Afghan officials were rightly concerned when a conference on Afghanistan was organised in Moscow without their presence in December 2016. China, Pakistan and Russia had participated in the tripartite consultation while the United States also wasn’t invited. To dispel the impression that Pakistan was trying to forge an alliance to counter the perceived Indo-Afghan partnership, Moscow hosted another meeting after two months in February 2017. Afghanistan, Pakistan, Russia, China, Iran and India participated this time. In March 2017, Afghan National Security Adviser (NSA) Haneef Atmar visited Moscow to hold dialogue with the Russians on several issues including counterterrorism and bilateral ties. These developments seem to indicate hectic diplomatic efforts as the Afghan Taliban have signalled their willingness to attend the upcoming Moscow conference. It is, henceforth, significant to unravel the emerging extremist landscape, especially in Afghanistan and the Pashtun belt of Pakistan. The self-styled Islamic State of Khorasan (ISK) and its affiliates, including the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) and the Pakistani Taliban, seem to be drawing lines against the region. In the meanwhile, regional states are engaged in hectic diplomatic efforts to re-adjust strategic alliances. The ISK, previously based in areas on both sides of the Durand Line, has recently expanded its presence in the north and west of Afghanistan. It has started its recruitment drive from the areas previously under the influence of Lashkar-e-Islam of Khyber Agency. The splinter groups of Pakistani Taliban and IMU seem to have already forged strategic and tactical alliance with the ISK. While Afghanistan is concerned about the expansion and the recruitment base of the ISK, the group has already claimed responsibility for the recent attack on a Sufi shrine in Pakistan that killed 88 people. It was also blamed for the deaths of six aid workers in northern Afghanistan. Some Afghan officials accuse Pakistan of allowing the ISK to expand its strategic influence on both sides of the Durand Line. The expansion of ISK to the north and west of Afghanistan has also caused ripples in the security circles of Iran and Russia. Kunduz and Badakhshan are reported to have become safe havens for the IMU, ISK, JuA, Lashkar-e-Tayyaba (LeT) and Laskhare Jhangvi (LeJ). Pakistan, on the other hand, blames the Afghans for protecting the Pakistani Taliban that regularly launch attacks against Pakistan. Having witnessed strategic complications in Syria and Yemen, both Russia and Iran have been working on the assumption that ISK might be facilitated, in one way or the other, by the US and her allies in Afghanistan. Iran and Russia seem to incline towards the simplistic approach to use the Afghan Taliban as counterbalance to the ISK. Iran also seems to be weary of the ISK’s stark bias against the Isna Ashari (Shia) interpretation of Islam. The ISK considers Shias to be heretic. Iran assumes that this brings the ISK closer to Saudi Arabia’s interests. Hence, both Iran and Russia might have developed the proclivity to pit certain groups each other. Pakistan is said to have offered its facilitation to bring Russia and the Afghan Taliban closer together on the assumption that the Pakistani and Afghan Taliban are ideologically distinct entities. India and the US, on the other hand, seem to consider the Afghan Taliban and the Haqqani Network formidable threats to their interests. Another complication in this intricate geo-strategic matrix seems to be the perceived understanding in Russia and China that the US’ influence in the region might be shrinking under Donald Trump. The security apparatuses of all the above-mentioned states seem to have nurtured two major illusions. These illusions have threatened their vital interests in the past and might continue to pose challenges in the coming years too. First, the security establishments of these states tend to ignore close ideological linkages among religious militias. Second, the security establishments of these states have nurtured an illusion that they would be able to use a group of their choice against other states without any backlash. Afghanistan may probably remain an arena for strategic interests of regional and global powers in the long-run. The collision might, once again, inflict death and destruction upon locals on a large scale but there could be a huge drawback in terms of pitting militants against certain states. The One Belt, One Road (OBOR) initiative, the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), and multi-million dollar Chinese-sponsored projects in Afghanistan might tempt China to play cementing role in the region. Moreover, the extremist movements in Chinese territory may also compel China to convince other powers to withdraw support to militancy. The writer is a political analyst based in Peshawar. He can be reached at khadimhussain565@gmail.com and tweets @khadimhussain4