On April 13, the United States (US) dropped a bomb called Massive Ordnance Air Blast (MOAB), nicknamed ‘Mother of all Bombs’, in the Afghan province of Nangarhar. The bomb weighing 11-tonnes is said to be the largest and most lethal non-nuclear weapon in the US arsenal. The intended target was the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) stronghold in Achin area. Official sources have put the number of casualties at 96 dead, all of them stated to be affiliated with the ISIS including some members of the Tehreek-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP). But these figures must be taken with a pinch of salt. We will have to wait to find out if there were any civilian casualties in the blast. Reportedly, Russia has a far more lethal non-nuclear weapon in its military stockpile nicknamed ‘Father of all Bombs’ (FOAB). Russian military officials claim that it is four times as lethal as the MOAB. However, the US continues to be the only country that has used its most lethal weapons on live targets. In 1945, the US had dropped nuclear weapons on Japan. We now know a high-powered Japanese delegation was present in Washington DC for negotiations when the bomb was dropped. The US military has steadily deteriorated in terms of its regard for human rights and dignity, and respect for internationally-accepted rules governing warfare. Whether this is a consequence of or cause for the almost simultaneous deterioration in the US’ conduct in wars is for American analysts to determine. I suggest Vietnam War had a major role in pushing the US military towards this trajectory. In Vietnam, the US military resorted to the use of Daisy Cutter and napalm bombs, exterminating all kinds of life present in the area. Since then, US military’s indifference to civilian casualties, or collateral damage, has increased exponentially. A few days after the MOAB attack on ISIS targets, Indian media carried reports that those killed by the MOAB included 13 Indian citizens who had joined the militant group. Indian intelligence officials were the source of these reports. The only direct land-based route for anyone from the Indian territory wanting to join ISIS militants in Nangarhar province of Afghanistan is through Pakistan. And this is not an easy journey. The sea-cum-land based journey via Iran is also difficult. However, this trip from India into Afghanistan can get quite easy if one is flown in under diplomatic cover. It is far more likely that the Indian citizens killed in the blast were trainers and handlers of the ISIS, rather than mere members. Why else would the Indian intelligence know about the casualties and how did they discover their identities, presuming the blast wouldn’t have left behind many easily identifiable bodies? Most modern military theorists are of the view that existing concepts related to warfare would not be relevant to future wars. These wars will last longer and will be decided based on numerous tactical victories — instead of current wars’ emphasis on sweeping strategic victories won through combinations of manoeuvre and firepower. This 4th/5th generation warfare (a new term for guerrilla war that is now increasingly employed for anti-terrorism operations) will feature non-state actors engaging state armies. The criteria for victory in such wars will also need to be redefined. Victory will increasingly involve a conquest of hearts and minds. And the US’ recourse to massive and indiscriminate use of firepower will be least suited to achieve victory in such a situation. Before I conclude, let me briefly review Afghanistan’s security situation over the last 16 years. When the US had invaded the country in 2001, Al-Qaeda was stated to be the major ‘problem’ there. The Taliban government became a part of the problem for providing succour to Al-Qaeda. Since our bellicose dictator, General Musharraf, capitulated to the US demands, Pakistan became an ally. Though few dared say so publicly but discerning analysts could tell that the US had started becoming a part of the problem in Afghanistan by 2006. On the contrary, by then many were publicly questioning Pakistan’s role, some even referring to it as a part of the problem. But Pakistan’s status as an ally got reaffirmed by 2009 after General Kiyani took over as the Army Chief and oversaw a swift success against militancy in Swat, not to mention his efforts in South Waziristan Agency (SWA). The success in SWA could have been far greater if the US had played the role expected of it. However, for many Pakistan once again became a part of the problem on the discovery of Osama bin Laden’s hideout in Abbottabad in 2011. The charge was far less justified in 2011, compared to the pre-Kiyani days. By 2011, Al-Qaeda had virtually disappeared from Afghanistan but the US had become a major part of the Afghan problem. Today, Pakistan is clearly not a part of the Afghan problem. Afghan Taliban has split up and is, therefore, a much weaker force. IS presence is increasing in Afghanistan but only because it is perceived as an effective opposition to the US. The US is the real problem in Afghanistan today. It is time for it to leave the country — the sooner, the better. The writer is a retired soldier with pretensions of being able to think