AJK President Sardar Masood Khan said that the Indians have installed lethal weapons at the Line of Control, which is clearly reflective of the Modi government’s aggressive designs against Pakistan. The current government in India has demonstrated its willingness to take considerable risks, including in the February 2019 crisis. Moreover, New Delhi’s August 2019 decision to revoke the special constitutional status of Kashmir underscores its willingness to reconsider long-standing norms and practices. If the next crisis starts with an Indian false flag operation, the odds are much greater than viewed: it will escalate quickly to war for reasons that the conventional South Asia crisis wisdom tends to discount. But any misadventure at the part of the Modi’s government would cost harrowing implications. Make no mistake that a nuclear conflict would be a disaster for humanity. It is an established fact that Pakistan never received any positive response from India in spite of Islamabad’s peace taking initiatives since the time PM Imran Khan has always directed its efforts to establish peace between the two countries. When Prime Minister Imran Khan took the charge he developed an ardent faith that both India and Pakistan could work together for the betterment of the region and hence he was willing to negotiate with India. But Khan’s peace aspirations with India could not succeed because of Modi’s nasty warmongering tactics of catering to his political interests. “In case of any aggression or false flag operation by India, our armed forces are ready to effectively thwart it,” FM Shah Mehmood Qureshi said in a video message shared by the Foreign Ministry. Slamming the “highly irresponsible” statement of Indian Army chief GenBipinRawat, in which the military official hinted at military escalation along the Line of Control dividing the parts of Kashmir under Pakistani and Indian control, Qureshi said, “We are peaceful nation, but our desire for peace should not be taken as weakness.” Pakistan’s Foreign Minister also claimed in the letter to the UN that India has partially removed the fence in five areas along the Line of Control (LoC) that divides Kashmir between the two countries. “The reason could only be planning for some ‘misadventure’ across the LoC,” Qureshi’s letter said. The fact of the matter is an overt nuclearization of South Asia being changed over the strategic dynamics of this region and which have so far apparently remained instrumental for deterring both India and Pakistan from indulging in any major wars On August 15, last year Modi announced the creation of the post of chief of defense staff. The decision was widely hailed by members of India’s strategic community. With that decision, Modi seems intent on transforming the Indian military. But there is no iota of doubt that to defend its territorial integrity from Indian aggression, Pakistan may not hesitate to use its nuclear capability.As for Pakistan’s nuclear operation and weapon capabilities, Islamabad has nuclear-capable aircraft such as F-16A/B and Mirage III/V) with ranges up to 2100 km, eight types of land-based ballistic missiles with possible ranges up to 2750 km, and two types of cruise missiles with ranges up to 350 km. All of India can be reached by the longest-range delivery systems. Since India has about 400 cities with more than 100,000 people, Pakistan could potentially attack slightly more than one-third of all moderate- and large-sized cities in India with its current arsenal and more than two-thirds by 2025. The nuclear researcherHansKristensen provides satellite images and locations for 10 facilities in Pakistan that may be locations of missile garrisons or nuclear-capable fighter-bombers. Pakistan is developing capabilities for sea-based nuclear weapons. According to Pakistani officials, Pakistan’s weapons are disassembled, and the parts are stored in several separate locations to reduce the possibility that terrorists might capture a usable weapon. Using satellite images, expert studies, and local news reports, in the given nuclear operational capabilities of India and Pakistan, Modi and Khan will hardly have time to make such a decision. A nuclear-armed Shaheen missile fired from inside Pakistan would arrive in New Delhi in about seven minutes. Missiles fired on a depressed trajectory could reduce these flight times further. It is extremely unlikely that warning of a missile launch would reach either Prime Minister before the missile did. Undeniably,given an inadvertent war scenario In South Asia, Modi and Khan could hardly have time to make such a decision. A nuclear-armed Shaheen missile fired from inside Pakistan would arrive in New Delhi in about seven minutes. India’s newest short-range ballistic missile, the Pralay, would strike Islamabad in less than six minutes. Missiles fired on a depressed trajectory could reduce these flight times further. It is extremely unlikely that warning of a missile launch would reach either Prime Minister before the missile did. Not only did Modi campaign on his handling of the crisis and his willingness to commit a “night of the murder, but” he also promised to strip Kashmir of its semi-autonomous status. He has now taken that step, prompting what may begin yet another cycle of violence in South Asia. Though the combined nukes of Pakistan and India are nevertheless small compared to those of the US, Russia or China, they are more powerful than those dropped on Japan in 1945 and consequently could unleash a fatal catastrophe if deployed on civilian targets. And yet, even a constrained exchange of nukes– between the two nations would, in a while be among the most calamitous ever –notwithstanding the harrowing risk of the radioactive aftermath and the long-term impact on the environment.Given that the very use of nukes could cause transgression of IHL rules, such acts of violations would certainly and potentially be subject to rules and proceedings under international criminal law (ICL). Admittedly, the use of nuclear weapons could, under specific circumstances, amount to be committing genocide, crimes against humanity, and/or war crimes. This would seem to apply irrespective of the discrepancy between the 1998 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC) and other international legal regimes, including customary law, when it comes to specific references to prohibited weapons. The fact of the matter is an overt nuclearization of South Asia being changed over the strategic dynamics of this region and which have so far apparently remained instrumental for deterring both India and Pakistan from indulging in any major wars. However, this scenario cannot be ruled out which argues that the possibility of limited war under the nuclear overhang because of the unresolved issues including the core issue of Kashmir, while change in the Indian military’s strategic thinking, massive military modernization and consistent war mongering by the Indian military and political leadership are enough indications in this regard. In his quest wage a religious war between Islam and Hinduism, Modi is trying to invest the ideology of the Armageddon in sub-continent. The writer is an independent ‘IR’ researcher and international law analyst based in Pakistan