force’s conventional capability, which enabled Pakistan to respond with a calculated approach. Pakistan’s military and civil establishments have, so far, proved that India cannot influence Pakistan with its assertive and offensive policies and that Pakistan has the willpower to deter Indian aggressive and its so-called surgical strikes.

On the other hand, the “Political Will” of India is influenced by the RSS Ideology, under whose umbrella, India is aggressively modernising its nuclear arsenals with modern technology, which is contradictory to the obligation of deterrence stability. Therefore, a significant question arises that would the Credibility of Deterrence work in future affairs? It is hard to assess the Credibility of “political will” than technical capability. The technical capability of a state can be analysed. However, the political will can change with the leadership’s thought process. Then how can future crises be managed? The political will is reliant on the nature and behaviour of individuals and systems and in India’s case, Pakistan is dealing with the Hindutva Ideology, which is mounting extremism behind the Indian political parties (BJP, Congress, or the Awami part), India Foreign and Defence establishment. The fuel adds to fire when India gets discriminatory support of the US, which gives them the political privilege to compel Pakistan.

The more the public opinion is not in favour of using nuclear weapons, the higher will be the Credibility of Nuclear Deterrence

The hawkish Indian irrational leadership statements undermine the Credibility of Deterrence. In 2001, Prime Minister Vajpayee said that we were not going to sit back and wait for the other side to use these weapon nuclear weapons against us, which meant that they were not going to follow the no first use (NFU). From the last decade, India is on its way to altering its “No First Use” policy and maturing its Counter Force Strike. In Pulwama crisis of 2019, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi called Pakistan nuclear arsenal bluff and cleared that our weapons are not for Diwali and then talked about “Qatal Ki Rat.”

Hence, all these kinds of crude signals emanating from India are a threat to the Credibility of Deterrence. Indian Home Minister in the Indian Parliament after the revocation of the Article 370 and 35A in Indian occupied Kashmir has said that Pakistani part of Jammu and Kashmir is Indian Territory, and we will take it back even if we must sacrifice our lives. Such statements make political and diplomatic environment tensed under the nuclear umbrella.

The Credibility of Deterrence also depends on the fact of how much public opinion supports or oppose the use of nuclear weapons, how they respond in peace and wartime with regards to the employment of atomic weapons. It will influence the strategic thinking of the civil-military leadership. The more the public opinion is not in favour of using nuclear weapons, the higher will be the Credibility of Nuclear Deterrence. But unfortunately, in India Pakistan crises, Indian public media messages, especially in the form of public statements, has remained very unpolished and immature. The trends on twitter and news channels’ so-called “raged breaking news” issued without any understanding of the policy impact the stability of the entire region. Such patterns and trajectories on which Indian leadership is moving is a grave threat to regional security.

Theoretically, the reason behind their irrationality can be i) – the lack of information on which they make irrational judgments, ii) – states fail to communicate threats effectively, iii)- any information gap which leads towards irrational behaviour. Unfortunately, irrationality in India originates from their strategic culture. India is in the delusion that she is a regional power state and can influence their dominancy. The way Indian strategic thought is leading the region and altering the dynamics of the Credibility of Deterrence is reversible. The system should instead depend on progressive strategic thinking than the void sentiments against your nemesis. The volatile strategic environment of South Asia under enlightened leadership can sense the catastrophe of nuclear war beyond hegemonic ambitions.

The writer is a research associate at the Pakistan Institute Conflict and Security Studies, Islamabad