Daily Times

Last week’s column on the 1973 Arab-Israeli War seems prescient given the attack launched by Hamas this past Saturday on Israel. Thus far, and that may change if Hezbollah attacks the northern part of Israel, this is not the fifth Arab-Israeli war yet. It is the extension of the war between Israel and Hamas that began in 1987 with Hamas’ creation.

Gaza is a tiny strip on the southwest and Mediterranean side of Israel. It is about 30 miles in length; 140 square miles in size; and has a six-mile border with Egypt. Its 20 million inhabitants make Gaza one of the world’s most populated areas.

Hamas has vowed the destruction of Israel. Hamas never recognized the Jewish state’s right to exist. Supported by Iran, Hezbollah, Syria and Qatar, it has received assistance from Russia. The degree to which any of those outside actors is directly involved in the current fighting is unclear.

While it is too early in this fight to draw far-reaching convictions, several observations can frame future understanding. Hamas’ attack probably took many months to plan. The attack incorporated an extraordinary coordination of simultaneous sea, air and land strikes using commando tactics employing paragliders, motorboats, bulldozers, motorcycles and thousands of rockets. But that attack reaffirmed history.

Surprise in starting a war always works. That has been true dating back to the Trojan Horse.

Surprise in starting a war always works. That has been true dating back to the Trojan Horse. Achieving tactical surprise, however, does not always win wars: quite the contrary. Japan learned this twice in the 1904-1905 Russo-Japanese War it started with a surprise attack on the Russian fleet at Port Arthur and ended in a stand-off and of course Pearl Harbor in December 1941.

Hitler launched a surprise attack against Poland in 1939 and then against the Soviet Union in 1941. That did not go well for the Nazis and Hitler. As 9/11 shocked America, al Qaeda ultimately was crushed. So declaring the Hamas attack as another intelligence disaster may be an overstatement. Surprise works.

While Hamas’ strategic aims may not yet be fully understood, it did employ the new MAD with a massive attack of disruption. The attack was designed to disrupt not only Israel but also the increasing likelihood of peace with Saudi Arabia. And in a malevolent and even bizarre way, Hamas may be provoking Israel to take very harsh measures against Gaza.

Cutting Gaza off from food, water and electricity could cause a humanitarian disaster feeding Hamas’ well-organized propaganda machine and a global audience that includes about 1.5 billion Muslims and others not friendly towards Israel. In his writing, the Israeli Defense Forces is preparing an offensive to enter Gaza to weed out and destroy Hamas. How it conducts this offensive will have a huge impact for good or ill.

Israel could overreact in ridding Gaza of Hamas. Civilian deaths and casualties along with massive destruction of critical infrastructure imposed by Israel could mount. If this were to continue, some of Israel’s friends could be persuaded to demand an end to the violence and possibly a UN-imposed ceasefire.

Escalation is a risk. Should Hezbollah intervene in the north, which in turn could force Israel to retaliate against Syria and Iran, widening the war into a regional conflict? As in 1973, Israel could face a two-front war.

Israel also must be prepared for the very public execution of hostages as ISIS has done in the past. This would enrage Israelis (and many others) possibly to overreact. It also could pose a huge challenge for the US if its citizens were killed. Having sailed a carrier battle group to the eastern Mediterranean, the US does have a substantial hostage rescue capability.

Would that be used? No one knows. In the past, the US has made attempts to rescue hostages. Many succeeded. The mission to Iran to free fifty-three US hostages seized by Iran at the embassy in Tehran in 1980 was a disaster. And would Israel cooperate with the US under any circumstances? That is unknowable.

What price should Hamas pay? And what might be the cost to Gaza residents who neither support nor like Hamas? These hugely difficult questions are only among many that will need answers as this violence continues.

He writer is a senior advisor at Washington, DC’s Atlantic Council and a published author.