A dispassionate overview of Gen Musharraf’s eight year reign shows one really worthwhile achievement: the peace process with India, including a tacit acceptance of the status quo in Kashmir, so long as the sufferings of the people of Kashmir are eased; and for many an analyst, including this author, it is a huge achievement, one that was only possible under a military dispensation.While the macro-economic situation has also improved, it is an outcome of the aid flowing in to compensate for our assistance to the US in their so-called ‘War against Terror’, and owes nothing to the General’s policies. For the rest, his legacy is a total destruction of all institutions, including the judiciary, subversion of the independence of the media, growing domestic terrorism, an insurgency in Waziristan that has turned patriotic Mehsuds and Wazirs into ‘enemies of the state’ (the exclusion of the Mohmands from this statement is not intended to imply that they are less loyal, but is only due to the fact that the Mohmand agency has traditionally been trouble prone), and leaving to his successor an army that was the beloved of the nation and has now become the main target for all suicide bombers.The question now is: what will follow his tenure as a General-President during his period as a civilian president?Nawaz Sharif is still trying to convince Benazir Bhutto to boycott the coming elections. If he manages to do so and these two major political parties refuse to participate with Musharraf as president, the entire election process will become a sham and the pressure on Musharraf to step down will become compelling.It appears, however, that Bhutto has decided to contest the elections. She is obviously under pressure from the US, which was responsible for orchestrating her ‘deal’ with Musharraf, to reconcile and learn to live with him. If Bhutto’s PPP participates in the elections, Nawaz Sharif has no choice but to follow suit or commit political suicide, if he boycotts unilaterally, since the participation of the PPP will lend sufficient legitimacy to the electoral process; and will leave Nawaz Sharif out in the cold for five years, an isolation he and his party are unlikely to survive.The PMLQ, a product of Musharraf’s untrammelled authority, and the President’s complete support for the PMLQ, will be the greatest sufferer, since it will lose voters to both PMLN and the PPP. It is unlikely, however, that any one party will emerge with sufficient seats in the National Assembly to form a government on its own. The government at the centre will have to be a coalition.The largest numbers of seats in the NA are likely to go to the PPP and, on that assumption; it is likely to be asked to forge its own alliance to form the government. It would be best if the PPP could forge an alliance with the PMLN and, even though this would have been considered unimaginable some years ago, it is no longer impossible. A government born out of such an alliance might not last the five-year tenure, however, since the irreconcilable differences between the two will continuously re-emerge.Whatever coalition the PPP decides to form, there will be some aspects that Bhutto and Sharif are likely to find agreement on and muster the seventy five percent majority necessary for constitutional amendments. Both will certainly be keen to get rid of the infamous article 58(2)(b), which will hang like the proverbial sword of Damocles over the heads of future prime ministers. Both would be keen to restore the judiciary and the media to their respective pre-November 3 states, not necessarily on a matter of principle but because both are politicians; and failure to do so would not be impolitic, given the current mood of the people. Both would like to ensure the restoration of balance of powers between the pillars of the state, to the exclusion of the presidency and, with a democratic COAS in General Ashfaq Kayani, they are likely to be able to do so, without interference.While the Swat situation will be resolved militarily, the insurgency in our border belt needs defter handling. It is unlikely that the next political dispensation will be able to do so and, therefore, I apprehend that we are unlikely to see a radical change in policy. Consequently, domestic violence is likely to be prolonged along with the insecurity resulting from it; to the detriment of economic growth.It is also within the realm of possibility that if senior members of the judiciary, ousted under Musharraf’s PCO, are restored and someone files a reference against Musharraf’s self-confessed violation of the constitution on November 3, we might witness some real accountability.It often seems that Pakistan has spent its sixty years moving from one crossroads to the next, without charting a clearly defined course for its future. We are at such a crossroads once again and the next few years are not likely to give us a defined direction, unless better sense prevails in the US and its ‘War on Terror’ programme. However, we are likely to continue to witness interesting times.* The author is a retired brigadier. He is also former vice president and founder of the Islamabad Policy Research Institute (IPRI)