Forgive the alliteration. But one of the most crucial issues for international security is the future of the rift between the West and Russia. Is this rift reparable? If the answer is yes, how might this be achieved? Or, is this confrontation a 21st century version of the past Cold War in which the inimical interests of the parties, as opposed to the competing ideologies of democracy and communism, make it impossible for any lasting arrangement to take hold for some time to come? If this is the case, what then might be a modus vivendi to prevent further deterioration of and miscalculation in the relationship as a temporary palliative? If no such framework exists or can be made to work, what then is Plan B? An objective assessment of how this standoff and conflict came to be requires both East and West and the U.S. and Russia to accept some of the blame. From Washington’s perspective, the expansion of NATO posed no danger to Russia. Interventions into Afghanistan, Iraq and Libya were very much justified at the time. Moscow’s warnings on NATO expansion and the interventions were not heeded. Nor did the American side see George W. Bush’s promise of NATO membership for Georgia and Ukraine at the 2008 NATO Bucharest Summit as particularly threatening to Russia. President Vladimir Putin strongly disagreed and bluntly told Mr. Bush that if this offer stood, consequences would follow. Several months later, Putin baited a trap into which Georgia readily fell. The war was short and one-sided. The result was contested borders making Georgia ineligible for NATO membership. The cause celebre that solidified this rift was Moscow’s intervention into Ukraine and the illegal annexation of Crimea in 2014. From the West’s perception, Moscow had violated the “rules based order” of the post-Cold War and the sanctity of international borders. That Moscow continued to deny the presence of Russian troops in eastern Ukraine despite irrefutable evidence to the contrary convinced President Barack Obama that Putin’s word could no longer be trusted. And Moscow’s military intervention in Syria to save the regime of Bashar al Assad led to charges of war crimes over the brutal bombings of civilian targets including hospitals and humanitarian relief columns. Russian hacking of the Democratic Party’s emails and “active measures” to interfere with the American 2016 elections were further strains on an already tense relationship. Moscow issued denials of any interference refuted by America’s intelligence agencies who maintained possessing incontrovertible evidence of Russian hacking. That President Obama could tell President Putin “to knock it off” at the G-20 meeting last Fall did not enhance the relationship. Allegations of President Donald Trump’s deeper involvement with Russia are now roiling American politics. However, members of his election team including son-in-law Jared Kushner and his two sons indeed had contacts with Russian sources raising troubling questions. The resignation of former National Security Advisor Michael Flynn for concealing conversations with Russian Ambassador to the US Sergey Kislyak added to this controversy. And Attorney General Jeff Session’s failure under oath to disclose meetings with Russian officials and in written answers to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee have been high octane fuel for this smoldering tale now called “Tower-gate” over the president’s unproven assertion that Obama ordered wiretapping of Mr. Trump.From Moscow’s perspective, the United States could no longer be trusted to behave responsibly in international politics promiscuously applying military force that exacerbated already volatile conditions. Assaults into Afghanistan however justified and then Iraq over non-existent weapons of mass destruction have plunged the regions into chaos and created the Islamic State (IS). Libya was the last straw to Moscow as the killing of Muramar Qaddafi in 2011 has exploded into civil war. And the continued expansion of NATO to surround Russia was perceived as a direct threat to “containing” Russian ambitions. Concurrently, while Moscow denies “active measures” to disrupt Western countries and interfere in domestic politics, Russia has taken a page from the American playbook. From the end of World War-II through the 1970’s the CIA actively interfered in supporting friendly regimes irrespective of adherence to democratic principles while attempting to topple unfriendly governments. These activities ranged from Greece and Italy in the late 1940’s to Africa, South America, Iran in 1953 with the overthrow of Mohammed Mossadegh and of course Vietnam. That Mr. Trump’s administration appears ambivalent towards Russia is not a good sign. The president has gone out of his way to seem supportive of Mr. Putin. Yet, Nikki Haley, his ambassador to the UN, has reacted strongly against Russian aggression in Syria and Ukraine. And the Pentagon still considers Russia the number one danger as a potentially existential threat to America given its strategic nuclear arsenal. Hence, as Lenin famously asked, “what is to be done?” First, it is vital to identify any shared or common interests. Obviously avoiding war or unwanted crises is the top priority. Acting against international terror particularly the Islamic State (IS) is second. Third is adhering to current arms agreements or putting further limits on nuclear weapons numbers and possible proliferation. A distant fourth is reaching agreement on Syria and Ukraine that could lead to the lifting of sanctions against Russia. For any of these common interests to lead to reducing tensions, what is needed is dialogue. The standard heads of government summit is too short for a complete range of discussions. After Pearl Harbor, British Prime Minister Winston Churchill spent two weeks in the United States with President Franklin Roosevelt that produced the strategy for winning World War-II. No one is suggesting two weeks are needed for a Putin-Trump meeting. However, a carefully scripted and well-prepared agenda is essential. Part of this can be accomplished in prior military to military and diplomatic talks, currently forbidden by the National Defense Authorization Act in retaliation for Russian interventions in Ukraine and Syria. Despite Congress’ understandable reaction, cutting off military contacts is not a smart way for determining how relations might be improved and crises avoided. This column has speculated that President Trump may have a grand bargain in mind for negotiations with Russia. Theoretically, provided the land mines and traps can be avoided, that approach could be helpful. If however it fails, a Plan B is needed. To work, a Plan B must be based on the realization that responding to 21st century challenges in the form of active measures and asymmetric, non-military tools cannot be effective using 20th century means. While deploying four battalions of troops to the Baltics and rotating a US Brigade Combat Team to Poland is reassuring to NATO allies, these augmented military forces have virtually no role in denying Russian active measures. As argued in last week’s column, NATO needs a new strategy. But, as chaos and confusion reign in Washington, and Moscow obviously is playing a wait and see game, valuable time is being wasted. Perhaps cooler heads in the NSC, the State and Defense Departments will prevail and are thinking these issues through. For the benefit of all, let us hope that is being done. The writer is UPI’s Arnaud de Borchgrave Distinguished Columnist, a Senior Advisor at Washington D.C.’s Atlantic Council and chairman of two private companies. His next book due out this year is Anatomy of Failure: Why America Loses Wars It Starts that argues failure to know and to understand the circumstances in which force is used guarantees failure. The writer can be reached on Twitter @harlankullman