As the Tashkent conference for Afghan peace wrapped up, the Taliban were conspicuous by their absence; with the Uzbek government and its western allies trying to cajole them into getting on board. Yet, in truth, the talks themselves were rather overshadowed by reports of American missteps dating back to the previous administration. For over the weekend, the US media reported how Akhtar Mohammad Mansour, the then Taliban leader, had been engaged in secret dialogue with the Obama White House; some seven or so months after assuming the reins of the insurgent group. These clandestine meetings took place in Doha, where the Taliban had set up office back in 2013; with both sides agreeing that they would deny talks had ever taken place in the event of their becoming public knowledge. So far, so good. Especially given that the US, along with Pakistan, had noted the need for a negotiated settlement to the conflict way back in the initial days of Operation Enduring Freedom. Indeed, Hamid Karzai, who served as the head of the interim set-up following the overthrow of the Taliban, was among the first to put out feelers towards this end only to be rebuffed by then Defence secretary Donald Rumsfeld. What followed over the years was a round of stop-start moves towards peace that eventually petered out some time in 2012. Meaning that the February 2016 dialogue with Mansour should have been pursued with renewed invigoration, if not enthusiasm. Yet by that May — the Taliban chief was dead. The US had learned that he was in Dubai and yet reportedly dilly-dallied too long before approaching the UAE government to have him taken off a plane headed for Iran. The next day, Mansour was back in Pakistan and a US drone was waiting to take him out. The official line is that the Taliban chief was an obstacle to peace due to the group’s ongoing hits against international forces in the country. But then the US and its allies had not halted their military offensive either. Meaning that it will always be a lost gamble when an occupying power lays down preconditions for talks but refuses to meet its partners for peace at least halfway. For this creates a gaping trust deficit. As does ‘arresting’ and shipping off to the legal black hole of Guantanamo Bay those wishing to down arms and surrender. This new information raises important questions, such as: why the Americans went ahead and assassinated, on Pakistani soil no less, the man they believed could hold the key to Taliban peace? Especially considering the current pressure on this country to drag the group to the negotiating table. Or, why Washington officials did not approach Mansour directly; given that this would have been their first opportunity to talk to a leader of the Taliban since the group took over Afghanistan back in 1996? This is to say nothing of the greatly reduced US military presence that suggested peace was, indeed, the way forward. Pakistan played a positive role at Tashkent; and should continue to do so behind-the-scenes. But it must also make clear that being scapegoated for failure to get the Taliban on board will be a non-negotiable red-line. For while the no-strings-attached peace package put forward by President Ghani last month may well be, according to the western gaze, the best deal that the group will ever get — it nonetheless circumvents the issue of how the US, as the occupying military power, has not as yet proved itself serious about reconciliation. Thus it is up to the latter to rebuild the trust deficit. If, that is, it wants to see a secure and stable region; as well as two neighbours at peace with each other. And this means being clear when one is dealing with terrorists and partners for peace. Whatever the commander of the commander of American forces in Afghanistan might say. * Published in Daily Times, March 28th 2018.