Daily Times

Sir: Bribe-seeking reduces government revenue, actual wealth-creation, economic efficiency (profiteering without hard work and innovation) and results in poor allocation of resources, income inequality (ostentatious lifestyle), and national decline. But, Tullock noticed a decline in corruption. He wonders why `the world is not more corrupt than it already is, given the lure of benefits derived from bribe-taking `for tax, subsidy and other favours from politicians and bureaucrats. He explains that `cost (bribe) of seeking favours from the government is lowered by competition between favour-givers to pocket bribes from citizens. Favour-givers demanding lower bribes can out-compete those demanding higher bribes, thus limiting corruption’. In USA, favour-givers are handicapped in pushing up price of bribe due to several factors _ underhanded’ nature of the deal, unavailability of legal recourse to recover unpaid bribe (electoral donations), and reputational aura (gentlemanly constraint).

The paradox is nullified by Pakistan. Here, there is ever-growing greed among politicians and bureaucrats to amass wealth. Bribe — givers honestly pay bribes (`commissions’) without blowing a whistle even under judicial wrath.

Another paradox belied by Pakistan is the economics indifference principle (Steven Landsburg, The Armchair Economist, 1993) — ‘nothing can make people happier than the next best alternative. The marginal utility of social benefits that people derive from the initial choice (PTI) drops gradually until it equals the utility derived from the alternative (PML-N or PTI).

For instance, a child might prefer chocolates to ice cream until he has had too many chocolates. In Pakistan, the politicians offer neither chocolates nor ice-cream to the people. Yet, they are voted back into power again and again? Why hungry people don’t rebel? (Ilya Somin, The Hunger Games and Gordon Tullock’s Paradox of Revolution, December 18, 2014)

SAMAN JAVED MALIK

Rawalpindi

Published in Daily Times, November 16^th 2018.