Why do nations and states go to war? This is a pivotal question that has attracted massive amount of literature and forced the scholars to think and reflect their thoughts in several ways. The human civilisation right from its inception has witnessed one particular aspect that remained constant and continuous while at the same time it accelerated and took numerous forms. Apart from scholars, military thinkers, philosophers and even war veterans dedicated their whole lives in search of this question that has dominated human history. General William Tecumseh Sherman — hero of the American Civil War (1861-1865), argued that ‘War is hell.’ Sherman, along with his soldiers and comrades saw the bloody battles in which blood, flesh, and bones were all subjected to violence of extreme level. Though, Sherman out-performed on the battlefields of the Civil War but it is noticeable that the horrors of war made him to think the other way. Who first resorts to war — the weak or the powerful? This inherent question keeps scholars thinking. It is argued by many that great power comes with great responsibility. However, it is one’s assertion that the initiation of war does not necessarily lie with the powerful. It is conceivable that the powerful being powerful has a lot to lose in relation to the weaker one. The start of war is highly context dependent and it would not be a surprise that the powerful may find itself in a difficult situation simply by starting a war. Now, undisputedly it is more or less of a ‘Chicken Dilemma’ — especially when hostilities exist. Like the rest of the world, war has dominated the South Asian region — perhaps since ancient times. Though, the character and nature of war shifted fundamentally due to revolution in military affairs (RMAs) which have had their foundations in technology and advancement in military thought. Military thinkers and strategists relentlessly try to refine warfare by adopting and adapting to the circumstances their fighting forces might be dealing with while conducting their respective operations. Generally, doctrines and field manuals enable commanders and forces for the attainment of objectives in this regard. The nature of war is shifting globally; however, it did not completely fade the traditional and conventional methods of war-fighting. It cements one’s belief in the previous argument that military forces around the globe are striving hard to modernise their troops along with advanced equipment and better training. Furthermore, to augment, refine and define their particular roles in hostile environments — military forces sharpen and hone their offensive as well as defensive force postures and doctrines — primarily, not to start a war but to evade it; nevertheless, when it becomes unavoidable — to fight and win it. The nature of war is shifting globally; however, it did not completely fade the traditional and conventional methods of war-fighting The generations of war have had a profound effect on warfare and the war fighting actors. As it is argued by Col Antulio J Echevarria in his monograph titled as ‘Fourth-Generation War and Other Myths’ (2005) that “warfare has evolved through four generations: 1) the use of massed manpower, 2) firepower, 3) manoeuvre, and now 4) an evolved form of insurgency that employs all available networks — political, economic, social, military — to convince an opponent’s decision-makers that their strategic goals are either unachievable or too costly.” The contemporary era is witnessing warfare of a different kind called the hybrid warfare. According to Merriam-Webster, the word hybrid has its origins in the Latin language called as hybrida which means a combination of two or more distinct elements. The literal meaning of the word actually tells that hybrid warfare does not remain limited to a single domain of fighting and it employs various facets of warfare. It is one’s observation that hybrid warfare is reminiscent of Unrestricted Warfare — a book published by Peoples’ Liberation Army (PLA) Literature and Arts Publishing House, Beijing, China, back in the year 1999. The authors were Qiao Liang and Wang Xiangsui, who at that time were serving senior colonels in PLA. They argued more or less the same about employing a combination of different warfare and tactics for the achievement of objectives. Especially, the Chapter 7 of the book primarily deals with the combination of methods. People talk about love — it’s good; however, to love, one must know the art of love. Similarly, war and warfare are two distinctly separate entities; nonetheless, they are inherently dependent upon each other. It can be argued that war being the mean, warfare acts as the instrument and victory remains the end. Without knowing warfare, how can a war be fought and won? The writer can be reached at: firstname.lastname@example.org Published in Daily Times, May 30th 2018.