The Second Emergency continued to haunt President-General Pervez Musharraf for the rest of his life. On assuming office of the Prime Minister in 2013, Nawaz Sharif, the victim of Musharraf’s first strike, decided to “return the compliment”.
A three-member Special Court, headed by Justice Waqar Ahmed Seth, Chief Justice of the Peshawar High Court, known for his bold judgements, was constituted to prosecute Musharraf on charges of suspension of the Constitution, dismissal of judges, and imposition of Provisional Constitutional Order.
Musharraf left Pakistan for Dubai on 18 March 2016, for “medical treatment of a rare disease, called amyloidosis”, and, of course, to “avoid legal proceedings”. He didn’t return to Pakistan alive.
In a split decision on 17 December 2019, the court convicted Musharraf, in absentia, of high treason, under Article 6 of the Constitution, for imposing emergency rule. The court sentenced him to death, marking an historic first in Pakistan’s history, where a former military ruler was convicted of treason.
The court’s ruling was historic but controversial, especially for the inclusion of an unusual clause in Justice Seth’s part of the verdict, suggesting that Musharraf’s corpse be “dragged to and hanged at D-Chowk in Islamabad for three days if he died before the execution of his sentence”. The unique suggestion was deemed legally and ethically inappropriate and widely condemned.
Rather than upholding the Constitution or safeguarding the judiciary’s honor, Justice Chaudhry’s actions seemed more driven by self-preservation.
In January 2020, the Lahore High Court declared the special court’s formation and its ruling unconstitutional, nullifying the verdict.
Musharraf passed away in a Dubai hospital on 5 February 2023.
It is generally believed that in his duel with Chief Justice Iftikhar Mohammad Chaudhary, Musharraf was stabbed in the back by Lt. Gen. Ashfaq Parvez Kiani, then Director-General of the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI).
Kiani, who later succeeded Musharraf as Chief of Army Staff (COAS), is perceived to have played a behind-the-scenes role in fostering tensions between Musharraf and Chaudhry, ultimately leading to Musharraf’s political downfall.
It is argued that Kiani, as ISI Chief, could have intervened to de-escalate the confrontation between Musharraf and Chaudhary but chose not to. And, this inaction may have allowed the crisis to spiral.
Some speculate that Kiani saw an opportunity to position himself as a stabilizing figure, distancing himself from Musharraf’s increasingly unpopular regime.
By allowing Musharraf’s political troubles to worsen, Kiani’s eventual appointment as COAS in November 2007 was seen as a move to restore the military’s reputation.
While direct evidence of Kiani’s involvement in encouraging Chaudhry is lacking, his reputation as a cautious and politically astute soldier lends some credence to these claims.
Musharraf, in later interviews and memoirs, hinted at feelings of betrayal by individuals close to him, though he never directly accused Kiani of undermining him.
He acknowledged that his handling of the judiciary crisis and the imposition of Emergency in 2007 were missteps that eroded his support base, including within the military.
Musharraf’s misadventure reconfirmed the military’s persistent involvement in politics and exposed pervasive duplicity in the society.
The legal community celebrated Chaudhary’s reinstatement as its victory over the Army.
The civil society saw the success of the Lawyers’ Movement as a significant step towards strengthening of democratic institutions.
Chaudhry was hailed for “heroic defiance”, which “became a rallying point for democratic forces, significantly shaping Pakistan’s political and legal landscape in the following years”.
But, for the Army, it was just a friendly match between its two teams, one led by Don Quixote and the other by his Squire, Sancho Panza. And, as expected, the sagacious Squire won.
The Musharraf-Chaudhary duel presented a kaleidoscopic phenomenon. It was, in fact, a “tr-uel” among the trio, fighting their personal battles under the banners of their respective institutions, in the name of national interest.
Chaudhary was, no doubt, not infallible. He was caught, confronted and asked to surrender. Fair enough. But Musharraf’s decision to challenge him was driven solely by personal interests, rather than any sense of patriotism.
Likewise, Kiani’s encouragement, tacit support or acquiescence to Chaudhary’s defiance was not motivated by his desire to protect the judiciary from the Armed President or avert an institutional clash. It was essentially dictated by self-interest – to get to the helm with high moral ground.
And, culpable Chaudhary was not Sir Thomas More (1478-1535) – far from him – to stand up to a uniformed President. Given his known proclivities, he could have resigned instantly had he not been alerted and guaranteed exoneration by invisible hands.
Chaudhary allowed himself to be manipulated by a pretentious “good cop” from an institution infamous for its relentless abuse of civil society and habitual disregard for the Constitution.
Rather than upholding the Constitution or safeguarding the judiciary’s honor, his actions seemed more driven by self-preservation, even as he ostensibly sought to present himself as the judiciary’s savior.
The trio is gone but the saga continues.
(To be continued)
The writer is a former diplomat, based in Canberra, and can be reached at khizar_niazi@ hotmail.com