Becoming almost a routine thing, bomb blasts draw little sympathy and raise more questions regarding the state of security attained by the government in the tribal areas. The bomb blasts in Landikotal and Kohat the other day claimed altogether 29 lives. The Kohat blast killed four police officers. Normally, it would have seemed reasonable to ascribe the Landikotal blast to Mangal Bagh’s Lashkar-e-Islami (LeI) as this area is their happy hunting ground, but now the Tehreek-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) has claimed responsibility. It remains to be seen if this is a ‘genuine’ claim or a red herring. The LeI had a stronghold in the Bara subdivision of Khyber Agency until the paramilitary forces drove the group out in 2009. It has upped the ante against the government since. Now holed up in the Tirah Valley, the group has waged war on the security forces as well as the militias that have joined hands with the authorities since 2008 to frustrate the designs of the militants. These pro-government militias have so far managed to capture or kill many terrorists. The blast in Landikotal is believed to have been aimed at members of the Zakakhel tribe who are fighting alongside the security forces against Mangal Bagh. In January this year, a major operation was launched in Khyber Agency, sending some 20,000 people of the area fleeing to camps for internally displaced persons in Peshawar. Violence abated until March, only to resurface, and has since been getting worse. Mangal Bagh and his accomplices have in the past targeted pro-government militias. In March this year there were reports of skirmishes between the pro-government Tawheed-e-Islami and LeI. The infighting between the lashkars (tribal militias), and the pounding of the security forces on the hideouts of the LeI in the Neka area of the Tirah Valley using gunship helicopters led to the evacuation of hundreds of people from the area. It seems that the security forces have not been able to achieve their target, i.e. bringing the terrorists to their knees. Perhaps it is time for the military to take stock of the situation anew and define a better strategy to handle the situation in Khyber Agency. Presently, the tactical, piecemeal, Agency-to-Agency approach has failed to deliver results. Given the difficult, porous nature of the terrain, unless their retreat routes are cut off and a concerted offensive mounted against the militants, taking FATA as a whole into account, the security forces and their tribal allies would keep bleeding. Understandably, the area in question is difficult and requires extraordinary combat efforts, yet gaps and loopholes in security and strategy cannot be ruled out. Peace in Khyber Agency, as in FATA as a whole, is closely linked to a paradigm shift in strategy by the security forces for sustainable results. *