Khyber Pakhtunkhwa’s budget standoff has exposed far more than procedural dysfunction. It has highlighted the fragility of institutional responsibility in a province caught between populist loyalty and constitutional obligation. At the centre of the crisis was Chief Minister Ali Amin Gandapur’s refusal to table the budget without explicit approval from incarcerated PTI founder Imran Khan. The episode underscored the extent to which executive authority in PTI-led KP is subordinated to extra-parliamentary command. Decision-making, it seems, is no longer grounded in office or law, but in symbolic loyalty.
That dynamic quickly created cracks within PTI itself. Senior lawmakers, aware that failing to pass the budget by June 30 could provoke federal intervention, began to assert themselves. The eventual decision to approve the budget without Khan’s greenlight marked a subtle but significant shift. In essence, it was a sign that even within PTI, there are those who understand the cost of performative politics when it collides with constitutional deadlines.
This tension captures a broader dilemma: Can PTI evolve from a confrontational, centralised movement into a functional political party capable of governance? Thus far, its provincial government has struggled to balance loyalty with responsibility.
But this impasse was not solely a PTI creation. The role of KP Governor Faisal Karim Kundi, a federal appointee who refused to summon the assembly session, added institutional fuel to a political fire. The governorship, once envisioned as a neutral constitutional post, now appears indistinguishable from partisan strategy.
All of this unfolded in a province still reeling from two decades of militancy and economic neglect. The budget itself was modest and focused on salaries, development, and reconstruction. Yet it became a battleground because political actors chose to weaponise it for leverage.
Proving to be much more than a provincial drama, it reflects a deeper distortion of Pakistan’s federal model, where political contestation routinely erodes governance, and trust between the centre and provinces remains paper-thin.
The budget’s passage is a relief, but not a resolution. If PTI hopes to govern as a national force, it must reconcile its internal contradictions. A party cannot claim constitutionalism in Islamabad and defy it in Peshawar.
There is a final, sobering dimension. This entire crisis played out against the backdrop of rising unemployment, an IMF programme under review, and dwindling political capital both at home and abroad. In such a context, treating a provincial budget as a battleground for loyalty and leverage sends precisely the wrong signal to creditors, to citizens, and to institutions already struggling to maintain their legitimacy. *