When 9/11 kicked off the global war on terrorism, the main focus of counterterrorism efforts was Al-Qaeda (AQ) linked groups operating in the Middle East and South Asia. Close to two decades later, the United States (US) and its allies are still involved in efforts to suppress AQ and its offspring in Iraq and Afghanistan, albeit perhaps not for much longer. After an exhausting effort, the US is signaling a shift elsewhere as the Islamic State (which rose from the ashes of al Qaeda in Iraq) has suffered a comprehensive reverse, while Washington has sat down for talks with the Taliban as a precursor to a possible withdrawal of US and allied troops from Afghanistan over the next several years. At a press conference in Kabul on Wednesday, Syed Mohammad Akbar Agha, who is the current leader of Rah-e-Nejat (High Council of Salvation), said President Ashraf Ghani’s government is sabotaging peace talks being held in Qatar between Taliban representatives and US officials.”The government doesn’t want peace. They are still targeting civilian areas while claiming to have targeted Taliban hideouts,” Agha told international media, adding that air raids are being carried out “almost every day”.”We are all positive about peace and very serious, especially now that Mullah Abdul Ghani Baradar is directly involved in the talks in Qatar,” he said.”We are expecting positive results for peace in Afghanistan.”Taliban and United States officials are meeting for the third day on Wednesday in Qatar’s capital Doha, where two main issues being discussed in the high-level talks are: the withdrawal of US troops from Afghanistan, and assurances that Afghanistan will not be used by foreign armed fighters. The talks have gained momentum in recent months after the US decided to engage with the Taliban, which has been waging a deadly armed rebellion since the group was removed from power in 2001. But just as extremist activity has waned in relative terms, in the Middle East and Afghanistan, Islamist militancy has increased in different parts of Africa, particularly following the collapse of Moammar Gadhafi’s government in Libya, which created a power vacuum that sparked increased jihadist activity in the Sahel and Sahara. The escalation of Mali’s conflict in 2012, when lingering jihadists from AQ in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) combined with local Tuareg tribes, has led to a situation in which several new successors operate from Algeria and Libya all the way to Burkina Faso. But before these groups came to the fore in the Sahara and the Sahel, two other groups were already active: al Shabaab in Somalia, which appeared in 2006, and Boko Haram, which emerged in 2009 before evolving into the Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP). More than a decade on, these two groups are still stalking the continent. As a result, Africa has now become home to some of the most active jihadist groups in the world. That, in turn, appears set to shift the focus for militants and those battling them alike to the continent, even if local factors are likely to make the battle there very different than in the Middle East. As the IS caliphate is no more; the Sahel, Sahara and East Africa may become the destination of choice for foreign fighters From the perspective of jihadist groups, Africa may bring renewed opportunities for them. With the Islamic State on the wane in its heartland, the Sahel, Sahara and East Africa may attract an increasing number of foreign fighters. Whats more, groups operating there may also witness a surge in support from foreign financiers who had previously directed their funds to the Middle East. Nevertheless, Africa’s emergence as a prominent area for militancy illustrates more the repression of AQ and Islamic State (IS) activity in the Middle East and Afghanistan than it does an uptick in jihadist operations on the continent. The biggest surge in militancy in Africa actually occurred between 2006 and 2012 – but that was at a time when the activities of AQ-affiliated groups in Iraq, Yemen and Afghanistan drew more of the world’s resources. Naturally, IS captured even more of the globe’s attention when it burst onto the scene, seizing Mosul in 2014. But even if jihadists in Africa have grabbed fewer international headlines like their brethren in the Middle East, they invariably have proved themselves resilient through the years, despite a number of African-led security operations, as well as Western-led interventions. With less need for counterterrorism resources in the Middle East or Afghanistan, Africa’s stubborn militant movements are likely to come more onto the radar of external powers, as well as become a magnet for foreign fighters no longer able to battle in the Levant. That, however, does not entail that the conflict between militants and the states intent on eliminating them will proceed in Africa as it did in the Middle East. In the latter, the conduct of Western counterterrorism operations has dovetailed with other geopolitical imperatives. Accordingly, Western countries have worked with and through their local allies, reinforcing their regional position and guaranteeing a stable environment for economic interests. Those same interests simply don’t translate to the African theatre. For one, the global economic importance of the Sahel, Sahara and Somalia is much more limited than that of the Middle East, which is a hub of oil production and transit activity. This means that over time, states different from those that have spearheaded activities in the Middle East and South Asia, especially the US, may come to prominence in countering terrorism in Africa. And with a different set of regional interests involved in the global fight against militancy, the African theatres might not attract the same degree of interest in future global counterterrorism operations. External actors other than the US traditionally have taken the lead against militants in the Sahel and Sahara. Since its intervention in Mali in 2013, the most prominent outside power in the conflict has been France. Paris’ deep historical ties to the Sahara and Sahel, as well as its wealth of military experience in the area, have put it in the driver’s seat when it comes to counterterrorism efforts in most of the continent’s theaters, although it has also received support from the US and its European allies. But because it possesses fewer total resources than the US, France has also worked to play a supporting role for local governments by enhancing local and regional capabilities, such as through the G5 Sahel Force. Nevertheless, the weaknesses of African security forces have forced Paris at times to act directly through its Operation Barkhane. France’s central role in Africa does not preclude US engagement on the continent. The US has been particularly active in the Horn of Africa, where it maintains the ability to rapidly engage in counterterrorism operations from its base in Djibouti. Thanks to this presence, the US has supported continued operations against al Shabaab and IS in Somalia. In the years to come, such efforts are only likely to intensify. Meanwhile in West Africa, the US military’s Africa Command (AFRICOM) has continued to develop regional logistical capabilities that indicate a longer-term commitment to supporting counterterrorism operations there. Nevertheless, the US is unlikely to be front and centre in pursuing jihadists in Africa. The country’s military planners have displayed a reluctance to dig in too deeply, particularly after a militant attack on the US Green Berets in Niger, while Washington also views some of these groups as less of a direct threat to the US, meaning it can delegate the bulk of the responsibility for counterterrorism operations in the area to France. Now that the IS caliphate is no more, the Sahel, Sahara and East Africa may become the destination of choice for foreign fighters, a fact that is unlikely to escape the notice of outside powers. Ultimately, however, militant groups might find the time and space to hone their capabilities, particularly if external powers feel less geopolitical imperative to devote resources to stabilising areas of Africa in which the jihadist threat is highest. That’s something that could further destabilise local states and even travel back up the transnational jihadist network to inflict harm on Europe and the US themselves. The writer is a news anchor Published in Daily Times, March 5th 2019.