Fazlullah was eliminated in a drone attack on June 13 in Kunar, north-eastern province of Afghanistan bordering Pakistan. The news of his death was confirmed by the Afghan defence ministry after two days. Subsequently, Afghanistan’s president also called the Pakistani Chief of Army Staff to affirm it. Though it was big news, the response to the death of this agent of destruction from Swat at least on social media feeds in the Pakhtun region was a guarded one. Instead of sending a wave of relief to the terrorism affected region, the overwhelming response was that elimination of a proxy could not eradicate terrorism unless the hands and policies that produced such characters were devitalised. These apprehensions are not mere paranoia, but are based on hard facts and empirical evidence. Consequently, such developments in the War on Terror, from elimination of Baitullah Mehsud to Fazlullah by US drones, to the US Seal’s sting operation in Abottabad killing Osama Bin Laden on May 2, 2011, raised more questions than answers. If most of the high profile dons of the TTP terror syndicate had been eliminated by US drones then who was the target of multiple ruthless military operations by our state? Except Fazlullah, all other TTP terrorists were killed by the drone on this side of the Durand Line. The elimination of Fazlullah is also a blow to the narrative of the Pakistani security establishment that he was provided sanctuary by the Afghan government. Some self-appointed defence analysts went to the extent of alleging that TTP was a band of Khawarij and was playing into the hands of NDS and CIA. But what is their response to the NDS and CIA eliminating their own assets? More importantly but ominously, the death of Fazlullah refreshed once again the question of how he was able to escape from Swat at a time when even a bird would not dare fly freely over Swat? People would have forgotten all the previous atrocities committed in the name of national interest and security if the powerful institutions of this state had put a full stop to the factors responsible for this mayhem. Alas! That is not the case. The continuation of selling old wine in a new bottle bespoke of the reality of mere change in tactics by employing a lay low approach. No visible fundamental change occurred in the blue print of national interests and security policies, two cornerstones contrived by the powerful military in the 1990s. The sudden appearance of Jihadi elements — mostly affiliated with the banned JUD — in local mosques, where they deliver speeches on Jihad on the same pattern as that of the 1990s, is quite alarming In the aftermath of the last military operation in 2009, the military used all power in its kit to (re)claim Swat by turning it into a global model for the War on Terror. The militancy and terrorism were also portrayed as the outcome of religious extremism and radicalism but the first sign of normality was conveyed through the introduction of a mass Tableeghi Ijtima (congregation) on the bank of Swat River in Barikot. The first three-day congregation started on April 26, 2012 where everyone all over the country could participate without any hindrance. Citing reasons of security and public safety, only those public events organised under the army’s patronage were allowed. By contrast, tourists and the local people of Swat had to undergo strict security mechanisms on a daily basis, such as passing through checkposts. In the name of security, the army oppressively managed sites demarcating them secure or otherwise. In the same year, 2012 also witnessed something which was a new phenomenon for the people of Swat. Eid-Milaad-u-Nabi on Rabiul Awal 12, was publicly celebrated under state patronage and protection. Since 2012 the event is regularly celebrated at Wadoodya Hall, Saidu Sharif with much fanfare. Apparently, it was encouraged at the time in the name of countering Deobandi radicalism, which the majority of the Taliban adhere to, notwithstanding the Tableeghis who are mostly affiliated to the Deobandi school of thought. As I remember from my childhood, the Imam of Balakhti mosque in Koozabandai was a Barelvi, wearing a green turban and used to celebrate the event inside the mosque with a few disciples. Save that, I had never heard or witnessed those celebrations in other parts of the area. The only indication of the event were colourful streamers flailing across the mosque’s gate. It was mostly a domestic affair as majority of the people celebrated by distributing sweets or cooked rice in the neighbourhood without organising processions or public events. Currently it has taken a formal shape in Swat as well as other parts of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa in the form of the Milli Muslim League and TYLP. According to reports, candidates of these organisations submitted nomination papers to contest the forthcoming election in July. A recent discussion with local commentators, social and political activists revealed that Jamaat-ud-Dawa (JUD) reached the dwellers of far flung mountainous areas, mostly the Gujjar community through its welfare organisation Falahi Insaniyat. This organisation was extremely active and preferred by the state organs to distribute relief goods after the military operation and the 2010 floods in Swat. As per the available information, one of the candidates for general election affiliated with the Hafiz Saeed led MML. Presently, MML is using the platform of Allaho Akbar Tehreek, belongs to the Gujjar community hailing from the village of Toat Banai in Kabal tehsil. However, more alarming is the sudden appearance of jihadi elements — mostly affiliated with the banned JUD — in local mosques, where they deliver speeches on Jihad on the same pattern as that of the 1990s. The major reference point is Kashmir, Palestine, Syria and Burma and with an oblique reference to PTM dubs it anti-state for criticising state institutions. But astonishingly, there was no mention of atrocities in Yemen. According to my sources and information, these elements were confronted and prevented from delivering provocative speeches in mosques by the locals in Phase VII E IV, Ibrahimi Mosque, Hayatabad in Peshawar, Daggai a village in Swabi and at a mosque opposite the general bus stand in Mingora, Swat in the recent month of Ramazan. In all three instances, the persons who confronted them were PTM activists. This makes obvious why the good Taliban as well as state institutions are after the PTM. When the PTM activists came out in Islamabad to protests against the good Taliban’s attacks on PTM’s Ali Wazir and his comrade in Wana on June 3, 37 people were arrested from the surroundings of the National Press Club before the protest and subsequently charged under sections on treason and anti-state activities. The session judge not only rejected their bail application before Eid but also added section 7 and referred their case to the Anti-Terrorism Court. They are still incarcerated. The state’s manipulations portend a gloomy picture. This country and its people have suffered a lot due to such myopic policies and are not ready to bear it anymore. State institutions should refrain from bulldozing and imposing them on gun point, otherwise the resulting destruction would be unthinkable. Please take note! The 1990s are over. The writer is a political analyst hailing from Swat. Tweets @MirSwat Published in Daily Times, June 21st 2018.