As the wheat harvest blankets the Pakistani plains with golden hues, anxiety shadows the air instead of celebration. April 2025 has turned into a season of unrest, disappointment, and strategic missteps. Wheat, long regarded as Pakistan’s staple lifeline and a political commodity, is now at the heart of a storm that spans food security, farmer livelihoods, taxation reforms, and flawed market liberalization. At the center of this crisis lies the decision by the federal government to withdraw the long-established minimum support price for wheat, leaving farmers exposed to market fluctuations. For decades, the minimum support price for wheat served as an anchor, ensuring that farmers had a guaranteed floor price during procurement season. In 2024, the minimum support price was set at Rs 3,900 per 40 kg, giving farmers a sense of stability. But 2025 brought a dramatic policy shift. The federal government announced that it would not set a support price nor intervene in the procurement market. This decision, largely influenced by fiscal tightening measures and IMF reform commitments, left farmers vulnerable to speculative pricing and exploitative intermediaries. Wheat prices quickly collapsed to Rs 2,100-2,400 per 40 kg, far below breakeven for most growers, especially those without access to affordable inputs or mechanized farming. The Punjab government, which produces over 70 percent of the country’s wheat, also refrained from conducting its annual procurement drive. Instead, it introduced a Rs 15 billion relief fund through the Kisan Card mechanism. While this support was advertised as a game-changer, the reality on the ground has been different. The disbursements have been slow, not all farmers are registered digitally, and the cash incentives offered are nowhere close to covering the losses incurred due to the absence of a structured procurement price. The result has been distress selling, increasing farmer debt, and the rise of unregulated private procurement by intermediaries. Flour millers have similarly suffered under the current policy vacuum. Without clear guidance or government-supplied quotas, millers have been forced to purchase wheat at volatile rates, hoarding has surged, and flour prices in retail markets have spiked. The consumer, in turn, is facing inflation at a time when wage growth is stagnant. In major cities like Karachi and Lahore, flour prices have exceeded Rs 160 per kg, a figure that is unaffordable for lower-income households. This economic pressure risks triggering social unrest, especially in urban areas already struggling with unemployment and inflation. The choices made today will shape not just the next harvest, but the very foundation of Pakistan’s social contract. The decision to withdraw the support price defies Pakistan’s own history. From the wheat shortages in 2007 that led to flour riots to the procurement delays of 2018 that created artificial scarcity, Pakistan has repeatedly faced wheat crises when government oversight was inadequate. Each of these events underlined the importance of state intervention in stabilizing both farmer income and consumer affordability. The 2025 season risks becoming the most damaging yet-not just for farmers but for national food security. Beyond the domestic landscape, the global response to wheat subsidy and procurement offers important lessons. India, for instance, continues to provide minimum support prices and procures over 30 million tons of wheat annually through the Food Corporation of India. This grain is then distributed through the Targeted Public Distribution System, ensuring food security for over 800 million citizens. Even during the COVID-19 pandemic, India expanded free grain distribution, preventing hunger despite global disruption. China maintains enormous grain reserves and provides guaranteed procurement prices that secure farmer confidence. Egypt subsidizes its staple bread supply, ensuring price stability through universal access to basic food items. These models emphasize that food security is not left to chance-it is the result of deliberate planning, stockpiling, and public investment. Pakistan, instead, appears to be moving in the opposite direction. The IMF-backed withdrawal of subsidies and price guarantees comes at a time when farmers face a near 25 percent increase in input costs. Diesel prices have crossed Rs 280 per liter, urea is retailing at over Rs 4,000 per bag in the black market, and certified seed varieties remain out of reach for smallholders. Mechanized harvesting costs have also risen, and labor shortages have added to the bottlenecks in rural supply chains. These factors, combined with unpredictable rainfall patterns and increased pest risks, have raised the cost of wheat production to above Rs 2,800 per 40 kg for most farmers. When market prices sit below Rs 2,400, losses are not just possible-they are inevitable. Even