The materialization of the US-Taliban agreement at Doha on 29th February is more face-saving for the US exit than bringing peace to Afghan soil. The signing of a peace agreement will possibly bring an end to the US-Taliban twenty years of war. The end or reduction of violence between the US and the Taliban is not tantamount to the internal peace of Afghanistan. To substantiate it, after Geneva Accord all the foreign troops left Afghanistan but the ferocious civil war remained continued between Taliban and warlords, till the formation of ‘Islamic Emirate’. So, Afghan peace is more concomitant with the understanding of internal factions or groups to direct their future political lines than the presence or absence of foreign troops. The critical question that erupts in everyone’s mind is that; will the US-Taliban agreement bring peace and stability to Afghan soil? This all depends on the complexity of the intra-Afghan dialogue. The documents signed at Doha could open its way as a good initiative for further intra-Afghan negotiations. The recent peace agreement does not highlight in detail the process of intra-Afghan dialogue. The process of intra-Afghan dialogue is an enigma. The success of the intra-Afghan dialogue is the desire of every war-torn Afghan. The consensus among the differing stakeholders in Afghanistan will surely guarantee peace and prosperity to the Afghan landscape. Equally, the succeeding agreement, in the form of intra-Afghan dialogue, is more critical than the agreement held between the US and Taliban at Doha. Regarding the intra-Afghan dialogue, both the Afghan government and the Taliban contain differing views. Mullah Abdul Salam Zaheef, being interviewed with Independent Urdu, told that (we) Taliban have not stepped back from the stance of ‘Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan’. In contrast to it, the US has agreed on our terms. He added that as the Taliban have not renounced their ‘Islamic Emirate’, so they are not liable to accept any other government including the incumbent one of Ashraf Ghani. In this regard, he emphasized that the Taliban will initiate dialogue with ‘Afghans’ not ‘Afghan government’. This will suspiciously disarray the intra-Afghan dialogue to a fiasco. Ashraf Ghani’s regime holds its own spectacular perspective regarding the intra-Afghan dialogue. The current regime is committed and crystal clear that the government cannot be dissolved at any cost to ensure peace for new settlements. Other than this, the intra-Afghan dialogue can be commenced, if the Taliban or any other faction accepts the existing government as the representative government of the Afghan people. Moreover, Ghani and his team avoid repeating the 1992’s experience when Dr. Najibullah was dethroned for the sake of acquisition of peace in Afghanistan. The intrinsic and esoteric aims of Dr. Najib’s dethronement were different from what was exoterically propagated. The end of Dr. Najib’s government crumbled the state into anarchy and civil war followed by his inhuman execution. Ghani’s vision regarding Afghanistan is based on the democratization process and that of institutionalization of institutions. The practical manifestation of both these processes needs time to nurture. The anti-Afghan factions are engrossed in derailing these processes to avoid the institutionalization of institutions and democracy at Afghan soil. Mr. Ghani is determined that toppling of the central government for the acquisition of peace is equivalent to invite anarchy and civil war to Afghanistan. He, therefore, strictly shuns this development to take place. The intra-Afghan dialogue will start with the establishment of trust among those who enter into an agreement. In this regard, the extension of a comprehensive and permanent ceasefire and releasing of prisoners will pave the way for further peace proceedings. Taliban have claimed that the US has assured the release of the five thousand imprisoned Taliban. In contrast to it, the incumbent Afghan president has contended that the authority of releasing the jailed Taliban lies with the Afghan government rather than the US. He added that the Afghan government has not signed any treaty with the US regarding the release of the Taliban. The US-Taliban agreement also advocates that the intra-Afghan dialogue will lead Afghanistan to ‘new post-settlement Afghan Islamic government’. This new post-settlement is again a mystery to be comprehended at this stage. It gives genesis to many questions. For instance, Will the new post-settlement be based on bullet or ballot? Will president Ghani quit the current government and enter into a new social contract or take a stand for sustaining the present constitution? I think Ashraf Ghani will stand firm at the ground to ensure the sustainability of constitution, completion of government tenure and mainstreaming the dissenting factions to mainstream politics. Moreover, he will never let the institutionalization process of democracy to be collapsed again. Taliban’s agenda of entering into intra-Afghan dialogue with ‘Afghans’ rather than ‘Afghan government’ is a self-contradictory argument. The recent Afghan government has the mandate of the people and can be entitled as the representatives of people by every account. President Ghani contends so. Therefore, the Taliban’s adhesion for not sitting with Afghan government is a negation of their stance to engage in peace process with ‘Afghans’. It is again feared that Taliban might not push the Afghan state and society to chaos and repeat the 1992 episode. The true peace agreement is the one if time was given to the political system to be institutionalized smoothly. The institutionalization of the system is reliant on the transition of democratic regimes. The transfer of power through a democratic way will impart strength and stability to Afghanistan and its political culture. Therefore, it is high time for all Afghan factions, to agree on the ballot rather than a bullet, to assure lasting peace to the Afghan landscape.