Daily Times

It was mother nature against which a state was formed to protect its citizens. Another state replacing nature led to the emergence of an interstate prototype — friendly or unfriendly — in the world. This is the point where Niccolo Machiavelli made his mark by describing interstate relations driven by national interest. Every state was out to set its own ambitions and objectives to achieve under the guise of national interest. Consequently, the realist school of thought emerged to rationalise even war under the same ruse.

Amongst the given shades of imprudence, the worst is labelling expediency as national interest. Pakistan has been a victim of this (mal) practice couched in the term military alliances. When Pakistan signed its first Mutual Defence Assistance Agreement with the US in May 1954, its history of military alliances ensued. For instance, the country had to join South East Asian Treaty Organisation (SEATO) in September 1954 and then Central Treaty Organisation (CENTO) in September 1955 to contain communism, despite the fact that there was no immediate and direct threat of communism to Pakistan, even to East Pakistan. Interestingly, before promulgating its first constitution, Pakistan had joined the SEATO and CENTO projecting anti-Soviet Union objectives, and not anti-India objectives. Both diplomats and generals failed to see that the Truman doctrine to contain Communism was fully functional in Europe, and that Pakistan’s defence agreement with the US would not let Pakistan escape from a broader duty.

Both pacts insidiously affected the course of nation building and the mode of state building in Pakistan, which was passing through its nascent stage. Nation building gravitated overwhelmingly towards religion (justifying pan-Islamism to offset communism) and state building became tremendously centralised (justifying a strong central authority to mute dissenting voices). The dream of practicing democracy and upholding constitutionalism was frustrated in the name of national interest sprouting from blatant lies.

The pacts opened the space for military-to-military alliances, thereby strengthening the military. In their wake, the case of Pakistan turned interesting. Instead of Pakistan describing its national interest, it became the other way around. National interest started describing Pakistan. Nevertheless, by joining the pacts the veiled goals Pakistan wanted to achieve were to get financial aid to run the country and obtain military hardware to counter India. This is how national diplomatic and defence realms got imbued with hypocrisy, which is now an indispensable part of national narrative, both domestic and foreign. Quintessentially, Pakistan is still struggling with the duo: running the country and countering India.

Pakistan had to join South East Asian Treaty Organisation in 1954 and then Central Treaty Organisation in 1955 apparently to contain communism. Yet the fact remains that there was no immediate and direct threat of communism to Pakistan, neither in the eastern wing nor in the western wing

Even if it were assumed that the limited war with India on Kashmir in 1947-48 enforced Pakistan to look for help external to South Asia, a fact cannot be ignored that the six-year period from 1948 to 1954 failed to witness a war. Instead of extending the period of peace, Pakistan encumbered itself with a new responsibility for containing communism in the region. Interestingly, Pakistan justified both pacts in the name of its geo-strategic position. Nevertheless, to the West, the pacts exposed Pakistan’s bent for obtaining financial aid and making military alliances. Pakistan overlooked the fact that the countries (such as the US and the UK, which had fought two world wars) offering Pakistan the pact, were more experienced in conflict and diplomacy. Pakistan was an inchoate partner which fell quickly into the category of a stooge. The disparity went against Pakistan. In the wake of the test of Soviet’s Hydrogen bomb in November 1955, the US was allowed to use Pakistan’s military base near Peshawar to fly its U-2 spy plane over the Soviet Union from sometime after July 1956 to early May 1960, till the plane was shot down en route to Bodo, Norway. Animosity against India transported Pakistan direct into the thick of the Cold War (1947-1991), which swelled Pakistan’s sense of insecurity several times. The solution became another poison to endure.

The proverbial tail of national interest became stronger to wag Pakistan, which learnt the methods of manoeuvring internal situations to frame a consensus. For instance, the military kept on stepping into the civilian domain under the ruse of national interest. Secondly, intelligence agencies enforced peremptory ways to bring citizens in line with the goals set by their parent institutions. That is, the one-man rule and all-man obey took precedence over all else.

Interestingly, the consciousness about geo-strategic location bequeathed by the pacts has not yet deserted Pakistan, which is still keen to enter into military alliances. For instance, in 2017, a feeling of deja vu visited Pakistan when it joined the 41-nation Islamic Military Alliance to Fight Terrorism (IMAFT). The course adopted was both interesting and alarming. Interesting in the sense that Pakistan’s retired Chief of Army Staff (COAS) General Raheel Sharif was made the head of the alliance by Saudi Arabia. In April 2017, the general obtained an NoC to join the position for three years in his private capacity. However, afterwards, the incumbent COAS General Qamar Javed Bajwa visited certain countries of the Middle East (ME) under a new phenomenon called military diplomacy and supported the alliance.

The matter is alarming in the sense that like while joining SEATO and CENTO, this time the matter was also not discussed in the parliament, despite the fact that both civilian leaders and military officials attended the alliance’s Conference of Minister of Defence Council in Riyadh in November 2017. In December, the COAS briefed the Senate on the ‘military diplomacy’ carried out by the army in the ME. Various opinion pieces have appeared justifying Pakistan’s joining the alliance just as the opinion pieces appeared when Pakistan joined the SEATO and CENTO.

Pakistan is back to square one. When national interest is defined and its itinerary is decided outside the parliament, the whole such exercise becomes illegal and unconstitutional. Consequently, the citizens feel disaffected by such decisions and get disassociated from the state, as they think that the army is not their representative and that the repercussions of such decisions have to be borne by them unwillingly. The Senate briefing is not a substitute for the approval of the parliament, which is the sole originator and exegetist of national interest.

The writer can be reached at qaisarrashid@yahoo.com

Published in Daily Times, January 1^st 2018.