landowning farmers are struggling. A farmer in central Punjab with 10 acres of land, producing 30 maunds per acre, earns Rs 66,000 per acre if wheat is sold at Rs 2,200 per 40 kg. But his input costs, now standing at roughly Rs 48,000 per acre, leave a meager Rs 18,000 margin. For a 10-acre holding, this amounts to Rs 180,000 annually. Once family labor, opportunity cost, and post-harvest losses are accounted for, the return is unviable. Tenant farmers fare far worse, as they must pay land rent or share cropping arrangements, pushing them into negative territory. Many are now unable to repay arthi loans taken during sowing season. This economic squeeze comes just as the government has moved forward with plans to tax agricultural income. New slabs indicate rates as high as 45 percent for incomes exceeding Rs 5.6 million annually, a policy designed to widen the tax net and target large landlords. While the principle is sound-wealthy agriculturists should pay taxes like urban elites-the execution is flawed. No distinction has been made between crops, farm sizes, or regions. A rain-fed wheat grower in Rajanpur is being treated the same as a sugarcane baron in Sahiwal. Without nuanced implementation, this policy risks punishing marginal growers who are already bleeding from the loss of support pricing. Food security, in the meantime, is hanging by a thread. Wheat consumption in Pakistan continues to rise with a growing population, while the USDA has forecast a 13 percent decline in the 2025 wheat harvest. The country is expected to produce only 27.5 million metric tons against a consumption demand of nearly 32 million tons. This creates an import gap of over 4 million tons. At current international rates exceeding $370 per ton (C&F), Pakistan would need more than $1.48 billion in foreign exchange just to cover this shortfall. With foreign reserves under pressure and rupee volatility making imports expensive, the country faces the real threat of flour shortages or massive subsidy bills to maintain urban food supplies. The crisis is not one of supply alone. It is a crisis of confidence. Farmers no longer trust government pledges. Millers fear inconsistent policy. Consumers are frustrated with rising prices. And the food ministry appears paralyzed, caught between provincial mandates and fiscal constraints. The disbanding of federal-level wheat procurement has left a void no private player can fill. Strategic grain reserves have dwindled, and mismanagement at provincial storage facilities has allowed pests and moisture to destroy thousands of tons of wheat in recent years. Moving forward, the government must reinstate a procurement system that guarantees price stability. Even if procurement is decentralized, provincial food departments should be mandated to purchase at floor prices tied to inflation and input costs. A dynamic MSP formula, revised annually by an independent commission, could offer both transparency and fairness. Wheat reserves must be maintained through predictable cycles and not just in reaction to public outcry or media coverage. Simultaneously, Pakistan must invest in post-harvest infrastructure. A staggering 15 to 18 percent of harvested wheat is lost to inefficient handling, poor storage, and substandard transportation. Building modern silos, expanding cold storage where applicable, and leveraging blockchain for stock monitoring can improve transparency and reduce leakages. Millers and bakers should be included in the food security ecosystem with incentives for quality and price adherence. The government must also rethink its subsidy strategy. Blanket flour subsidies benefit the middle class disproportionately and encourage smuggling. Instead, a targeted subsidy mechanism-using the BISP database or the newly developed National Socio-Economic Registry-can offer e-vouchers to low-income families redeemable against a monthly quota of flour. This would eliminate black markets and ensure that only the vulnerable segments benefit from state support. Food security must not be politicized. It is a matter of national sovereignty. If Pakistan continues to destabilize its wheat economy, the repercussions will not be limited to rural poverty. They will extend to urban hunger, macroeconomic instability, and social unrest. In a region increasingly shaped by climate change and geopolitical volatility, self-sufficiency in staples like wheat is not a luxury-it is an imperative. The choices made today will shape not just the next harvest, but the very foundation of Pakistan’s social contract. It is time to recognize wheat not merely as a crop but as the cornerstone of national security, rural dignity, and economic resilience. Failing to do so could leave a nation of farmers-and millions of citizens-starving for solutions. The writer is a financial expert and can be reached at jawadsaleem.1982@ gmail.com. He tweets @JawadSaleem1982