The carnage in Syria looks never-ending. The recent grisly scenes of battered corpses posted on the Internet are the worst of its kind since the uprising began March 2011. The deaths of over 100 civilians, including 49 children, 32 women, add to the mounting death toll of over 10,000. It happened in Houla, a township in Homs province. Apparently, the military trying to wrest control from the rebels, after doing their bit of pounding the town with heavy artillery, the pro-regime militia was left to finish the job, and they went about it with their customary brutality. The army seems to be forgetting, though, that despite the heavy price they are paying, the rebels are not deterred. Therefore, what worked for Bashar al-Assad’s father, Hafez al-Assad, in 1982 when he unleashed unrestrained brutality in Hama, killing upwards of 10,000 people, is not working in 2012. There are two reasons. First: the rebellion is much more widespread this time; the military therefore, is overstretched. Second: the Arab Spring that has overwhelmed much of the Arab world inspires the rebel movement there. Its success in Tunisia and Egypt had its contagion effect in Syria. The Bashar regime therefore, might need to rethink its strategy of violent repression as the only course before the upsurge reaches a point of no return, if it has not already happened. Not surprisingly, the killings in Houla have created an even greater outrage internationally, leading the UN Security Council to condemn the “outrageous use of force against the civilian population”, calling on both the government and insurgents to end violence. The Security Council’s statement was issued after accommodating Russia in not apportioning all the blame on the Assad regime. According to the Russian Foreign Minister, Sergei Lavrov, both sides in the Syrian conflict “had a hand” in the deaths, who maintained, “The guilt has to be determined objectively. No one is saying that the government is not guilty, and no one is saying that the armed militants are not guilty.” Which the British Foreign Secretary, William Hague, then visiting Moscow, did not dispute, despite making the point, “… it [the regime] has the primary responsibility for such violence.” In other words, Russia and China stand in the way of a Security Council resolution for international intervention in Syria to stop killings. Of course, the US and its allies might decide to intervene without a UN resolution but this seems unlikely. Albeit vociferous in their condemnation of the Syrian atrocities, none has so far shown any appetite for an armed intervention. Calling it a “vicious assault… on a residential neighbourhood”, the US Secretary of State, Hillary Clinton, said, “… the United States will work with the international community to intensify our pressure on Assad and his cronies, whose rule by murder and fear must come to an end.” France is planning to host a Friends of Syria meeting, while Britain says it is in urgent talks with allied countries on “a strong international response.” In the US, President Obama is in the midst of an election campaign for another term. One of the selling points of his campaign is that, under him, the US is disengaging from its military commitments in Iraq and Afghanistan. That advantage will be nullified if it were back in another bloody conflict, this time in Syria, which could even be bloodier than Iraq and Afghanistan. Another reason is that President Obama only recently made an important decision to shift the focus of the US’s strategic policy to the Asia-Pacific region. During the last decade, when the US has been preoccupied with Iraq and Afghanistan, China has made important inroads into the region to the detriment of US power and interests. Another US shift to the Middle East, this time in Syria, will only further fortify China’s strategic advantage. Third, the US global overreach in the last decade, if not before, has significantly contributed to its indebtedness, thus making another military adventure an unlikely proposition. The US’s European allies are in an even worse situation economically. Obviously, the Bashar regime is aware of these constraints of western countries, giving it some leverage in a very tight situation. Therefore, as long as Russia and China do not join the US in the Security Council for a concerted international action (a combination of armed de-stabilisation and comprehensive sanctions), the regime might be able to prolong its life. So far, Moscow is proving a tough nut to crack with its considerable economic and strategic stakes in Syria. There is some suggestion that Russia might be persuaded to buy a Yemen-like compromise where its unpopular president was exiled, leaving the rump of his government intact. In Yemen, though, both Saudi Arabia and the US had considerable political and economic leverage to swing the deal, but this is not the case in Syria. If applied to Syria, this would mean that Bashar and his cronies will go into exile, leaving rest of the system and structure unchanged. Russia will thus continue to have strategic primacy in the country, where it will be business as usual minus Bashar and few of his close cohorts. Will Russia fall for it? It seems unlikely except as part of a wider strategic deal in which Russian political, strategic and economic interests worldwide, seen as threatened by the US and NATO, are assured. For instance, Russia is enraged over the stationing of US missiles in its strategic backyard, in Poland and elsewhere, as part of a defence system against a perceived Iranian nuclear threat. It also fears that the US and its allies are seeking to politically destabilise the Putin regime by fomenting and encouraging anti-Putin rallies in Russia. Russia has also incorporated parts of the neighbouring Georgian territory following a border war between the two countries some time ago. It would like legitimisation of that from the US. Moscow also wants to join the World Trade Organisation to reap trade benefits, and it probably would want some assurances against military attack on Iran by Israel and/or the US. It is a long list and hence difficult to be tied down to the Syrian situation. Despite all the humane concern for carnage in Syria, the international power brokers have their own agenda. The US, for instance, would like to break the close links between Iran and Syria, and their perceived disruptive role in the region. As for a Yemen-like solution for Syria, it will be difficult to sustain even if it were feasible, the two situations being quite different. First, Syria is much more diverse in terms of its ethnic, cultural and religious diversity, and the Bashar regime, though unpopular with the Sunni majority, has the support of the minorities, and a good section of its trading and middle class. Its Christian population, though not enamoured of the Bashar family dictatorship, are still thankful for its social and religious liberalism, free to practise their rituals and social modes. They are afraid of the alternative of the Sunni Muslim Brotherhood, as they see it. Second, the regime is not subject to outside dictates, perhaps not even from Russia. Its power base in the army and the Alawite political class remains intact. Therefore, it might still have enough life to persevere. However, unless the Bashar regime relents on its policy of killing its own people, it might only be a matter of time before it too becomes history. Nevertheless, that doesn’t mean the country’s misery will be over any time soon. A prolonged civil war might make it even messier and bloodier. The writer is a senior journalist and academic based in Sydney, Australia. He can be reached at sushilpseth@yahoo.co.au