The 5th July is firmly etched in our memory. That black night, the praetorian forces overturned the applecart of democracy; held the Constitution of 1973 in abeyance; arrested the political leadership en mass; clamped Martial Law in the country; usurped senior political positions; restrained the superior courts; gagged the press; garrisoned the cities and towns; established military courts at all levels. In all, the political tumult which preceded the night was quickly turned into a deadening silence accompanied by a thick pall of gloom, an unknown fear, a despairing uncertainty, a strong feeling of disappointment and a deepening disillusionment. We had lost the bigger part of the country just six years ago. We had sustained defeat, humiliation and dismemberment of the Jinnah’s Pakistan. Our military and civilian leadership knew that the main cause of the disgruntlement of the Bengalis was the absence of a participatory democratic rule. The political jerry mandering of the early years and the abrogation of the first Constitution of the country (1956) in Martial Law, followed by a long autocratic rule by a General had sowed the seeds of separatism in the former East Pakistan. After a decade’s effective rule, he handed over power to his Commander in Chief, General Agha Yahya Khan in violation of his own Constitution of 1962. The separation of former East Pakistan was a devastating blow to this hapless nation. The People were shell shocked and gripped by a fear of the collapse of this part of Pakistan; the young army officers were seething with anger and up in arms against their senior leadership. The situation had spiraled out of the control of the ruling junta. Some sound minds in the GHQ took control of the fast aggravating situation and contacted Zulfikar Ali Bhutto to take over. The broken and half-sunk country was handed over to him to rebuild it. This was the greatest political challenge to Bhutto. The political acumen of a leader comes to play into a crisis of this magnitude Thus, the broken and half-sunk country was handed over to him to rebuild it. This was the greatest political challenge to Bhutto. The political acumen of a leader comes to play into a crisis of this magnitude. He passed this litmus test with remarkable achievements. He virtually picked up the pieces of the broken ship to rebuild it; he raised the sinking morale of a despairing people and restored the confidence of a disillusioned nation. He addressed the post-war issues with India and recalibrated the country’s relations with the neighbours, superpowers and the Muslim world. He rebuilt the army as a fighting force, restored the economy of the country and achieved a marked political consensus for the new Constitution and the political dispensation. He accomplished this gigantic task within a span of three years. Bhutto was the product of the chequered political history of the country. He had his political grooming under Iskander Mirza and General Ayub Khan, though he had always displayed an independent bent of political thinking. His evaluation of the global power politics remained at odds with that of his mentors. His aversion to strategic alliances or placing the country’s eggs in one basket was evident. He believed in exploring avenues of independent bilateral relationships. He considered Pakistan a vital part of the Muslim world and the Afro-Asian bloc of nations. This fully crystallized in his foreign policy when he was at the helm. It was the economic and political domains where he erred phenomenally. He went the whole hog for nationalization. The nationalization of banks, insurance companies, and big industries to prevent the exploitation of the labour was understandable but the takeover of small industries like foundries, rice husking, cotton ginning and Ice factories, private schools and colleges was unfathomable. This inflicted a heavy blow to the private investment in the country. Though riding on a high crest of popularity, he fell back on the traditional strong arm tactics in the politics showing intolerance for the opposition and the media. He jailed many opponents on frivolous grounds. He also dealt sternly with the vocal left wingers in his party. In the last years of his rule, he drifted from his original constituency – the poor masses – wooing traditional political dynasties. He paid heavily for this political waywardness. The political turmoil ignited by the controversial general elections of 1977 lingered too long and revived the praetorian ambitions of the Generals lurking in the background and playing on both sides of the wicket to sabotage the dialogue between Z.A. Bhutto and the opposition. Bhutto failed to gauge the ambitions of his General. Overconfident about the loyalty of his handpicked Army Chief, Bhutto also displayed complacency. An agreement covering all the main demands of the opposition had already been ironed out. Bhutto wanted to sign it after his suddenly-arranged visit to a couple of Muslim countries. On his return, the 5th July was appointed for the signing of the agreement. A senior civil servant in the bureaucracy sounded the General to strike or be ready for crucifixion. In the early morning of the 5th July when the clock struck 2.0, the military surrounded the vital buildings in Islamabad including the Prime Minister’s House near the GHQ. The Prime Minister and the main PPP and opposition leaders were rounded up and whisked away. Behold the coincidences that the rules were relaxed and the same ominous hour of 2.0 was chosen for the execution of Z.A. Bhutto on 4th April and the same aircraft of C-130 which had fetched him from Rome to rebuild the country was used to carry his mortal remains to Larkana. Bhutto was physically eliminated and the PNA leaders did not even get a crumb of power. They had to bite the bullet to work as adjuncts to the PPP for the restoration of democracy in 1984. In the meantime, the country had been set on the path of religious bigotry and militancy and sectarian polarization and plunged into the Afghan war with all its concomitant consequences. We have not yet been able to rid the country of this extremism. Even then, neither our politicians nor our military leadership have learnt any lesson from the retrogressive cycles of our short history. The author was a member of the Foreign Service of Pakistan and he has authored two books