Israel’s military has released its first official assessment of the failures that led to its inability to prevent Hamas’s October 7, 2023 attack, which ultimately sparked the ongoing Gaza war. The 19-page report acknowledges that the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) “failed in its mission to protect Israeli civilians”. While much of the information was already known, the report formally lays out how the military misjudged Hamas’s intentions and underestimated its capabilities. Key Findings The IDF had prioritized threats from Iran and Hezbollah, treating Gaza as a secondary security concern. Despite labeling Hamas as illegitimate, there was no concrete effort to establish an alternative leadership in Gaza. The military adopted a “conflict management” strategy, assuming Hamas was not preparing for a large-scale war—an assumption reinforced by Hamas’s own deception tactics. Intelligence from 2018 onward indicated that Hamas was developing an ambitious attack plan, but it was dismissed as “unrealistic or unfeasible” rather than an immediate threat. In the months leading up to the attack, Israel’s Military Intelligence Directorate had started reassessing Hamas’s plans, recognizing them as an “operational framework” rather than mere aspirations. However, this reassessment never reached senior intelligence officials, contributing to the catastrophic security lapse. While the report contains no groundbreaking revelations, it offers a stark acknowledgment of the military’s miscalculations and strategic oversights in the lead-up to one of Israel’s deadliest attacks.