The recent incidents of terrorism have highlighted the importance of preemptive target detection to curb terrorism and reduce level of fatalities in such occurrences. The security forces and local administration have always been caught unawares whenever terror operators target a particular location. Through a predictive analytical approach one can look into the mind of a terrorist or a terror organisation and forecast with appreciable accuracy its next target. From the viewpoint of law enforcement agencies in the country such an exercise can bring effectiveness in security apparatus to deliberate on hidden integrated terror networks operating in society. Moreover, localisation of terrorism does not exist anymore, and an international or regional incident may have direct local implications. Our terror target detection model is based upon clear understanding of terror infrastructure in the country, its capability and capacity for initiating attacks, level of cohesiveness and organisational affinity, nature of preparedness of military and civilian agencies, financial resourcefulness, number of terror-related incidents, robustness of our society, and a few externalities based on national insecurities. The infrastructure of terrorism consists of groups like the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) and its affiliates, along with factions of various splinter groups who maintain anti-government stance or operate partially or completely under the influence of external actors with the availability of financial incentives. The Baloch insurgent groups are part of these anti-state elements. The members of TTP have the knowledge and wherewithal to carry out sophisticated and well-coordinated attacks on Pakistani soil through local and foreign support networks. Since the TTP conceptualises strategic thinking aiming at using different parochial and alien groups for tactical task execution, therefore it gains high variable maneuverability. The data indicates that nearly 750 security alerts were issued by civilian-military intelligence agencies in Punjab in 2014, whereas the number decreased to 580 in 2015, and during the current year only 77 threat alerts have so far been issued. Most of these alerts are specific to districts like Capital City District Lahore, Rawalpindi, Faisalabad and Dera Ghazi Khan. Initially, with the onset of the Zarb-e0Azb, the potentiality of TTP and its associates was dented due to shrinking free space for combat training, bomb making and human resource availability for suicide attacks. The ratio of security officials to terrorists killed was lowest in 2010 and highest in 2003. Whereas in 2015 it is increasing on monthly basis, and up till now Pakistan Army is losing one security personal for every five terrorists killed. If this increasing trend continues we may see a ratio of 1:3 at the end of the year. This can seriously enhance TTP capacity to conduct impressive attacks against Pakistani security forces. The availability of refuge sanctuaries along Afghanistan border gives these groups improvisation variation as well. Moreover, if the current Afghan-Pak intelligence coordination remains in limbo, then TTP and its leadership can further hone its capacity with improved capability. Interestingly, the TTP leadership is still not united as has been depicted by the chain of events from infighting after Hakimullah Mehsud was killed in a drone strike in November 2013. Apart from the non-Mehsud tribal lineage, Mullah Fazalullah has not been accepted as a legitimate successor of Mehsud. Resultantly, new splinter groups have emerged from the original TTP, such as the Jund-e-Hafza, Ahrar-ul-Hind and Jamat-ul-Ahrar. These groups have their own financial and logistical benefactors on both sides of the Durand Line. Recently, some wall-chalking in Peshawar and distribution of writing manuals in support of ISIS or Daesh is another indication of fissures within the TTP, and if the present spate of events continues we may see complete dilution of the TTP into another organisation with a different name and outlook in the coming years. The recent attack by ISIS in Kabul against Hazaras also points out its growing influence against Taliban insurgent forces thus posing a direct threat to their monopoly of violence. The Pakistan Army, being the principal counterterrorism force in the country, is at the forefront to arrest the tide of extremism. It has been actively involved in imparting training and CT expertise to law enforcement agencies such as police and levies in Balochistan. In urban centres, Rangers has virtually taken over civilian forces, and is primarily engaged in maintaining law and order in Karachi. Apart from conducting targeted operations against militant wings of different political parties, the senior Rangers command is currently coordinating raids with Special Police Units against TTP diehards in the city. Recent trends suggest that police may not become a forerunner in counterterrorism operations, and remain under-trained in terms of capacity and capability. The nature of target selection of the TTP has shifted towards public-oriented places instead of counter attacks against security forces. One might say that as the armed forces are carrying out indiscriminate attacks in North Waziristan the TTP leadership too has resorted to random target selection. Moreover, a sizable population of North Waziristan has crossed the Durand Line and is now living in Afghanistan. They can be turned into HUMINT sources for possible intelligence collection and information collation by foreign intelligence agencies. From a terrorist’s viewpoint there are four likely scenarios for target selection: high effort-high yield, high effort-low yield, low effort-high yield and low effort-low yield. Thus a spectacular attack like the one on GHQ or PNS Mehran base is very difficult to achieve by TTP affiliates. Nonetheless, hijacking is a real threat, which may turn into a deadly attack on Pakistan’s strategic installations. It will be a classic low effort-high yield operation if executed with precision. There is a moderate possibility of attacks on public schools or other such buildings. The most probable incident of high effort-high yield can be accomplished through an attack on minorities or Shias, which may trigger a swift response from the latter. It can also pressurise the civilian-military set-up to take action across the board against all militant organisations operating within the state of Pakistan. In addition, cantonment areas especially those that have a substantial civilian population may become a principal target for terrorists. We may also see more IS-linked terror actions against Law Enforcement Forces in future. Whereas the low effort-low yield actions like roadside bomb explosions will continue in Balochistan and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa provinces. With approximately 10,000 American troops likely to stay in Afghanistan till 2017, selective sting and counterterrorism operations along with expanding drone warfare are going to be seen in days to follow. The military and civilian law enforcement agencies in Pakistan must focus on beefing up security at places of minority worship and public congregation. The writer is a senior superintendent of police