Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif has called for the early formation of an Anti-Terrorism Force (ATF), for which no delay would be tolerated. While there are few details available at this point regarding the makeup, mandate and role of such a force, its formation has placed a question mark over the fate of the National Counter Terrorism Authority (NACTA) set up during the last government, but which remained virtually moribund for lack of focus and follow up. Also, of late reports have said NACTA was, as so many of our institutions tend to be, being used for unjustified recruitment of people not fit for the job. Given its chequered history and lack of proper setting up, let alone functioning, NACTA may well just wither on the vine, particularly if the government intends to place the new ATF at the heart of the struggle against terrorism. Irrespective of whether the old NACTA (or parts thereof) are salvaged or not, and whether ATF replaces it, both in the past and now the need is for a counter-terrorism organisation that is able to bring together under one umbrella all stakeholders in this critical task. That means, as we have repeatedly argued in this space, the setting up of a counter-terrorism organisation that unites the capabilities of all civilian and military, intelligence and security forces of the federal and provincial authorities, and brings together a common data base of all the intelligence available or to be collected in future on all the terrorist groups in order to discover their organisational structure, mutual links, areas and mode of operation, etc. This is doubly critical since the latest reports suggest there may be hundreds of groups operating autonomously in the name of jihad, with most but possibly not all sheltering under the umbrella of the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP). With the enemy displaying the characteristic of scattered small groups owing nominal allegiance to one platform but in practice operating autonomously, there is no escape from pooling the intelligence with the civilian and military agencies. Intelligence agencies inherently tend to be reluctant to share their information, even with sister organisations, and in Pakistan’s case the traditional suspicion of the military intelligence agencies about their civilian counterparts that they are unreliable, makes this inherently challenging task even more difficult. Difficult, but not impossible, provided the government and the military find the common political will to see this through as the critical input into the difficult anti-terrorism struggle. The ATF will be closely watched whether it fulfils these organisational and functional critical tasks.
Meanwhile developments in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP) indicate just how tough the process of overcoming terrorism is in reality. On the one hand, the KP government has announced that the military will be ‘pulled out’ of Malakand, Shangla, Buner, Swat, Upper and Lower Dir and other areas of the seven districts that constitute Malakand division in a phased manner. If an answer was desired from the terrorists regarding this suggestion, it came swiftly the very next day of the announcement when a roadside bomb in Upper Dir killed Major-General Sanaullah and two senior officers. The TTP was quick to claim responsibility. The release of seven of the eight officers of the Gomal Zam project after two years by the terrorists as a gesture of ‘goodwill’ may be considered by some as a positive development as a result of the present talk about talking to the Taliban, but the killing of senior army officers, particularly Major-General Sanaullah, credited with being the moving force in the state’s recovery of its writ in Swat after the 2009 military operation, indicates a targeted killing intended to delay or sabotage any talk about talks. While it is undeniable that the best strategy against terrorism is to keep the door of negotiations open, the government and the security forces must keep their powder dry in the event of the dialogue offer either not taking off or not producing the desired results. A nuanced strategy that leaves no option unexplored seems best, but the Upper Dir bombing is a good and timely reminder of the treacherous terrain that is counter-terrorism. *