Before November 5th, PTI supporters particularly youth believed that if Donald Trump is to win the US presidential election, it would have had positive effects for US-Pakistan relations and incarcerated Imran Khan. Keeping his remarks in mind, I came to the conclusion that the people of Pakistan seriously lack a basic knowledge of international relations, because the head of state never wants help for those who are detained. Even while several members of Congress and the Pakistani diaspora have expressed worry about Imran Khan’s captivity, these actions are typical of American politics, where elected officials speak to issues that are significant to their constituency primarily in order to win votes. Another Trump term would probably entail a focus on particular security issues rather than democratic or economic advancement for nations like Pakistan. Yet the Association of Physicians of Pakistani Descent of North America (AAPNA), which represents more than 18,000 Pakistani-American physicians, is a powerful organization. AAPNA began as an arrangement of medical practitioners and has since grown into a controlling advocacy. Trump’s foreign policy is likely to degenerate to an “America First” stance during his second term. The actions of his last regime suggest that another term will probably prioritize short-term US security and economic gains over longer-term pledges to democratic developments or international cooperations. Second term presidency would probably result in a change to a more transactional relationship for nations like Pakistan, one that prioritizes particular security issues over democratic or economic advancement. Let’s look at some of the most important facets of Trump’s foreign policy and how Pakistan might be affected. Trump had demonstrated a strong affinity for New Delhi as a geopolitical counterbalance to Beijing. Trump’s foreign policy strategy puts interests first, frequently at the expense of multilateral commitments and partnerships. Foreign aid to Pakistan may be drastically cut as a result, with money going only to certain security measures rather than sustainable development programs. A Trump administration might see these efforts as unnecessary and instead concentrate on counterterrorism efforts and security alliances that serve US interests, even if previous administrations have made investments to help Pakistan’s civilian institutions. Pakistan may be under more pressure because of this position since the US may scrutinize its strategic partnership with Beijing, especially under the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC). Trump might put pressure on Pakistan to curtail its collaboration with China, particularly in delicate domains like defense, technology, and infrastructure, but Pakistan would probably object to jeopardizing these vital connections. Under a Trump administration, Islamabad would probably find itself in a difficult situation where Islamabad would have to strike a balance between the demands coming from its long-standing friendship with the US and Beijing. US-Beijing relations significantly deteriorated during Trump’s first term, marked by a tariff war and restrictions on Beijing’s researchers and investments. Trump has always seen China as Washington’s main rival, and a second term might imply a more determined attempt to limit Chinese influence across the world. If US aid and investment decline, Pakistan may have to rely more on China for strategic and economic support as US assistance becomes more transactional and conditional. Trump had demonstrated a strong affinity for New Delhi as a geopolitical counterbalance to Beijing while serving as president; if he is reelected, this stance might become more pronounced. Pakistan may be affected by this, especially if Trump’s government is less considerate of Pakistan’s worries about New Delhi’s involvement in Afghanistan or its own Kashmir. Pakistan may perceive a pro-Delhi bias that disregards its security interests, and the US may prioritize its larger Indo-Pacific policy above resolving South Asian security dynamics. This might lead to a diplomatic split. Trump has previously voiced worries about South Asian nuclear security, and his government may put stricter restrictions on US support and aid for Pakistan. His foreign policy may include new calls for cooperation and transparency as well as heightened inspection of Pakistan’s nuclear assets. Furthermore, Trump’s past emphasis on counterterrorism exemplified by his strategy against the Taliban in Afghanistan may cause him to put pressure on Islamabad to take a more aggressive stand against domestic terrorist organizations, especially those that threaten US interests in the area. The risks would be high for Pakistan under a Trump presidency since balanced foreign policy depends on the US maintaining solid diplomatic and economic connections. Islamabad might be pressured to put Washington’s security interests ahead of its own if US-Islamabad nexus become selective its broader regional concerns. One cannot imagine a total separation with the United States. Pakistan’s economy is in dire need of foreign assistance, not only from the West, Beijing, and the Arab nations, but also from financial institutions around the world where Washington still has a big say. Making sure that future collaboration with Washington serves Pakistan’s broader national interests should be our top priority. This entails developing a typical business and economic partnership in addition to working together on common security issues like counterterrorism. They must also work together. Each nation contributes complimentary elements to the counterterrorism plan. Additionally, they both want to see Kabul stabilized. Geopolitical issues are another. Beijing ‘s swelling political and economic sway over Pakistan is something the US wants to closely monitor while making sure Islamabad doesn’t jeopardize Delhi’s strategic importance in the Indo-Pacific. Engagement is necessary to achieve this, a pressure campaign is insufficient. Trump has shown no signs of opposing such cooperation with Islamabad during his prior government. However, I must end on a warning. With Trump, you cannot be sure. The anti-Beijing hawks in his National Security Council (NSC) and cabinet would not worry me too much. Trump sees cabinet members as hatchet men, but other administrations consider them as advisors. While planning for the worse, I have to pray for the best. The writer is a PhD candidate at QAU and has worked at SDPI.