The Afghanistan presidential elections have been slated for April 5, 2014. Out of nine contenders, the top three contestants are Abdullah Abdullah, Ashraf Ghani and Zalmai Rassoul, who are all vying to succeed incumbent President Hamid Karzai. Amongst them, to become stronger, political make-and-break may matter. Amongst them, to be successful, the ethnic tinge of a candidate may matter. Amongst them, to be a winner, the force of money and guns may matter. However, to all of them, the Taliban factor is important in their having the capacity and intent to sabotage the elections process. The frustration of the Taliban at the prospect of the forthcoming elections is obvious. They have attacked offices of the election commission and have been threatening prospective voters of dire consequences in case the latter cast their votes. In southern Afghanistan, the Taliban have a palpable presence and the security situation is far worse there than in northern Afghanistan. In this way, the security threat will be the main challenge to Afghan voters especially in southern (and eastern) Afghanistan. This is where the problem lies for those running for the top slot. In a low or zero turnout election lies the success of the Taliban to delegitimise the future government of Kabul. On the other hand, to ensure a substantial turnout is the major challenge for all the candidates. The low turnout in the presidential elections of 2009 was one of the reasons for stuffing ballot boxes with votes, to show the world that an election did in fact take place. It is expected that the final round of the elections will be between Abdullah, who is an opponent of Karzai, and Rassoul, who is a supporter of Karzai. In short, the election may be reduced to a contest between pro-Karzai and anti-Karzai political alliances. In the inner politics of Afghanistan, Karzai has attained substantial influence. There are two apparent strengths of Karzai: first, he has successfully projected his image as an Afghan (and some say, a Pashtun) president who speaks for Afghan nationalism, and secondly, he has developed a rapport, on one basis or another, with most, if not all, regional and national political groups. Karzai has tried to project his Afghan nationalism by condemning the US on two counts: first, killing Afghan citizens even as collateral damage owing to military operations or drone strikes against the Taliban or al Qaeda, and second, sparing Pakistan from a military operation on Taliban hideouts in its tribal belt. Karzai has expressed his anger at the US by not signing the Bilateral Security Agreement (BSA) with them. This point is more relevant to Karzai’s second strategy: to make an attempt to appease others, including his rivals. By not signing the BSA, Karzai has tried to show his hatred of the presence of foreign boots on Afghan land. In this way, Karzai has attempted to stand ideologically closer to the Taliban. Karzai’s policies may yield fruit by ensuring the electoral victory of Rassoul. Interestingly, despite Karzai’s stance against the BSA, all presidential candidates, including Rassoul, are supportive of the BSA and have shown their willingness to sign it if they win the elections. This fact shows that the BSA is in the interests of Afghanistan. Karzai’s policy of appeasing Afghan warlords contains two important aspects: first, Karzai has overlooked the rampant corruption plaguing the Afghan system. Second, he has fostered favouritism. By so doing, Karzai has tried to mollify his critics and reduce the number of his opponents. Furthermore, by doing so, he has become able to secure his political survival at the helm of affairs till his successor takes oath. Both these points (allowing corruption and supporting favouritism) remained his strengths but, nevertheless, the US remained annoyed at Karzai for the same reasons. Another point has annoyed the US: on the one hand, Karzai has tried to stay in touch with the Taliban while, on the other hand, he has opposed the Taliban opening an independent office in Doha, Qatar, to negotiate with the US. Karzai has tried to persuade the Taliban to take part in the elections. He knows that the Taliban could disrupt elections in the south and east of Afghanistan, as they did in 2009. A low turnout of voters in the Pashtun areas (of south and east Afghanistan) would strengthen Abdullah who represents the Tajiks and non-Pashtun populace. This time, rigging the elections by stuffing ballot boxes with votes — even after a low turnout in the Pashtun areas — may provoke Abdullah into not accepting the election results. That situation would create another crisis in Afghanistan. If the fear of the Taliban stops Afghans in the south and east from going to polling booths and if no rigging takes place orchestrated by Karzai’s camp, the chances for Abdullah to win the election from the north and west of Afghanistan would be enormous. Furthermore, it is estimated that this time the youth vote may play a decisive role in determining the future of Afghanistan. The third front-runner presidential candidate, Ashraf Ghani, is relying on the youth bank. Currently, Afghanistan has the ability to hold elections but Afghanistan may not have the ability to hold an election free of rigging, especially mass rigging. This is where the catch lies. Abdullah, who also contested the presidential elections against Karzai in 2009, may not tolerate electoral fraud used to defeat him before. Apparently, the Taliban factor is bent on interrupting the elections, especially in its area of influence. How Afghanistan under the auspices of Karzai will hold a transparent election is yet to be seen. Nevertheless, the fate of the election will have a direct bearing on the state of talks being held between the Pakistani Taliban and the government of Pakistan. The writer is a freelance columnist and can be reached at qaisarrashid@yahoo.com