US President Trump may have tried to play smart by suddenly calling off talks with the Taliban apparently to give a jolt to the religious militia. However, battle-hardened Taliban have equally been a hard nut to crack. Their immediate contacts with Russia, Tehran and Beijing demonstrated their ability to preempt damage President Trump’s announcement may have intended to cause to the Taliban. This also showed that during the past two decades Taliban have learnt lessons in the art of diplomacy; their calculative move and carefully crafted statements during the course of 9-month dialogue with Ambassador Zalmay Khalilzad as to how sell their point of view and muster support from the regional countries may surprise many commentators. It now transpires that the pretext President Trump used for calling off the talks was not convincing enough for most of the regional countries. Taliban have been emphatic that they had agreed to a ceasefire soon after an agreement for the withdrawal of American troops and Taliban assurances was signed, and within next ten days they would have held intra-Afghan talks. Russian President’s Special Envoy Ambassador Zamir Kabulov endorsed Taliban’s views in an interview with the Indian TV SNI. He also described President Trump’s announcement as a “setback to the peace process”. Second, Secretary of State Pompeo’s refusal to endorse the draft agreement concluded by Ambassador Khalilzad and Taliban represented the American deep state’s, including CIA and Pentagon, aversion to President Trump’s plans of withdrawing troops from Afghanistan. Third, the US belatedly agreed to the hosting of presidential elections in Afghanistan which in their reckoning would strengthen the hands of newly elected government to face the Taliban at the intra-Afghan dialogue. It is besides the point that a disappointing turnout of 20% would hardly give confidence to any government to represent as a major stakeholder in the intra-Afghan dialogue. Fourth, spoilers, both internal and external, had an upper hand in stalling the talks which underlines the complexities of the Afghan imbroglio haunting the country whenever an opportunity for reconciliation or rapprochement arises. While the above factors hardly give confidence for revival of talks in the near future, a glimmer of hope has been generated with the visit to Islamabad of American and Taliban delegations led by Ambassador Khalilzad and Mullah Baradar, respectively. Both Khalilzad and Baradar-led Taliban delegations had extensive talks with the Pakistani leadership. Hectic efforts by Prime Minister Imran Khan on the sidelines of UN General Assembly in New York paved the way for Khalilzad’s visit to Islamabad and first ever “official visit” by Mullah Baradar. Although neither denied nor confirmed, there were indications that both the delegations held face-to-face talks. The immediate result of these talks was the release of 11 Taliban by the Americans in return for the release of 3 Indian engineers. (Hopefully Modi government would take note of the good news emanating from Pakistan about the release of their citizens). There are reports that Taliban would also release two professors of the American University in Kabul, soon. Such confidence building measures could be a prelude to resumption of dialogue in the coming days and also a signal to spoilers to give peace a chance. Interestingly, the western commentators are now harping on two pre-conditions from the Americans for the resumption of dialogue with the Taliban. The first is ceasefire, to which Taliban have already made their position known that as soon as an agreement is signed specifying the withdrawal schedule of American troops from Afghanistan, they would announce the ceasefire. As for the second condition of Intra-Afghan dialogue, Americans may insist on this demand but the ground situation in the country hardly gives confidence for peace and stability returning to the war ravaged country with such talks. For instance, 28th September presidential elections instead of becoming a source of strength to the system installed by the Americans has become a battleground among competing influences led by warlords or their cronies of the Jihad era. Already Ashraf Ghani and Abdullah-Abdullah camps are claiming victory while Afghan Election Commission has to formally announce the results of the elections on 7th November. Not only rivalry between Ashraf Ghani and Abdullah-Abdullah is creating tensions in the country, President Ghani is now facing opposition from Foreign Minister Salahuddin Rabbani. The situation has become so serious that President Ghani had to ask National Security Advisor Hamdullah Mohib to represent the country in the UN General Assembly instead of Foreign Minister Rabbani. So what kind of strength presidential elections could give to the future intra-Afghan talks may be anybody’s guess. If Americans thought that by holding presidential elections they would be able to speak to the Taliban from the position of strength then that objective has not been achieved. For Pakistan, arranging the meetings of Zalmay Khalilzad and Taliban and the agreement on both sides to release prisoners was a symbolic gesture of reconciliation Even an intra-Afghan dialogue is fraught with many pitfalls. Apart from differences between different warlords, the fear of Taliban’s monopoly in the future dispensation of the country would compel various groups to look for allies, domestic and foreign, to sustain their relevance in the country’s power structure. Uncertainty has been the hallmark of the Afghan political scene, at least, during the past four decades. In the coming days this uncertainty would become more pronounced when Taliban lay their cards on the table. One thing is certain though; Taliban do not subscribe to electoral process which they call as un-Islamic. For them there is an Amir-ul-Momineen (leader of the faithful) who is chosen by the “Taliban Shura”, implying that they have nothing to do with the adult franchise. Therefore, for non-Taliban factions it would be a nightmare if not total subjugation. So far very little has come out of the Taliban camp regarding the future contours of Afghan governance. Regardless of the American objectives in Afghanistan, Taliban must realize that even if they come to power they will have to survive in the international system. They must also realize that their growing acceptance in the region is conditional to their behaviour as responsible players for the stability of the region. When the interviewer of Indian TV Channel SNI wanted to know the views of Ambassador Kabulov whether he felt comfortable with Taliban, who till recently were dubbed as terrorists, the Russian envoy’s response was straight forward: “they (Taliban) have proved their worth as a formidable power player in Afghanistan so you have to deal with them”. However, this may change if Taliban try to pursue an expansionist policy or subject its opponents to persecution. For Pakistan, arranging the meetings of Zalmay Khalilzad and Taliban and the agreement on both sides to release prisoners was a symbolic gesture of reconciliation, a CBM that can usher the two sides to resume their formal dialogue and pickup the threads they left at the Ninth Round in Doha. However, complexities of the Afghan quagmire would keep the interlocutors and their facilitators on their toes till the time they reach an amicable solution and give peace a chance. Therefore, for Pakistan a cautious approach, without playing favourites, would not only be desirable but may also win the confidence of non-Taliban Afghan groups. The writer is a former ambassador