There are several ways to study the Balochistan problem. Two of them are to look at the problem through the lenses of Balochistan’s tribal reality and understand the nature of the relationship between the Baloch tribes and the federation of Pakistan. Generally speaking, there are two main characteristics of tribal culture. First, the members of a tribe may refuse to submit to the authority of the state. The plausible reason is that for the tribal members a tribe is itself a state; they pay allegiance to their tribe first and the state later. Secondly, the members of a tribe are averse to adopting the culture of the mainstream population. The plausible reason is that the tribal members believe in practising their tribal culture; they are tribal first and national later. That is why in all societies of the world, tribes are considered marginal, external and rebellious. Further, owing to the same reasons, tribes are stigmatised and reviled in the modern age. The tribal people may be nomadic or native. For a tribe that becomes native (owing to its settlement on a piece of land for generations), ownership of the land (which comes under its sway) is very important. Discovery of any natural resources from that land strengthens further the bond of association with the land. In a tribal context, the ownership is communal though represented through the tribal head. Unfortunately, the communality of ownership of the land and its resources stands in conflict with the system of capitalism. For a state running on the capitalist system, it becomes difficult to appreciate and respect the relationship between a tribe and the land. A tribe considers the land its mother oozing out the milk of happiness and prosperity. On the other hand, the state considers the land a means to enhance collective prosperity of the citizens of the state. Secondly, a tribe claiming ownership of the land thinks that the state possesses no right to violate the communal ownership. Contrarily, the state requires those natural resources to be tapped and utilised unhindered for the state’s benefit. Thirdly, the tribe prefers welfare and prosperity of its tribal members while the state considers the interests and prosperity of all members of the state as its preference. Consequently, a conflict appears between a tribe and the state. That sort of conflict has led to rooting out several tribes such as Native Americans in the US and Aborigines in Australia. For a tribe the point of concern is not only receiving royalty on the resources in financial terms but also enjoying the (communal) ownership of the resources in both legal and psychological terms. Resultantly, if royalty is paid but the ownership is denied, a conflict appears between the tribe and the state. If both royalty and ownership are denied to a tribe, a ferocious response appears from the tribe. What is happening in Balochistan, especially in the Sui area, falls in this ambit. If Sui gas is not available, for instance, to the residents of the Sui area, why should the residents not think that their communal ownership has been challenged by the state? Secondly, if the head of the tribe owning the Sui land is eliminated by the state, why should the members of the tribe not think that they are losing communal identity — and hence relevance? In a way, the problem is between the formula on which the federation of Pakistan was constructed and the reality of tribalism in Balochistan (or even in FATA). In principle, a federal government must respect heterogeneity (which may be based on ethnic, linguistic or racial realities) of its units. Unfortunately, it seems that the federation of Pakistan is failing to appreciate this reality. After 1947, the system of government ran more on unitary rather than federal lines. Secondly, the state tried to assert its verdict as if there had been existing homogeneity around. Thirdly, the Centre tried to control the Baloch tribes through the provincial government. When it underperformed, the Centre took upon itself the task of dealing with the tribes directly. This is where things went wrong. In principle, the chief minister of Balochistan should be managing the affairs of his province through a team of public representatives. When the state tried to bypass him and tried to deal directly with the tribes assuming them as marginal, external and rebellious, there surfaced a tribal defiance called the Baloch insurgency. Managing law and order in the province through the Frontier Corps (FC) is an antithesis of the formula of federation. The police of Balochistan should be manned, trained and equipped to take care of the affairs of Balochistan. Apparently, the federation is playing with fire. Perhaps the federation has assumed that the members of the Baloch tribes are fewer in number and weaker in strength and can be subdued to the capitalist wishes of the state. One point is not being understood: the Baloch identity is not because of the federation of Pakistan but the other way round. A consensus is developing in the rest of the provinces that any resources snatched from the Baloch should not be utilised. It is immoral to be benefitted from advantages, the cost of which is the dead bodies and missing persons in Balochistan. The federation is not supposed to act as a robber but as a benefactor. Persistence of insurgency in Balochistan is less a fault of the Baloch (and the Baloch tribes) and more a failure of the federation to study the aspirations of the Baloch and come up to them. It is the duty of the federation to listen to the grievances of the Baloch dissidents and address them. Secondly, it is the duty of the federation to see if it is justifiable to violate the tribal sanctity of the Baloch tribes. Thirdly, it is the duty of the federation to revisit the formula of federation and see if the promises made to the federating units are being fulfilled in letter and spirit. The writer is a freelance columnist. He can be reached at qaisarrashid@yahoo.com