Daily Times

What might be Russian President Vladimir Putin’s next steps towards Europe, the West, and the United States for advancing Russian interests globally? Obviously, the policies of the Trump administration are, at best, unclear if not contradictory. Putin needs to understand who in the White House and administration is key in making policy.

An iron law of politics in Washington is that influence on the president is inversely proportional to physical distance from the Oval Office. While Secretary of Defense Jim Mattis is by far the most experienced and knowledgeable senior appointee in national security and defence, the Pentagon is metaphorically a million political miles away from 1600 Pennsylvania Avenue. In contrast, Secretary of State Rex Tillerson has so far been relatively invisible in setting a mark on US foreign policy.

No doubt the FSB has compiled dossiers on the two Stephens — Bannon and Miller — who appear to hold sway over much of President Donald Trump’s thinking. That should make for interesting reading. Last weekend, the Washington Post ran a lengthy piece on Bannon’s personal history uncovering a man who combined secrecy and a vagabond existence with no clear permanent place of residence, and the new National Security Advisor (NSA) Lt. General H.R. McMaster has not been in place long enough to detect what his future policies may or may not be.

Putin has been described as someone who reads and learns from history. If that is correct, the Russian president only needs to go back four or five decades for appropriate lessons. The most relevant is President Richard Nixon’s triangular politics balancing the Soviet Union with an outreach to China. The second is Ronald Reagan’s firm stand on intermediate nuclear forces that ultimately led to the Intermediate Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF) between Moscow and Washington.

For much of the Cold War and certainly during the Eisenhower/Kennedy/Johnson administrations, the main enemy was the threat of ‘monolithic communism’ embodied in the unshakable ‘alliance’ between Moscow and Beijing. Of course, this monolithic threat was nonsense. Nixon understood or at least believed that major fissures existed. Hence, the overture to China not only eased withdrawal from the Vietnam War. Détente with the Soviet Union followed along with the ABM Treaty and Strategic Arms Limitations agreements.

In the face of powerful anti-nuclear forces demanding disarmament in the West, Reagan persisted in deploying both cruise and Pershing missiles to Europe to counter Moscow’s SS-20’s. Perseverance paid off. The INF treaty led to the withdrawal of these systems. Ironically, the aims of the nuclear disarmament factions were partly achieved because of Reagan’s steadfastness.

For Putin, as Nixon exploited the USSR-PRC cleavages, Moscow can do the same regarding the U.S. and pressures in Europe eroding alliance cohesion and the chaos in the Middle East and Persian Gulf. From Ronald Reagan, Putin must not back down once he embarks on his policy choices. Should he heed the successes of both American presidents and act accordingly, he will present a most formidable challenge for Washington.

As Putin gazes across the geostrategic landscape, what does he conclude? First, the seemingly monolithic cohesion of NATO and the EU is in tatters. Brexit, populism, the popularity of both President Trump and senator Bernie Sanders, elections in Netherlands (on March 16th) and France and Germany later in the year, and the growing rift between Turkey, Netherlands and Denmark and possible confrontation with the U.S. in Syria over the Kurds are indicators that “something is rotten” in these alliances. This ‘rottenness’ can be exploited as Nixon did in the early 1970’s with China and Russia.

Secondly, conditions in the Middle East and Persian Gulf are even riper for Russian engagement than before. As the battle for Raqqa appears to grow closer, U.S. support and reliance on Kurdish Pesh Merga and YPG forces enflame vehement Turkish hostility towards the PKK (Kurdish People’s Party) and the Kurds. Further, the concern if not alarm of the Arab Gulf states over the P-5 Plus One nuclear agreement with Iran and growing costs of the Yemen intervention provide Moscow an opportunity to play honest broker.

Signs have been present of increasing Russian presence. Russian arms deal with Iran, Egypt, possibly Libya and the UAE, along with sales to Egypt, give the Arab states an alternative to the US. Worse for the US, greater Russian access to these markets can lead to better understanding of the capability and technology of weapons the U.S. has sold. Along with arms sales, achieving greater influence is not impossible. How then might Putin’s fertile mind (or of those around him) be working? The major if not overriding aims are to enhance Russian security on geostrategic, political and economic levels. That means reducing or dissolving the coherence of NATO and the EU. In the Middle East, it means focusing on eliminating the danger of the Islamic State and other terrorist groups that could or do reach into Russia while reducing the influence of the US.

A weakened Europe almost certainly could be manipulated to give relief from sanctions imposed over annexation of Crimea. Election of populists such as Marine Le Pen could lead to ‘Frexit’ and very likely the beginning of the end of the EU. Whether Le Pen would attempt a Charles de Gaulle and withdraw from NATO militarily or entirely is surely not impossible. Moreover, the electoral defeat of German Chancellor Angela Merkel by a government more favourably disposed to Russia is likewise not beyond belief.

Regarding South Asia, especially on matters related to India and Pakistan, Russia has real interests in increasing its influence and arms sales. From the side-lines, Russia could be helpful in Afghanistan by virtue of its relationship with Iran and becoming an honest broker meditating between India and Pakistan. This is what the US has attempted to do with little success. Now that the Trump administration may be following an ‘America First’ policy, interest in becoming embroiled further in the region is an opening for Moscow.

So, what to expect? If Putin is as clever as some believe, the opportunities are too great to waste. Reliance as in the past on military intimidation through no notice exercises and increased military deployment to borders with the West and Kaliningrad in the Baltic would be replaced by both subtle and ‘active measures.’ As Nixon exploited cleavages between China and the Soviet Union, Putin would leverage the fault lines in the alliance. Closer relations with Turkey would provide leverage both in Northern Europe and in Syria especially if Ankara were perceived to be moving towards Moscow’s orbit.

Propaganda, fake news, disinformation and misinformation, hacking and the buying of political fellow travellers in these states are tools the Kremlin knows how to use. If Western cohesion cannot be entirely shattered, it is unlikely that these activities would provide a new cause celebre around which NATO and the EU might unite as during the Cold War. Given the tensions in the Gulf and uncertainty of what comes next when or if Mosul and Raqqa fall, Russian influence without the involvement of large number of military forces surely will grow. A further benefit is that if the Trump administration continues to increase forces in the fight against IS, it too might be caught in a quagmire. Time will tell to see how clever Putin may or may not be.

The writer is UPI’s Arnaud de Borchgrave Distinguished Columnist, a Senior Advisor at Washington D.C.’s Atlantic Counciland chairman of two private companies. His next book due out this year is Anatomy of Failure: Why America Loses Wars It Starts that argues failure to know and to understand the circumstances in which force is used guarantees failure. The writer can be reached on Twitter @harlankullman